

# THE PHILIPPINES: THE WAR & THE PEOPLE

ALBERT G. ROBINSON

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
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THE PHILIPPINES:  
THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE





# THE PHILIPPINES: THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE

A RECORD OF PERSONAL  
OBSERVATIONS AND  
EXPERIENCES

BY  
ALBERT G. ROBINSON

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## AUTHOR'S NOTE

THE major portion of this volume consists of letters which were sent to the New York "Evening Post" in my capacity as staff correspondent for that paper. The period covered by the letters was that from July, 1899, to February, 1900. An entire rewriting, which would have taken time not at my immediate disposal, might have resulted in a more coherent and better literary form for the book. I had no choice in the matter, and perhaps an advantage lies in the presentation of the letters in so nearly their original form, as they thus offer the impressions of the time and place from an immediate viewpoint.

My trip to the islands was made for the purpose of obtaining the fullest possible information upon the general subject. In obtaining that information I have been hampered by no prejudices, influenced by no partisan politics. I have sought only that which was fair and honest and right. Some will accept the views and opinions here presented; some will doubtless refuse them. They are at least honest and, I believe, also just and charitable. I was under no instruc-

tions from the home office, save the brief injunction to tell the truth as I saw it. That I endeavored to do, seeking no favor and fearing no rebuke.

My sources of information were many and various. Friends and acquaintances in army life and in civil life, Filipinos, Americans and aliens, have all been channels through which information has been obtained. My conclusions have not been hastily formed. They are, in large measure, a consensus of the statements of the many whom I have met, rather than a purely individual opinion. That the book is, in its general tenor, a pro-Filipino argument, I freely admit. If I have erred in anything, my error lies in an overestimate of the vitality of fundamental issues for which the Filipinos have fought again and again during their history.

In their present stage, American affairs in the Philippines are, to large extent, a matter of argument. That which is here stated I believe to be true. The events of coming days will establish the correctness or determine the error of the conclusions and opinions. The future alone can measure the extent and the seriousness of America's problem in the far East.

ALBERT GARDNER ROBINSON.

**THE PHILIPPINES:**  
**THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE**



## I

### *PHILIPPINE HISTORY IN BRIEF*

An unregarded region—America's awakened interest—Magellan—The islands discovered—The islands named—Expedition under Legaspi—Spain's permanent establishment—Chinese invasion—Native rebellions and foreign invasions—England's conquest—Native revolt—The real germs of the present war.

SO little have the American people known or cared about the Philippine Islands until within the last few months, that so comprehensive a work as Larned's "Topical History," issued within the last five years, fails even to mention them. Early in May, 1898, American attention was very sharply called to the fact that the islands had a place in the world. Although at times overshadowed by important interests elsewhere, it may be said that no other topic has held so firm and so continuous an interest for the American mind as have these islands, during all the world disturbances since the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.

The fighting around Santiago, the expedition to Porto Rico, the general occupation of Cuba,



the annexation of Hawaii, the war in South Africa, the famine in India, the war in China, the gold discoveries at Cape Nome—these and all the thousands of lesser incidents have, for a longer or shorter time, played their parts in the competition for supremacy in American interest. Great men have died and rulers have been assassinated. War-clouds have gathered and dispersed. Science has made new discoveries and mechanical skill has enriched the world of civilization. All these matters have held their place in the public thought for their little day, but for thirty months there have been few American journals or magazines whose every issue has not held some more or less ample news, comment or criticism regarding the Philippine Islands and the relations of the American people toward them.

Behind the two and a half years of history which America has made in the islands there stand the three and a half centuries of history made by Spain, China, Holland, Portugal, Japan, England, and the powers and people of their island neighbors—a period of no little activity, with a development upward. Great nations have fought for possession of the islands. Rebellion has followed rebellion in efforts to expel the ruler whose reign was regarded as unjust, oppressive and tyrannical. It is no part of the purpose of this book to enter into the detail of that history. A brief résumé, however, may be of service and interest.

In March, 1521, Ferdinand Magellan, having passed through the strait which has since borne the name Magellan in his honor, entered the group of islands now known as the Philippines. Sailing through the strait of Surigao, he effected a landing near the mouth of the Butuan River, on the north coast of Mindanao, and took possession of the district in the name of Charles I, King of Spain.

The expedition crossed to the island of Cebu, where it became embroiled in an affair with the natives. It seems fairly established that Magellan was killed in a skirmish on the small island of Magtan. Soon after his death, the expedition sailed away to the westward and reached Spain in the month of September, 1522. Two or three minor expeditions were essayed within the following years, but they were of no special importance or result, save that an expedition which sailed from Mexico in 1543 gave the islands their present title in honor of Philip, Prince of Asturias, the son of Charles, and afterward King of Spain under the title of Philip II.

On November 21, 1564, the Basque navigator, Miguel Lopez de Legaspi, sailed from the port of Navidad, on the Mexican coast, en route for the Philippines. He followed the track of his predecessors, via the Ladrones, and reached the middle group of the archipelago, that division which we now know as the Visayans. This expedition was the first to establish a permanent

occupation of the islands. The dates of Legaspi's expedition appear to be confused and unreliable, but it is fairly established that the first occupation of the island of Luzon occurred in the middle of the year 1570. On June 24, 1571, a city government was definitely established at Manila, at the mouth of the Pasig River, which drains the lake known as Laguna de Bay.

In November, 1574, the island of Luzon was invaded by the Chinese under Li Ma Hong. In a series of land and naval engagements, lasting for several months, the Chinese were defeated. A portion of the dispersed Chinese army escaped to the mountains of the interior and ethnologists assert the existence of manifest traces of Chinese blood among some of the hill tribes of to-day.

The two hundred years which followed the Spanish establishment in the islands were a time of frequent strife with the island people, and of successful resistance to foreign invasion. Dutch, Portuguese and Japanese all essayed either conquest or rival occupation by repeated attempts. Spain maintained her position until 1762. On September 22 of that year a British squadron entered Manila Bay and demanded the surrender of the city. A bombardment followed the refusal of the demand. British troops were landed, under command of Brigadier-General Draper. After two weeks of fighting, the terms of capitulation submitted by Archbishop

Rojo, acting as governor in the absence of a governor-general, were approved and England's flag flew over the walls of Manila, as it did over the fortifications of Havana in the same year. The terms of the Peace of Paris, under date of February 10, 1763, reached Manila on August 27. Yet fighting continued for more than six months after the receipt of the Paris determination, and hostilities and minor troubles continued until the final evacuation by the British in the spring of 1764.

Spain's sovereignty in the islands remained practically undisturbed by foreign powers from this time until Admiral Dewey made his May-day call upon them in the early morning of that eventful May 1, 1898. The intervening years were by no means a time of peace. Rebellion followed rebellion; uprising followed uprising. Spanish government in the islands, dominated as it unquestionably was by corrupt, grasping and licentious monastic orders, aroused the continuous resentment of the island people. Revolts and conspiracies, great and small, occurred at comparatively close intervals. Yet Senator Hoar's statement that "the people of the Philippine Islands have never submitted themselves willingly to Spain" needs some qualification. Their protest was not so much against the government of Spain as against the dominant influence of the obnoxious friars in the processes of that government. Even in their latest rebel-

lion, that of 1896, the cry of the Filipino soldiery was, "Viva España! Abajo los frailes!" ("Live Spain! Down with the friars!")

Spain encountered many difficulties in the establishment of her foothold at the beginning. That, once established, involved the necessity of fighting for its maintenance. The first of the more notable revolutions was that of the year 1622, under the leadership of the redoubtable Dagóhoy, who maintained the independence of the island of Bohol for thirty-five years. A three years' revolt started up in eastern Mindanao in 1629. In 1649 a large portion of the Visayan district was in armed opposition to the Spanish authority. Extensive disturbances occurred in northern and central Luzon in 1660. These and many of those which followed, down to the very latest, were purely local. Within the present century the notable uprisings have been those of 1823, in Luzon; of 1827, in Cebu; of 1844, in Negros; in Cavite province, in 1872; and the general revolution of 1896.

The uprising in Cavite province, in 1872, is of special importance, inasmuch as there is no doubt that it was the progenitor of the present strife. The revolution of 1896 may be called the father, in point of pedigree, of the present trouble, and that of 1872 may be called the grandfather. The same blood and very much the same motive may be said to run through them all. Not a few students and observers fail



to see the connection. It is, perhaps, only visible to those who, laying aside all personal and even national predilection, will investigate and analyze, broadly and charitably, the character and motives of the Filipino people, and the almost unbroken chain of events whose latest link is the present American-Filipino War.

## II

### *THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1872 AND 1896*<sup>1</sup>

A distinction between causes—The present war an outcome of former movements—Unique position of the monastic orders in the Philippines—The Cavite insurrection—Joseph Burgos—Secret societies—The Katipunan—José Rizal—Punishment and its results—Development of aspiration for independence—Rise of Emilio Aguinaldo—Growth of the insurrection—Demands made of the Filipinos by Spanish governors-general—Treaty of Biak-na-bató—Smouldering fires of insurrection.

IN any consideration of the conditions which have resulted in the present war in the Philippine Islands, it is necessary to make some distinction between immediate causes and root causes. The war was not a sudden and spontaneous outbreak resultant upon a given incident. Whether or not it was avoidable may be and is open to question. But it is not to be denied that war followed partly as a result of preëxisting conditions. The root cause, I believe, will be found in the Filipino uprisings of 1872 and

<sup>1</sup> In the making of this chapter, I have drawn to some extent upon Mr. John Foreman's book, "The Philippine Islands," now the standard work upon the subject. For that which I have taken, I beg Mr. Foreman's pardon, and thank him.—A.G.R.

1896. I believe also that these two are connected by a definite chain of events, the latter being but a revival, on larger scale, of its predecessor.

In 1872 there occurred what is known as the Cavite insurrection. Through all the term of Spanish occupation in the Philippine Islands, there have been heard the mutterings and there have arisen the storms of discontent among the people. The year 1872 marked the gathering of one of these storms. There was a focusing of that issue which is to-day the most important factor in the strife. In other chapters I shall review more fully the question of the place and influence of the monastic orders in the political life of the Philippine Islands. Here I shall only assert that the question of those orders lies at the bottom of the uprisings of 1872 and 1896 directly, and that, indirectly, it lies also at the bottom of the present trouble.

The monastic orders in the Roman Catholic Church have been defined as being "like corporations in a civil government, having special exemptions and privileges." With the exceptions of the Mohammedans of the southern Philippine Islands and the comparatively limited number of semi-savages of the interior, the religion of the islanders is that of the Roman Catholic Church. The Philippine Islands stand almost, if not quite, unique, in that the administration of the church, its preaching and its work, is wholly in the hands of monastic orders—the

Dominican, the Franciscan, the Austin, and the Recoletos. Secular priesthood, save in minor and subordinate posts, is virtually unknown. The ranks of these orders are filled from Spain. Protests against the abuses of the friars have again and again been followed by revolt. In many instances an outraged people, individually or collectively, have taken the law into their own hands, because the laws of the land gave them no protection against the friars, and have killed the incumbent of their district for his crimes.

The ground of the Cavite insurrection was the local opposition to the friars of the district. The outbreak failed through a mistaken signal, but it could hardly have succeeded in any case. Its leader, a Filipino, one Joseph Burgos, together with three other native priests, was executed upon the Luneta in Manila by the Spanish military authorities at the instigation of the friars. A number of others, native clergy and private citizens, were deported and their property confiscated. To-day the name of Joseph Burgos is one of reverence among the Filipino people as that of a martyr. Some of those who were expelled the country are still living. The memory of the event remains, a bitter and never-to-be-forgotten story, in the minds of thousands. There, in reality, was the seed sown which developed in dim light and in darkness until it sprang into larger life in the revolt of 1896.

Of this time John Foreman says: "No native,

at that period, dreamed of absolute independence." The sole object of the uprising of 1872 was the expulsion of the friars. At about the same time the constitutional government in Spain, which followed the deposition of Queen Isabella II, promised various reforms in the Philippine Islands. The reforms were never carried out, but the germ of a new idea, dimly seen and but partly realized, was implanted in Filipino minds.

Secret societies were organized. Among these were La Liga Filipina and the mysterious Katipunan with its "blood compact." The aims and objects of these societies were not identical and not all of them were directed toward either ecclesiastical or political reform. One, at least, looked to the establishment of a trade combination in the various departments of the leading agricultural interests, for protection and defense against the avarice of foreign commission merchants who fixed the prices and terms of payment for the commodities.

Preëminent among the men of this period stands José Rizal y Mercado, author, physician and martyred patriot, whose tragic ending is one of the dark stains upon the pages of ecclesiastical history in the Philippines. He was a man of high culture and wide attainments. He was a graduate of the University of Madrid and qualified himself for the medical profession by continuing his studies in the schools of Paris and

of Germany. During his stay in Europe he produced his now well-known story of Filipino life under the title of "*Noli me Tangere*,"<sup>1</sup> and one of lesser fame, "*El Filibusterismo*." The former especially found a wide circulation among the Filipino people. Though nominally a novel, it was really an exposé of the many offenses of the friars against the Filipino people. Chiefly because of these books their author incurred the bitter hatred of those friars against whom they were directed. The church forbade the reading of them, and it is asserted that even the ownership of them involved the risk of life. Rizal returned to Manila in 1893. He was at once arrested, at the instigation of the friars, upon a charge of sedition. Against the combination of church and state he was powerless. He was banished to one of the small coast villages of the island of Mindanao, where he remained until July, 1896. He was then, at his own request, granted permission to go to Cuba for enlistment as a surgeon in the Spanish army. He sailed for Spain early in the month of September, bearing letters of recommendation from General Blanco to Spanish cabinet officials. Arriving in Spain, he was arrested, in response to cablegrams from Manila, and returned to the Philippines as a state prisoner. Rizal's stay in Manila, prior to his departure for Spain, was

<sup>1</sup> An adaptation of it has been published in America, by Messrs. McClure, Phillips & Co., under the title of "*An Eagle Flight*."

coincident with the outbreak of 1896. Although there was no evidence that he was in any way connected with the plots of that time, and in spite of the fact that he had been a Spanish prisoner in Mindanao during the three preceding years, he was charged with complicity in the affair, tried, condemned as guilty and shot as a traitor. The closing years of his young life were a martyrdom. His death was a tragedy.

Against the secret societies, and particularly against the mysterious Katipunan, the friars directed all their energies. Unable to fathom them, they denounced them as "masonic," and consequently anti-Christian, prohibited by the church and by special papal bulls. Members and suspects were denounced by the hundred, and, at the instigation and through the influence of the friars, hundreds of people, whose only offense was that they were offensive to the friars, were banished from their homes, some to other lands, and some to the smaller and unpeopled islands of the archipelago. Their personal property was confiscated, their real estate was condemned and sold. Some of their holdings unquestionably fell into the hands of the various orders and now constitute a part of that immense possession of the friars, the title to which will yet furnish a great deal of complicated work for the law-courts. It is even asserted by some that the Cavite uprising was instigated and fomented by emissaries of the friars for the ex-

press purpose of implicating certain individuals who made themselves offensive to the church dignitaries. Be that as it may, the uprising came and was quelled with a strong and cruel hand, but the idea which lay behind it took new life. That which the friars hoped would prove a deadly poison proved to be a tonic, a stimulant. It roused the Filipinos to a closer union, a firmer purpose. The societies which were formed anew taught the Filipinos the value of organization and served as a nucleus for the insurrection of 1896.

The heart of this insurrection appears to have been the Katipunan. The word has no other meaning than "the league." The movement failed in its first stroke. It is asserted that its plans were revealed by a woman in the confessional and were carried to the archbishop, the present incumbent, Nozaleda, whom Foreman styles "the Bloodthirsty."

The usual coöperation between the church and the military authorities led to the prompt arrest and imprisonment of hundreds of the native people, among them many of the best and wealthiest families. The banishment of the strongest supporters and wisest leaders, those who could and would give of their time, their money and their strength to the cause, only served to embitter the masses and to stimulate them to more active and determined revolt. It was evident that the motive was ecclesiastical



rather than political reform. It has been alleged by some that even then there was no idea of a blow for independence. Much that I heard while in the islands leads me to a conviction that the idea of independence, though not yet an appreciable force among the masses, was even then a purpose of the leaders. But, even to them, independence as a nation was less an end than a means to an end—the expulsion of the friars. Their idea of independence was crude and almost chaotic. They understood little of its meaning, less of its responsibilities. How should they know anything of it? Where in their past experience had there been that which would teach it them?

As Santiago province has been the hotbed of Cuban revolutions in the past, so has Cavite province, just southward of Manila, been the focal point of Filipino insurrection. In this movement of 1896 Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy first came into political and military prominence. He was then a young man of twenty-seven years of age, but little known outside his own province,—that of Cavite,—and far from specially notable there. He was a man of fair and respectable, though not prominent, social connection. He was well, but not unusually well, educated. By just what steps he attained leadership I do not know. It is a safe assumption that he rose as he did mainly through the operation of those little understood laws which, in time of stress

and crisis, so often bring fitting men to the front. It is useless to sneer at him, to vilify him as a schemer and a trickster. For four years he has been the leader and the idol of his people. Schemers and tricksters may attain that height; none but strong and forceful men can hold it through four years of national struggle. He has been lauded as a Washington and condemned as a knave. He probably is not the former, but he certainly is not the latter.

In spite of the revelation of its plans and the rigid punishment of many who were supposed to be connected with it, the insurrection grew in strength and in extent. Spain increased her army and her navy in the Philippines. Governor-General Ramon Blanco, the same man who succeeded Weyler in Cuba, was not disposed to follow the brutal measures urged by Archbishop Nozaleda and some of the leading Spanish citizens. Probably at the instance of this group, Blanco was recalled, and Polavieja, a ready tool for the hands of the friars, was sent to succeed him. More reinforcements were sent out from Spain.

The first encounter between the Spaniards and the insurgents worthy to be called a battle occurred on Sunday, August 30, 1896, at the village of San Juan del Monte, some three or four miles outside the city of Manila. On that day martial law was proclaimed in Manila and throughout a considerable area of the surrounding country.

The story of the ensuing months is too long for a place in this volume. Numerically the insurgents were in overwhelming force, but they lacked arms and ammunition, training and discipline. Their forces were little, if anything, better than a mob. At the time of their greatest strength the Spaniards numbered about twenty-seven thousand soldiers. Battles were fought with varying success and with severe losses upon both sides.

Few wars of civilized or semi-civilized peoples have been carried on with so much of utter brutality as that waged by Polavieja against the Filipinos. If, in our own struggle with them, there have been occasional instances of a savage inhumanity manifested by Filipinos, it is more than probable that they learned their lesson from Spanish butchers under the command of this chief butcher. In the spring of 1897 Polavieja asked to be recalled on the ground of broken health. He was succeeded by General Primo de Rivera.

The new governor-general inaugurated his rule by a proclamation of amnesty to all insurgents who would lay down their arms. It was a politic move. The war was virtually a deadlock. Neither side was strong enough to win within a calculable period. The Filipinos held much of the country and could not be defeated or suppressed by any force which the Spaniards could send against them. The Span-

iards held Manila and some of the larger cities. Their dislodgment was beyond the powers of the Filipinos because of the native lack of suitable ordnance and small arms. A portion of the Filipino army adopted guerrilla methods and minor engagements were of more or less frequent occurrence.

A second edict issued by Primo de Rivera was followed by one issued from the Filipino side which bore no date and, unfortunately, no official signature. But it appears to have expressed in formal terms the demands of some portion of the Filipino people. A preamble is followed by the ensuing demands:

1. Expulsion of the friars, and restitution to the townships of the lands which the friars have appropriated, dividing the incumbencies held by them, as well as the episcopal sees, equally between Peninsular [Spanish] and Insular [Filipino] secular priests.

2. Spain must concede to us, as she has to Cuba, parliamentary representation, freedom of the press, toleration of all religious sects, laws common with hers, and administrative and economic autonomy.

3. Equality in treatment and pay between Peninsular and Insular civil servants.

4. Restitution of all lands appropriated by the friars to the townships, or to the original owners, or, in default of finding such owners, the state to put them up at public auction in small lots of a value within the reach of all, payment to be made within four years, as in the case of the present state lands.

5. Abolition of the government's authority to banish citizens, as well as of all unjust measures against Filipinos; legal equality for all persons, whether Peninsular or Insular, under the civil as well as the penal code.

This was widely circulated during the month of July, 1897. Shortly afterward there appeared a *manifesto*, signed by Emilio Aguinaldo. A portion of it reads as follows:

We aspire to the glory of obtaining the liberty, independence and honor of the country. . . . We aspire to a government representing all the live forces of the country, in which the most able, the most worthy in virtue and talent, may take part, without distinction of birth, fortune or race. We desire that no monk nor friar shall sully the soil of any part of the archipelago, nor that there shall exist any convent, etc.

In view of certain allegations that it was only after the return of Aguinaldo to Manila in May, 1898, that any idea of a national independence was ever entertained, or even formed, the foregoing is not without interest. It was issued in the summer of 1897, and it will be noted that it contains a specific statement of Filipino aspiration for *independence* and a representative government.

During the month of August, 1897, steps were taken toward effecting a settlement of the difficulties between the islanders and the home government. A series of conferences resulted in a treaty, known as the Treaty of Biak-na-bató, on December 14, 1897.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is the treaty according to Aguinaldo (from his "True Version of the Philippine Revolution," published in *Tarlak*, September 23, 1899):

"Don Pedro Alejandro Pa-

terno (who was appointed by the Spanish governor-general sole mediator in the discussion of the terms of peace) visited Biak-na-bató several times to negotiate terms of the treaty,

The major portion of the terms of this treaty were virtually nullified by subsequent events and proceedings. A special interest centers around the clause which relates to the money payment to be made by Spain to the participants in the insurrection. This has been made the basis of many representations, or misrepresentations, reflecting upon the honor and the sincerity of Señor Aguinaldo. He has been charged with seeking only his own ends and with playing a

which, after negotiations extending over five months, and careful consideration had been given to each clause, was finally completed and signed on December 14, 1897, the following being the principal conditions:

"1. That I would, and any of my associates who desired to go with me, be free to live in any foreign country. Having fixed upon Hongkong as my place of residence, it was agreed that payment of the indemnity of \$800,000 (Mexican) should be made in three instalments; namely, \$400,000 when all the arms in Biak-na-bató were delivered to the Spanish authorities; \$200,000 when the arms surrendered amounted to eight hundred stands; the final payment to be made when one thousand stands of arms shall have been handed over to the authorities and the *Te Deum* sung in the Cathedral in Manila as thanksgiving for the restoration of peace. The latter part of February was fixed as the limit of time wherein the surrender of arms should be completed.

"2. The whole of the money

was to be paid to me personally, leaving the disposal of the money to my discretion and knowledge of the understanding with my associates and other insurgents.

"3. Prior to the remainder of the insurgent forces evacuating Biak-na-bató Captain-General Primo de Rivera should send to Biak-na-bató two generals of the Spanish army to be held as hostages by my associates who remained there until I and a few of my compatriots arrived in Hongkong and the first instalment of the money payment (namely, \$400,000) was paid to me.

"4. It was also agreed that the religious corporations in the Philippines be expelled and an autonomous system of government, political and administrative, be established, though by special request of General Primo de Rivera these conditions were not insisted on in the drawing up of the treaty, the general contending that such concessions would subject the Spanish government to severe criticism and even ridicule."

shrewd game for the lining of his own pockets. He has been charged with "selling his country for Spanish gold." The total amount payable was seventeen hundred thousand dollars, Mexican silver (equivalent practically to one half that sum in gold). But only four hundred thousand dollars (Mexican) of this was ever paid; and it is upon the receipt and alleged disposition of this amount that there rest the charges of greed and dishonesty on the part of Emilio Aguinaldo. The evidence in the case tends to show that Aguinaldo's conduct was wholly honorable and conscientious.

Under the terms of this Treaty, Aguinaldo and his associates left for Hongkong on December 27, 1897. It was mutually hoped that the trouble was ended. But the friars could neither forget nor forgive. Former experiences were repeated. Persecution and execution followed, again creating unrest. In its issue of March 17, 1898, the "*Diario de Manila*" published an article demanding autonomy and the carrying out of the reforms provided for by the Treaty of Biak-na-bató. Governor-General Rivera ordered the suspension of the paper. Recognizing more and more clearly that they had been tricked, the deported Filipino leaders established a more effective organization of La Junta Patriótica (the Patriotic Council) in Hongkong. This organization has continued up to the present time, working



persistently in the interests of the Filipino people.

Yet the Spanish authorities appear to have regarded the troubles as over. Some of the Spanish troops were returned to the Peninsula. Primo de Rivera was recalled and General Basilio Augusti was appointed to the governorship. On April 3 a wide-spread uprising occurred in Cebu. The rebellion revived actively in the northern provinces. The smouldering fires of protest sprang into new and stronger flame. This was the situation when Admiral Dewey sailed into Manila Bay.



### III

#### *ROOT CAUSES OF THE WAR*

The Junta Patriótica—Continuance of insurrection—Aguinaldo's return and leadership—America's first touch in the Philippines—The Singapore meeting—Aguinaldo sent to Manila—Proclamation by the Junta—Renewal of war in Luzon under General Aguinaldo—Declaration of Filipino desire for independence—American encouragement of the idea—The Filipino-American military alliance.

**I**T has been asserted that the revolution of 1896 was wholly suppressed, that it had terminated in the dispersion of the Filipino forces and the expatriation of the leaders. This assertion is not supported by the facts in the case. The Treaty of Biak-na-bató was effected on December 14, 1897, and Aguinaldo and his companions were sent to Hongkong in accordance with its terms. Whether or no the Filipinos lived strictly up to their part of the compact is perhaps a question, but there seems little doubt that Spain was unduly dilatory in fulfilling her part.

The expatriated leaders, convinced that they had been duped in this matter as they had on

similar occasions in earlier days, organized in Hongkong and prepared, through the Junta Patriótica, for a resumption of the struggle. They were in active communication with their followers on the islands and to some extent directed movements there. That active military operations against the Spaniards had been resumed and were in process at the time of Admiral Dewey's arrival at Manila is amply evidenced by the reports of the United States consul at Manila, Mr. Oscar F. Williams. During the month of February, 1898, Mr. Williams wrote to the department at Washington as follows:

Peace was proclaimed and, since my coming, festivities therefor were held; but there is no peace, and has been none for about two years. Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law. The crown forces have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within ten miles of Manila and last Saturday, February 19, a battle was there fought and five dead left on the field.

During the month of March he again wrote:

Insurrection is rampant; many killed, wounded and made prisoners on both sides. A battle-ship, the *Don Juan de Austria*, sent this week to the northern part of Luzon to coöperate with a land force of two thousand despatched to succor local forces, overwhelmed by rebels. Last night special squad of mounted police were scattered at danger-points to save Manila. . . . Rebellion never more threatening to Spain.

Around Manila, in northern Luzon and in some of the southern islands, the insurrection was still alive and active and fighting was still going on. Upon Aguinaldo's arrival, on May 19, he reassumed the command of the insurgent forces. He resumed that place in their political life which he had held from the beginning of the outbreak, and which he holds to-day—that of acknowledged leader, guide and commander. It was no unwilling tribute and service which they rendered. He took his place by no act of a tyrannical usurper, but by the consent and with the support of his people, heartily accorded. Despite assertions to the contrary, the insurrection of 1896, though interrupted and declared by Spain to be at an end, was still in progress at the time of Dewey's arrival.

I have no purpose to discuss here whether or not the Filipinos were or are capable of self-government; whether a government of their own or a government by the United States would be the better for them and for the world at large. That is another and a different matter. The purpose of this chapter is the indication of some of the root causes of the war which followed between the Filipinos and the United States.

America's first touch upon the Philippines appears on February 25, 1898, ten days after the destruction of the *Maine* in Havana harbor and one month before the declaration of war with Spain. On that date, Mr. Roosevelt, As-

sistant Secretary of the Navy, then acting as Secretary, sent the following despatch to Commodore Dewey, commanding the Asiatic squadron of the United States navy:

Order the squadron, except *Monocacy*, to Hongkong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep *Olympia* until further orders.

On April 23 war was declared between Spain and the United States. Hongkong being a neutral port, the American squadron was obliged to withdraw from its harbor under the established international law covering such situations. It sailed to Mirs Bay, a few miles to the northward, in Chinese waters, China not being included in the international agreement. In the meantime Aguinaldo had gone to Singapore. It is at this point, practically, April 24, that there begins the much-disputed question of the encouragement given to Aguinaldo, by officials of the United States, concerning the future independence of the Philippine Islands. Charges and denials, allegations and contradictions, have followed and the matter is still in dispute. There would seem to be no question that a midnight meeting occurred, on the night of April 24, in Singapore, at the instance of Mr. Spencer Pratt, the American consul-general at that port. Seven people are said to have been present—Emilio Aguinaldo,

Mr. Howard W. Bray, an Englishman long resident in the far East and closely affiliated with the Filipino Junta in Hongkong, American Consul Spencer Pratt, the editor of the Singapore "Free Press" and three of Aguinaldo's associates. As to the tenor and the results of this meeting, Mr. Pratt denies the statements made by the other parties. They assert the drawing up of a provisional agreement, of which the following were the terms :

1. Philippine independence to be proclaimed.
2. A federal republic to be established by vote of the rebels ; pending the taking of this vote, Aguinaldo to appoint the members of that government.
3. The federal republic to recognize a temporary intervention of American and European administrative commissions to be appointed by Commodore Dewey.
4. The American protectorate to be recognized on the same terms as those fixed for Cuba.

This was followed by ten other and general clauses, and a fifteenth clause provided that the agreement was subject to ratification (by telegraph) by Commodore Dewey and President McKinley.

Consul Pratt denies this agreement, and the others have produced no incontrovertible proof that it ever existed. The Junta in Hongkong assured me in emphatic terms that it was a fact. It appears to remain largely a question of personal veracity and I make no effort to determine which side has the rights of the matter. That pleasant relations existed at the time between

Messrs. Pratt and Aguinaldo, that Mr. Pratt's sympathies were with the insurgents, and that he eagerly sought to make use of Aguinaldo as an ally of the United States, is clearly evidenced by Mr. Pratt's telegram of April 28, four days subsequent to the meeting. This is reported in Senate Document No. 62, in the following form <sup>1</sup>:

CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
SINGAPORE, April 28, 1898.

On the evening of Saturday, the 23d instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here, incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philippine insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. Howard W. Bray, an English gentleman of high standing, who, after fifteen years' residence as a merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish misrule to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom I had previously obtained much valuable information for Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc., at different points in the islands.

Being aware of the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the 24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present the general's trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as interpreter. . . . I telegraphed the commodore the same day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:

"Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong. Arrange with commodore for general coöperation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph. PRATT."

<sup>1</sup> Senate Document No. 62, Part I, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session, Despatch No. 212.

The commodore's reply reading thus :

"Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible. DEWEY."

I received it late that night, and at once communicated it to General Aguinaldo, whom, with his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British steamer *Malacca*, which left here on Tuesday, the 26th.

E. SPENCER PRATT,  
*U. S. Consul-General at Singapore.*

Aguinaldo returned to Hongkong, but did not arrive until after Dewey had sailed for Manila. Instructions had been left and arrangements made with Consul Rounsevelle Wildman of Hongkong for his early transportation to Manila.

Whatever may be the real truth about the conference at Singapore between Mr. Spencer Pratt and Emilio Aguinaldo, it is hardly open to doubt that Aguinaldo received a certain impression from the conversation. The Singapore "Free Press," the editor of which was present at the conference on the night of April 24, 1898, published a report of the meeting at the time of its occurrence, and Mr. Howard Bray, who was also present, asserts that Aguinaldo "had, in view of what took place in Singapore and the telegrams received from Commodore Dewey [then in Hongkong], full justification for believing that the United States would raise no objection to the complete autonomy of the Philippines, and would, after the Spaniards were expelled from



the islands, establish a protectorate over the whole group." I quote Mr. Bray's own words.

A few days prior to the sailing of the American squadron, the following proclamation was sent by the Junta Patriotica in Hongkong to representative Filipino insurgents in Manila:

COMPATRIOTS: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach, and in a way the most free and independent nation could hardly wish for.

The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune to extend their protecting mantle to our beloved country, now that they have been obliged to sever relations with Spain, owing to the tyranny this nation is exercising in Cuba, causing enormous injury to the Americans, who have such large commercial and other interests there.

At the present moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for the Philippines.

We, your brothers, are very much afraid that you may be induced to fire on the Americans. No, brothers; never make this mistake. Rather blow your own brains out than fire a shot or treat as enemies those who are your liberators.

Your natural enemies, your executioners, the authors of your misery and unhappiness, are the Spaniards who govern you. Against these you must raise your weapons and odium; understand well—against the Spaniards, and never against the Americans.

Take no notice of the decree of the governor-general calling you to arms, although it may cost you your lives. Rather die than be ungrateful to our American liberators.

The governor-general calls you to arms. What for? To defend your Spanish tyrants? To defend those that have despised you and even in public speeches



asked for your extermination—those that have treated you little better than savages? No! No! A thousand times, no!

Give a glance at history, and you will see that all Spain's wars in Oceanica have sacrificed Philippine blood. We have been put to fight in Cochin-China to assist the French in an affair that in no way concerned the Philippines. We were compelled to spill our blood by Simon de Anda against the English, who in any case would have made better rulers than the Spaniards. Every year our children are taken away to be sacrificed in Mindanao and Sulu, on the pretense of making us believe these people are our enemies, when in reality they are our brothers—like us, fighting for their independence.

After having sacrificed our blood against the English, against the Annamites, against the people of Mindanao, etc., what recompense or thanks have we received from the Spanish government? Obscurity, poverty, the butchery of those dear to us. Enough, brothers, of this Spanish tutelage!

Take note. The Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reinforcements coming from Spain; therefore we insurgents must attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufficient arms, because the Americans have arms and will find means to assist us.

There, where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers.

Our unworthy names are as nothing, but one and all of us invoke the name of the greatest patriot our country has seen, in the sure and certain hope that his spirit will be with us in these moments and guide us to victory—our immortal José Rizal.

That the United States authorities in Washington discredited, in the terms of the following despatch, any definite arrangement or understanding which Mr. Pratt might have made or did make with Aguinaldo is a fair implication

of their impression that an indiscretion had been committed; but it does not alter the fact that Aguinaldo certainly appears to have left Singapore with a conviction of American support in the Filipino struggle for independence, or, at least, autonomy under an American protectorate. Washington cabled to Mr. Pratt as follows:

It is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify. . . . If, in the course of your conferences with Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this government would coöperate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his coöperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he may put forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.

On May 19 Aguinaldo arrived in Manila Bay with seventeen of his associates, having crossed on the United States despatch-boat *McCulloch*, according to an arrangement effected by Commodore Dewey. Upon their arrival they received a cordial welcome from the commodore and a most enthusiastic welcome from the Filipino people. Aguinaldo was promptly installed in an official headquarters in Cavite and at once took up the work of directing the movements of his people. Orders and proclamations were issued in great numbers. The insurrection

throughout the islands sprang into newness of life. The insurgents were supplied with arms, ammunition and stores by the American authorities. So active and energetic were their movements that, less than thirty days from the date of Aguinaldo's arrival, Consul Williams sent the following despatch (dated June 16) to the officials in Washington:

U. S. S. "BALTIMORE, CONSULATE OF  
THE UNITED STATES,  
MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, June 16, 1898.

I have the honor to report that since our squadron destroyed the Spanish fleet on May 1, the insurgent forces have been most active and almost uniformly successful in their many encounters with the crown forces of Spain. General Emilio Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief, who was deported late in 1897, returned recently to Cavite and resumed direction of insurgent forces. He is not permitted by his people to personally lead in battle, but from headquarters governs all military movements. He told me to-day that since his return his forces had captured nearly 5000 prisoners, nearly 4000 of whom were Spaniards, and all of whom had rifles when taken. General Aguinaldo has now about 10,500 rifles and 8 field-pieces, with 8000 more rifles, 2 Maxim guns, and a dynamite-gun bought in China and now in transit. The insurgents have defeated the Spaniards at all points except at fort near Malate and hold not only North Luzon to the suburbs of Manila, but Batangas province also, and the bay coast entire, save the city of Manila.

While the Spaniards cruelly and barbarously slaughter Filipinos taken in arms, and often non-combatants, women and children, the insurgent victors, following American example, spare life, protect the helpless and nurse, feed and care for Spaniards taken

prisoners and for Spanish wounded as kindly as they care for the wounded fallen from their own ranks.

OSCAR F. WILLIAMS,  
*U. S. Consul.*

The Philippine Islands, with the exception of the besieged city of Manila, were virtually in the hands of the Filipinos.

Space does not permit the inclusion here of a great mass of documentary proof, some already published and some as yet withheld, fairly establishing that which is indicated by the foregoing, namely, that, authoritatively or otherwise, American officials, notably Consuls Pratt, Wildman and Williams, did honestly and deliberately, whether or not through inefficient diplomacy, convey to Aguinaldo and his associates an idea, which he and they converted into a belief, that out of the Spanish-American complication would come political independence for the Filipinos. In view of the attainable facts in the case, it is both astonishing and puzzling to read in the report of the first Philippine Commission that it was only at the time of the arrival of American troops under General Anderson, on July 1, 1898, that there, "for the first time, arose the idea of national independence." The statement seems to leave the commissioners open to a charge of either perversion of facts or a superficial investigation.

I have already quoted, in the preceding chapter, Aguinaldo's manifesto of the midsummer

of 1897, asserting the Filipino aspiration "to the glory of obtaining the liberty, *independence* and honor of the country." Without going into any earlier history, and dealing only with the period of the early days of American occupation, we find, under date of April 30, 1898, a letter from Consul Pratt to the Secretary of State in Washington, in which he says:

The general [Aguinaldo] further stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own.

Further evidence is found in the proclamation of the Junta, already quoted.

On June 8, 1898, and before the declaration of independence by the Filipinos, the Filipinos of Singapore presented an address to Mr. Pratt, the American consul, in which they said:

Our countrymen at home and those of us residing here—refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land—hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the program arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States.

Aguinaldo's proclamation, issued from Cavite June 18, contains these words:

I proclaim in the face of the whole world that the aspirations of my whole life and the final object of all

my desires and efforts is no other thing than your independence, because I have the innate conviction that that constitutes your unalterable desire, as independence means for us the redemption from slavery and tyranny, the reconquest of our lost liberties, and our entry into the concert of the civilized nations.

The following appears in a decree issued June 23, though probably prepared at an earlier date :

*Article 1.* The dictatorial government will be called in future the revolutionary government, whose object is to fight for the independence of the Philippines until the free nations, including the Spanish, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country for the establishment of a true republic. The dictator in the future will bear the title of president of the revolutionary government.

These are but a few of the many references made at this time and at earlier dates to the aspiration and aim of the Filipinos for national independence. That the Filipinos were, for several months after Dewey's naval victory, regarded by the Americans as allies, is fully established by a mass of correspondence. Upon his arrival in Manila Bay, under date of July 4, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows :

SEÑOR DON EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY,  
COMMANDING PHILIPPINE FORCES.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the kingdom of Spain, have entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands.

For these reasons, I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people *coöperate* with us in military operations against the Spanish forces, etc.

The argument of an alliance finds support in the friendly personal relations existing between Aguinaldo and Commodore Dewey; in the fact of the military operations throughout Luzon and the investment of Manila within sight of the American ships; in the fact that for a number of weeks vessels flying the Filipino flag moved about Manila Bay, saluting and being saluted by the ships of the American squadron; in the fact that arms and ammunition and stores were supplied to the insurgents, and that Spanish prisoners to the number of several hundred, taken by Americans, were turned over to the Filipinos; and in all of that general coöperation which is known to have existed prior to the final attack on Manila on August 13.

There would seem to be but two possible interpretations of the situation: either the Filipinos were the allies of the Americans and were so regarded by the Americans and by themselves, or they were looked upon only as convenient tools.



## IV

### *IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR*

The dictatorial government—The constitution of a revolutionary government—America's attitude toward the Philippines—Arrival of American troops—Distrust engendered—Strained relations—American commanders—Attitude of American soldiery toward the Filipinos—Faults of enlisted men—American fighters—The germs of war—Faith in the American people—Increasing strain upon relations—Paris treaty—A blow to Filipino aspirations—A doubtful proclamation—The commission.

**W**ITHIN the range of Dewey's guns, Aguinaldo, on June 18, 1898, established a dictatorial government, placing himself at its head by the advice and with the support of his associates. A few days later the dictatorial was changed to a revolutionary government. An elaborate constitution was issued. It is probable that it had been in course of preparation for many weeks. Of that constitution an eminent American authority, Senator Hoar, has said: "There are not ten men on the planet who could have made one better." They organized an army, launched a small navy, which they main-



tained until their little vessels were seized by the American authorities, and established local governments throughout the islands. They had telegraphs and a post-office. They had a President and a Cabinet, recognized and supported by all. In these processes they received direct and indirect support and encouragement from American officials. In the main, up to the capture of Manila on August 13, the relations between Filipinos and Americans were cordial. Some little friction occurred from time to time between members of the two armies and there were occasional differences between commanders, but, in general, they rubbed along easily enough.

Up to about August 1, little had been said or thought in America concerning the final disposition of the islands. A general interest was taken in the Philippine question, but it was overshadowed by the operations in the West Indies, then regarded as of supreme importance. The Philippines were far away and the American people knew little about them. Mr. Dooley's charge to Mr. Hennessy that " 't is not more thin two months since ye larned whether they were islands or canned goods," might have been brought against the great majority of the American people. We had heard of Manila hemp (which does not grow near Manila) and Manila tobacco (most of which is grown more than a hundred miles from Manila), and that was about

the limit of our information. It was many months before Mr. Dooley was able to describe the Philippines for us as "islands, an issue and a public nuisance."

Occasionally some little-noticed comment was heard, to the effect that we should retain a coal-ing-station in the islands. Now and then some one suggested that we should establish a protectorate over them. A few said something about keeping them. The situation was distinctly tentative. People were waiting to hear more. Meanwhile, even then, trouble was brewing on the islands themselves. The cloud was "no bigger than a man's hand," but it was the nucleus of the storm which broke some seven months later. I assume that the Filipinos believed, and had been led to believe, that the Americans intended no permanent occupation or retention of the Philippine Islands. In the beginning they trusted the Americans, believing that American purposes and plans were wholly altruistic. It took not many days to introduce an element of doubt and distrust. The American commanders treated Filipino officials with a businesslike curtness and a military imperiousness which was wholly new in their experience. Troop-ship after troop-ship arrived in Manila Bay. Ever fresh demands were made that the Filipino troops move a little farther away to make more room for the arriving thousands of America's soldiery. What was the need of all

these troops? This was the question raised by the little brown men. What were they for? Whom were they going to fight? Spain's weakened and broken remnant of an army was shut up in Manila. The Filipinos held nearly nine thousand Spanish prisoners. With the help of those great war-ships in the bay, without the aid of a single American soldier, the wiry little men of Aguinaldo's regiments could easily take Manila at any time. All they wanted was a few arms, and those had been supplied by the American navy, imported from China and captured from their enemies. Why, then, all these thousands of brawny American fighting-men?

Thus the little brown men reasoned among themselves. Doubt, suspicion and distrust of the American purpose grew stronger and stronger. They were used to little else, in their past history, than duplicity and bad faith. Suspicion grows readily in such minds. Most unhappily for them and for us, little was done to allay it and much was done to increase it. This feeling culminated at the siege of Manila. There is no doubt that the Filipinos were rudely crowded out of that which they had hoped to share—both the victory and the spoils. It is alleged against them that they wanted to loot the city. Very likely. Such had been their training under the Spaniards. Then, too, it is to be remembered that they are not the only army in the world which is given to a penchant for loot.

From this time on relations became more and more strained between the two forces. More and more the Filipinos began to doubt the realization of those hopes and aspirations for which American officials were, beyond a doubt, largely responsible. The alliance business seemed to be about over and the Filipino, who did not understand American ways, felt that he had been used while he was wanted and thrown away when the work was done. He felt that he was thrust outside and the door shut in his face.

It is unfortunate that the military commanders sent to the Philippines in those early days should not have been men of a different type. General Anderson was the first to arrive, a soldier brusque and imperious after the fashion of men whose life for forty years has consisted largely in giving orders. The life habit was strong upon him, and he sent orders to Aguinaldo such as he would send to colonels of his own regiments. General Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy may or may not have overestimated the dignity which attached to his position as commander-in-chief of the Philippine forces, but he was not pleased with being ignored in the military operations, called upon to furnish horses, carabao and forage for his allies, and ordered to move his troops from place to place to make room for the soldiers from America.

General Merritt was the ranking officer after his arrival on July 25. It is an open secret that

he was wholly out of harmony with his surroundings. He wanted to go home, hoped and expected to go home at an early date. General Merritt has been one of the ablest generals in the American service, but he failed utterly as an administrator in the Philippine Islands. General Greene's work was ably done, but his position was a secondary command. In that work he displayed a broader tact and finer diplomacy than did either of his associates and it is possible that trouble might have been avoided had he been in supreme command. It has been very truly said that "America's great need in those early days in the Philippines was a soldier who had also the qualities of a statesman." We have such men in the army and it is a pity that one of them was not in charge of the Philippine expedition. In this lack lies one of the immediate causes of the war, and a measure of responsibility rests with America for its occurrence.

Another feature presents itself. Even in those early days, little bickerings and a growing dislike for each other began to be manifest among the ranks of both armies. I heartily concede all the fighting qualities of the American enlisted man. I have seen him on the fighting-line. But I cannot compliment him as a diplomat. Particularly in relations with such people as our armies have encountered in our new possessions—in Porto Rico, in Cuba and in the Philippines—he fails to shine. He carries the

innate sense of an Anglo-Saxon race superiority and he often manifests it in a most offensive way. I speak from my own observation during two years of almost continuous life with the American army. The great mass of the soldiers are of a rather rough-and-tumble class, hearty, boisterous, and quite too much disposed to regard those whom we have encountered in our "expanding" as, in their own language, either "—— niggers" or "—— Dagos."

This has been a fruitful source of trouble. It has caused resentment and bitter feeling. The many soldier-men who go their way, mind their own business and do their duty pass unnoticed. The rowdy and the bully, loud-mouthed, aggressive and offensive, give to these people the impression of the whole. The Filipino resented the American way of taking complete charge of the situation in a country which he felt was his, and it is wholly probable that he often showed it. The brawny American pushed the little man off the narrow sidewalk in Manila. Very likely the little man expectorated on the big American. Very likely, also, the little man got a kick or a cuff for doing so. That sort of thing does not tend toward friendly international relations. In General Otis's report covering operations from September, 1899, to May, 1900, he states that he desires to correct a moderately prevalent opinion that war with the insurgents was caused by the attitude or conduct of our troops in Manila,

unless it was due to the failure of our men to resent insult and so to encourage the Filipinos in a belief in American cowardice. I think the general would better have left that out, unless he intended it as a joke. There is a world of humor in the idea of the long-suffering, patient and forbearing American trooper turning the "other cheek also."

Probably the majority of our officers in the regular army abhor war because they know what it means. They know that it means dead men, wounded men, sick men. They know that it means an old classmate bowled over by a shell or a bullet, a warm friend with an empty sleeve for the rest of his life, an associate gone out with dysentery or typhoid. It may mean their own call. Daring, enduring and unflinching when war comes, I still believe that few of them have any love for it. With the volunteer and the new man it is otherwise. Some picture war as a *schützenfest*—a kind of military picnic. They are the ones who grumble at their quarters and their rations. Some see in it a chance for a little tin glory, when they return to be hailed as heroes by their friends and companions. Some go from purely patriotic motives, from a sense of duty to their country. To go to war and see no fighting is, to the majority, a humiliation, if not a disgrace.

At the outset, enlistment was for the war in Cuba. Few had their thoughts turned westward to the distant Philippines. But, Cuba or



the Philippines, they enlisted for a fight, hoped for a fight, and many did not hesitate to say—I have heard it often from their own lips—that they did not intend to go home without having seen a fight. The reports sent in, officially, from Manila during the early summer of 1899 indicated the probability of an early ending of hostilities in the Philippines. I have seen the look of delighted satisfaction on the faces of hundreds of new arrivals who had left San Francisco fearing that all would be over before they arrived out, when they heard the news, on landing, that there was still ample chance for a “scrap.” This belligerent attitude on the part of our soldiery is admitted by all fair-minded observers. Some even glory in it. In the presence of any possible enemy this attitude becomes a mass of inflammable material, the ready cause of a conflagration.

In that attitude the American soldiers were not alone to blame. With the development of the situation, the Filipino soldiers became, perhaps, equally culpable, except that, as the stronger and the wiser, a greater moral responsibility rested with the Americans for the preservation of peace and the maintenance of friendly relations.

General Otis, in his official report, asserts the capture, at Tarlak, of documentary proof that Aguinaldo, prior to his arrival in Manila, had resolved to use the American forces to further



his own ends, and then to "drive them out by the sword." In view of the facts that at that time there existed no purpose on the part of the American people to hold the islands, that his own associates on the commission have asserted, in their report, that it was not until some months later that there "first arose the idea of a national independence," and that the supporting evidence is not produced, the statement is somewhat remarkable.

Rest the responsibility where it may, the fact stands that there was a continually increasing strain on the relations of two military forces that stood face to face along a line extending for some twenty miles around the city of Manila. Both sides threw up intrenchments. General Otis states that America is the only nation in the world which would have permitted these warlike preparations on the part of the Filipinos; but would not the intrenching by his own troops and his insistence upon American occupation of blockhouses and the most important points of strategic value, be naturally construed by the Filipinos as a threatening attitude which necessitated defenses upon their part? Free passage to and from the city was denied to the Filipinos and in various ways restrictions were imposed, the meaning of which they did not comprehend. It is wholly easy to see how they might, as they doubtless did, interpret the necessarily strict and sometimes apparently high-

handed processes of military law into an attitude of predetermined aggression.

Still another factor, and one of the most serious, enters into the situation. The Filipinos, flushed with the success which had attended their operations throughout the islands and ardent as so many of them then were for the day of their national independence, not only failed to understand the continued presence of a large body of troops, but, as well, they failed to understand why America did not announce her policy in regard to the islands. Some of us have done a little puzzling over that subject on our own account. They were kept in a state of uncertainty, and doubt and suspicion of the intentions of the American administration grew from day to day. Their complaint was against the officials. Nearly a year later, Filipinos who were prominently connected with their cause told me in most positive terms that their faith in the "great American people" was unshaken. They asserted their belief and their confidence that when the American people should know and understand them and their aspirations, their wrongs would be righted. It is that idea which lies at the root of their interest in the American election. They believe that American officialdom has done them wrong, and they look to the "great American people, who are a just and honest and noble people," to set them right.

With the developments of the autumn of 1898

the increasing strain upon the relations continued. The idea of permanent hold upon the islands appeared to strengthen in the United States. The commission sat in Paris, and on December 10, the treaty was signed under which the Philippine Islands were definitely ceded by Spain to the United States. It was ratified on February 10, 1899. The Filipino saw in this a threatened death-blow to his aspirations for national independence. On December 21, President McKinley sent to the Secretary of War the following letter of instructions. It was duly forwarded to General Otis, then serving as governor-general in the Philippines.

SIR: The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th instant, and as the result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In fulfilment of the right of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible despatch to the whole of the ceded territory.

In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations of the inhabitants, and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the security of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, coöperate with the government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity so far as may be possible.

Within the domain of military authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory, in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime, are to be considered as continuing in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals so far as practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen as far as may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands.

While the control of all the public property and the revenues of the state passes with the cession, and while the use and management of all public means of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected except

for cause duly established. The taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late government become payable to the authorities of the United States, unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of government, whether general or local. If private property be taken for military use, it shall be paid for when possible in cash at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not practicable, receipts are to be given.

All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares not prohibited for military reasons by due announcement of the military authority will be admitted upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their importation.

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfilment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.

(Signed) WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

This document of December 21 was, to the Filipinos, another straw upon the camel's back. Point after point, act after act, tended to con-

vince them that the United States was but the successor of Spain, their ruler and perhaps their tyrant. With or without due justification, wisely or unwisely, they prepared for war. None save the narrowest of considerations can wholly condemn them for the step. War broke out on February 4, 1899. It came without immediate expectation from either side. It is probable that the Filipinos, quite pluckily on the whole, had meditated and prepared for an attack at some not far distant date. But the fact that it was not scheduled for that night is proved by ample and unquestionable evidence. The first shot was fired, by a picket of the Nebraska regiment, at a Filipino who did not halt when challenged.

As this work is not intended as a war history, I omit the details of the fighting which followed. The ultimate success of the stronger power was practically assured from the beginning, though even at this date, more than a year and a half from the time when Private Grayson shot at the unresponsive Filipino, the end is not clearly visible.

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the commission appointed by the President appeared on the islands. The commission was authorized to discuss and to investigate, but not to determine. It had no definite policy to announce, no binding promises or assurances to give. It returned in the autumn to submit a report in which state-

ments were made which are not admitted by many whose experience on the islands was of both wider scope and longer duration than that of the commission.

In this attempt to analyze the immediate causes of the war, I admit the seeming advocacy of the Filipino cause. There are those who will dispute both argument and statement. There are also many who will support them. The verdict remains for the historian.



## V

### *MIDSUMMER OF 1899*

The opinion of an army officer—The midsummer situation—Filipino fighters—American heroism and fortitude—Pseudo-activity in Manila—Military success more apparent than real—Custom-house and post-office—Schools—An unsatisfactory balance-sheet.

**D**URING the latter part of July, 1899, the following letter was placed in my hands for publication by a well-known officer of high rank in the United States army serving in the Philippines. I was glad enough to get it, as the opinions of such men are of value and are seldom obtainable. The writer says:

Barnum once said, "There is nothing the American people enjoy so much as being humbugged," and it is certainly true. The reports and statements about the situation in the Philippines which we read in papers from the United States cause us to doubt the evidence of our senses. We have been here since last summer. We went through the almost bloodless campaign against Manila—with our allies at our backs—and the triumphal entry into the city, and a few months later had the pleasure of fighting over the same road, this time driving our allies out of the city and its defenses.

Then since March 25 we have been fighting pretty



steadily, fighting at one place or another most of the time, our force probably averaging about 25,000 men, or 20,000 effectives; and what has been the result that we know of up to this time?

We have lost by wounds and death fully 1000 men, and, including the sick, have some 4000 in hospitals. We have always, or almost always, been able to drive the Filipino troops out of the towns or works we have attacked, but as we have of late months pushed out to some distance from our lines to make such attacks, we have had to fall back each time to our own lines; this because our forces are too weak to hold advance points and to guard our base—Manila.

In effect, we have advanced our lines, against a stubborn foe and in the face of great difficulties, about thirty miles. All that men could do with such an inferior force and in the face of tropical seasons has been done. Now we are at about the end of our tether. To conquer these islands will take at least 75,000 men. So far, their losses have probably been less than ours. We know what our losses are in a fight, and we get a pretty good idea of the enemy's, as we usually remain for the time being in possession of the field. The reports published in America underrate our losses and vastly overestimate the enemy's. We have always had to attack them in a chosen and fortified position. The odds are all against us.

Again, the enemy can supply their losses at once. With their armed troops they always have half as many again who accompany them to relieve their troops of labor, and whenever a man falls, one of these bolo [sword or large knife] men takes his place. These natives can march all day in the heat of a tropical sun, with a handful of rice in their knapsack for food, and sleep on the ground in those terrible rains without the slightest injury. The Tagal tribe alone numbers about four hundred thousand people. They have been fighting for the greater part of three hundred years, off and on. That indicates what kind of people they are. Yet the world is led to believe that we can easily subjugate

those islands (at present we have only a very small part of one of them) with an army-corps, or about thirty thousand men.

Every officer of experience with whom I have talked has placed the number of troops needed at between seventy-five and one hundred thousand men. Thirty thousand men will have to be reinforced by many more thousands if they are left to perform this great task. In the meantime we will lose thousands every year by disease—men who will break down if they don't die or have to be sent away.

Another point. How are these troops to be relieved by others? The medical authorities all state that white troops cannot remain in this climate more than two or three years at farthest; and now the *whole* of the United States army is abroad except half a dozen regiments.

There is one more point to be considered. Now that we have burst our bounds and gone in for conquest of foreign territory, *we must be prepared to hold what we have taken* against any foreign foe. For this we must have a large regular army. It must be a trained, disciplined force, always available. There is no other possible solution of this difficult problem. If we would not doom our little regular army to destruction, and court dishonor, we must face this matter boldly and act promptly.

My own views of the situation at that time are outlined in the following letters written soon after my arrival. In re-reading them for publication here, I see no changes which I would make, and I am struck by the fact that their dates might quite as well be those of a year later, so little has the situation materially altered.

“MANILA, August 4, 1899.

“When a civilian essays comment upon military matters, it is the customary and therefore

proper thing for his hearers or his readers to charge him with presumption. Yet it may be permissible for a civilian to formulate and submit a consensus of the opinions of military men. That course is a safe one and I shall follow it. After numerous conversations with men who have spent weeks and months on the advance-line, I remark that the opinions of such men seem to be widely at variance with the opinion of General Otis, who has never yet been to the front at all.

“The United States is fighting an unknown number of little brown men out in the Philippine Islands. From the standpoint of resources, of men, of equipment, of military knowledge, it is a contest between a giant and a pygmy. Yet the pygmy has maintained his fight for six months, and many, whose opinion is of weight and value, assert that the little brown man is stronger to-day than at any time since the struggle began. If the army of these little brown men is so insignificant as to be unworthy of political recognition, a mere handful of insurgents to be crushed out, why has not the giant crushed them? If they be a formidable force, a nation, a people in arms against another people who seek to conquer them, where is the national disgrace to the United States in treating with them for an adjustment of their relations and an end to hostilities?

“It is beyond all question that the American soldiers have borne the miseries of tropical cam-

paigning with most commendable fortitude, and that in fighting they have maintained the reputation of the nation as a fighting people when a fight comes their way. It is true that there have been no great battles, but a hot little engagement and a charge on the trenches are quite as sharp a test of nerve and courage as a field like Chickamauga or Gettysburg. The prolongation of the war against the little brown men is in no way chargeable to lack of courage or fighting quality on the part of the men in the ranks or on the part of the men who command and lead them in the field.

“A certain kind of heroism is displayed by our opponents. Their method of fighting is rather that of the Indian or the guerrilla. They fight from cover of trench or thicket. Driven from one cover, they seek another. Their firing is of the poorest, and usually one of the safest places in an engagement is the American advanced firing-line. The reports which are sent to the United States always show the Filipino loss to be exceedingly heavy, while the American loss is exceedingly light. The loss is usually given in the ratio of about twenty to one. The twenty is guesswork. But when the whole thing is counted up and the American loss by disease is taken into consideration, there is some doubt whether the advantage lies so heavily with the Americans.

“That the war may cease should be the prayer

of every thoughtful man. That unless there be a change in the method of its prosecution its end cannot be foreseen, is the opinion of all the men whom I have met here who have practical knowledge of the conditions of the line. A skirmish here and a skirmish there, the engagement that results in the occupation of a town or village which is almost immediately abandoned at the cost of another engagement for its reoccupation later on, the driving of the Filipinos from a field without following up the advantage gained, is the present method, and it serves no purpose save a continuation of hostilities. The Filipino is given time to establish himself behind new defenses, or he returns to occupy the old ones. Yet the reports go in of successful victories, accompanied by the assertion that 'the situation is well in hand,' and 'the war will be over in ten days.'

"In six months the forces of the United States have moved northward some forty miles, and eastward and southward rather less than the half of that. Beyond a point ten miles or so to the northward, our lines are barely more than threads, consisting of a few garrisoned towns and a series of outposts. San Fernando is occupied by the advanced force operating in the northward direction. These advanced posts are kept on an almost constant tension from the dropping fire which may come at any time from a hidden foe. Killed or wounded on outpost is no infre-

quent record. All this have we accomplished in six months, resisted by a force of little brown men poorly equipped and poorly conditioned. Surely it is no very creditable record.

"Months ago General Lawton said that it would need one hundred thousand men to end the war in the Philippines. Again and again has the same statement been made by military men in the field here in the islands. The men who are in the field are the men who know what is wanted, and they know it far better than a man who sits at a desk in Manila directing the movements of thirty thousand troops, while at the same time he guides and supervises the civil administration of a city of three hundred thousand people and a score or two of towns and villages outside."

"MANILA, August 16, 1899.

"On August 13, 1898, the American navy bombarded the fortifications of Manila while the American army attacked and entered the city itself. One year later, on August 12 and 13, 1899, there was fighting between the Americans and the Filipinos within ten miles of the city, which, for twelve months, has been under American control.

"What has been accomplished within the past year in the Philippines? There are those who quote a commercial activity in Manila as a sign of a new era in Philippine prosperity. Those

who do so mistake a shadow for a substance. Business in Manila is active, but it is a wholly abnormal activity. It is created by the presence of thousands of American soldiers who have money to spend. It is a wholly factitious activity, terminable by their withdrawal to the States or their distribution through the country. The departments of the American commissary, the quartermaster and ordnance, are furnishing employment to thousands of Chinese laborers. The quartermaster's department has recently occupied a warehouse in the rear of the hotel in which I am staying. For the last four days hundreds of Chinese bearers with their shoulder-poles have been busy carrying materials of many kinds to this warehouse. Back and forth they go in an endless stream. If that sort of thing, and much more of similar kind, be business, then Manila is busy. But it is all no more than a feverish activity, and no sign of a sound prosperity. Of the latter I can see no indication whatever. Production and commerce are both in a state of disturbance and temporary decay. This is a pessimistic view, but not the view of a pessimist. It is a fact.

“There are those who report the city of Manila as enjoying a period of social and civic order unknown before in its history. Such an assumption is based upon ignorance of the normal conditions of Oriental cities. Leaving comparisons and coming to facts, it is to be noted that peace-



able Manila requires the protecting services of thousands of American soldiers. It is regarded as necessary to oblige all people, citizens and soldiery, to retire to their various abodes at 8:30 P.M. Twice within the last ten days have the guards been doubled, while soldiers slept on their arms in anticipation of a threatened uprising. A Spanish newspaper was suppressed for daring to say that the streets of the city were less well kept under American than under the former administration.

“Military success in the island is far more apparent at a distance than it is close at hand. The ‘heroic bravery’ of the American troops has led to a series of ‘glorious victories.’ Thus runs the tale. The heroic bravery is undeniable. The soldiers have marched over weary miles under broiling sun, have marched through knee-deep mud in long stretches of rice-fields and have charged intrenchment and breastwork with a grit and a courage which have made them worthy of the highest honor. But what of these ‘glorious victories’? Wherein lies the ‘glory’ of killing ‘niggers’? It seems to take very little nowadays to make a ‘glorious victory.’ The process seems to lie in the marching of well-fed, well-armed, brawny Americans, supported by all the resources of the United States, against a force which, though often numerically greater, is always in all other ways vastly inferior; in driving the enemy from his trenches and his towns; and



then, usually, the abandonment of the place captured by a 'glorious victory' with a minimum of casualties. It quite suggests the old lady's job of sweeping back the sea, or the great military move of marching up the hill and then marching down again. There are towns here which have been 'captured' again and again, each time with a 'glorious victory.' To-day it is unsafe for an American to go alone even ten miles from the city of Manila in any direction. On August 12, 1899, a military reconnaissance ten miles north-east of the city cost the Americans five men killed and fourteen wounded in a contest with intrenched Filipinos. Had the Filipinos an officer of the type of the Cuban Antonio Maceo, a considerable number of American soldiers would fail to get as much sleep as a soldier needs.

"There are regular army officers here who have seen much service in fighting Indians on the Western frontier. Many of them do not regard the military problem as one of any great difficulty. A comparatively small body of troops, so long as it included an ample cavalry force and proper transportation service, would have little difficulty in effecting a very thorough disintegration of the main bodies of the Filipino army. Behind that there stands the need of a large army for purposes of garrisoning and holding that which the attacking column secured. The special difficulty of the objection to the plan now followed lies in the fact that it seeks to cover

too wide a territory with an inadequate number of troops. . If more troops come they should be accompanied by a military commander of all the forces in the island. He should be a man who would sometimes get out to the front and see for himself the conditions under which his troops must fight. He should be one whose time and interest were not occupied by questions of gambling Chinos, cock-fighting Filipinos, and superfluous dogs.

“The customs service is a cause of much complaint. The former high rates are still maintained, and as the collector, Colonel J. D. Miley, is an officer of the regular army, the importer finds that the old system of gifts and ‘cahoots’ no longer serves in getting goods through the custom-house by fraudulent methods. The rate, however, is excessive and should be reduced as it was in Porto Rico and Cuba. It is probable that such a reduction would result in an increased revenue. The post-office also is a cause of dissatisfaction through the increase in postal rates. A local paper risks the censor and comments as follows: ‘A foreign letter now costs the citizen five cents gold. During the Spanish régime the stamp on foreign letters was five cents Mexican or two and a half cents gold. Surely the government of the United States, which prides itself on carrying the banner of the advance-guard of civilization and progress among all nations, is not so hard pushed that it has to

resort to means to coin money which even poverty-stricken Spain, with her depleted treasury, never did.' Under Spanish rule newspaper publishers mailed their papers to subscribers at one twentieth of a cent per paper; it now costs them one cent per paper.

"Something has been done toward an extension of the old school system and some forty-two hundred pupils are now in attendance in Manila schools. This is probably about one fifteenth of the children of school age. A system has been formulated for municipal and town government, but in the present state of things the island has about as much use for it as a hen has for a toothpick. The sectarian missionary, with Sunday-schools and other religious work, followed the army in the West Indies. That sort of thing has barely made its appearance in the Philippines.

"On the whole, it would take one of vastly hopeful and cheerful temperament to find much in the experience of the last twelve months in the Philippines that was gratifying or encouraging. General Otis is forced to confess the error in his judgment that the war would 'be over in ten days,' that he had 'the situation well in hand,' and that he had a sufficient force to establish peace and order. I saw much that was open to criticism in the methods employed in Porto Rico and in Cuba. Had I been through the Philippine experience first, I have no doubt that I should have regarded both the former as little short of

marvels of progress in good government. It is hard to see that any material or permanent advance has been made in the Philippines as a result of twelve months of American occupation. Still, we shall probably lift them into civilization in due time, if, meanwhile, we do not decide that it is necessary to civilize them by the Krag-Jorgensen method. By the present system and under the present management, the outlook is but a dismal one."

*THE NEWS AND THE CENSORSHIP*

Lessened activity—The protest of the correspondents—Its effect in America—The story of the protest—Private letter of a correspondent—A mysterious order from the War Office—Its effect in Manila—Difficulty of news-getting—Experience of Manila editor—A note from the censor.

MIDSUMMER of the year 1899 brought a kind of breathing-space in the military operations. General Otis had declared that the rainy season would neither hamper nor hinder the movements. Partly because of the rains and partly from other causes, notably the necessity for the return of the volunteer troops and their replacement by fresh material, there was a cessation of the general activity throughout the islands. At this time no little excitement was created in the United States by the publication of the so-called round-robin of the news correspondents stationed in the Philippines. The text of the message was as follows:

The undersigned, being all staff correspondents of American newspapers stationed in Manila, unite in the following statement:

We believe that, owing to official despatches from

Manila made public in Washington, the people of the United States have not received a correct impression of the situation in the Philippines, but that these despatches have presented an ultra-optimistic view that is not shared by the general officers in the field.

We believe the despatches incorrectly represent the existing conditions among the Filipinos in respect to internal dissension and demoralization resulting from the American campaign, and to the brigand character of their army.

We believe the despatches err in the declaration that "the situation is well in hand," and in the assumption that the insurrection can be speedily ended without a greatly increased force.

We think the tenacity of the Filipino purpose has been underestimated, and that the statements are unfounded that volunteers are unwilling to engage in further service.

The censorship has compelled us to participate in this misrepresentation by excising or altering uncontroverted statements of fact on the plea, as General Otis stated, that "they would alarm the people at home," or "have the people of the United States by the ears."

Specifications: Prohibition of hospital reports; suppression of full reports of field operations in the event of failure; numbers of heat prostrations in the field; systematic minimization of naval operations; and suppression of complete reports of the situation.

As stated by the "Review of Reviews," "This protest had a profound effect upon public opinion throughout the country, and greatly stirred up officialdom in Washington." There were those who implicitly believed the statements made and who upheld the correspondents in their course. There were those who sneered at them as carping and disgruntled boys who were

dissatisfied because they were not permitted to run the whole business. In this connection it is interesting to note how accurately, almost line for line, the seemingly pessimistic yet wholly truthful view held by these gentlemen has been indorsed by the facts of later development. Those whom I was wont to style the "cheerful enthusiasts" were at that time predicting the early dissolution of the Filipino forces and a speedy ending of the war. Some were even planning for a return to the United States. No one of the responsible correspondents of my acquaintance, and I knew them all, held any such view. And now, fifteen months later, the war is still on. So are the predictions by the "cheerful enthusiasts" of its speedy ending.

The question of press censorship is one of no easy determination; yet it might well be contended that, subject only to the limitation of giving "aid or comfort to the enemy," the right of the American people to the fullest possible information regarding important affairs which concern the American people, both as individuals and as a nation, would seem to be unquestionable.

I arrived in Manila on July 17. Upon my arrival I made it my immediate business to investigate the conditions under which news matter was sent, the influence upon it of the authorities and the effects of the censorship. I found the news-senders in a state of outspoken



protest against the limitations imposed upon them. The situation had culminated, a few days prior to my arrival, in a meeting of the leading representatives of the American press. The matter was fully and carefully discussed. Some of those present urged the withdrawal of the entire body from the island, with notification to their home offices that, owing to the restrictions to which they were subjected, they could not feel that they were properly discharging their duty to their employers and the public.

This proposition was rejected, and the question was decided by the preparation of the foregoing protest, to be forwarded through three different channels to insure its arrival for general publication in the United States. It is to be remarked that the statement, in its accepted form, was drafted by men representing publications which support the administration at Washington. It was, therefore, no anti-administration document designed to hamper or to criticize unduly the Washington authorities. The step thus taken was no trifling matter, nor was it taken hastily. The futility of verbal protest to the authorities had been proved by weeks of experience. Each man had his daily fight with the censor and frequent expostulations with the governor-general. The correspondents were impelled to the extreme and perhaps unprecedented measure through a sense of duty to the American people. It was



also personally due to them that their position be rightly set before the reading public. The paper prepared, the next step was its forwarding. Like all other telegraph news matter from Manila, it must be approved and passed by the censor before being accepted by the cable company. His passage of so seditious (?) a document upon his own responsibility was wholly out of the question, and the matter was laid before the governor-general, who constituted the court of last resort in such matters—in Manila.

After reading the paper, that functionary requested the presence of one of its signers. The man thus summoned represented an administration paper, and there was, perhaps, a hope in General Otis's mind that he might be led to retract. The signers decided that a committee would be better, not from any doubt of the man sent for, who had the entire confidence of all, but rather to back him up in an interview which promised to be stormy; so four of their number waited on his Excellency. It is to be remembered that all of these men had been selected and sent out by competent authority at home. They had been chosen because of their special fitness for the work given them. It did not seem to be recognized, but they represented a power which can make or unmake governors-general.

Ushered into the presence of General Otis,

they were greeted by the following, which, though given from memory by one of the committee, are approximately the words of the speaker :

“You have served a paper upon me—a most extraordinary document. Are you aware that this constitutes a conspiracy against the government? My first thought was to put you all off the island. My second thought is to summon a general court martial and have you tried for conspiracy.”

The members of the group smiled. Through many previous experiences they had become somewhat hardened to the threat of possible deportation. Permission to forward the message was, of course, flatly refused. But the Manila authorities have no jurisdiction over the cable-office in Hongkong, to which point a messenger was sent to forward the despatch.

It was seldom that the truth or the accuracy of the matter submitted by correspondents was denied. The refusal was based upon grounds of expediency, and no secret was made of the distinct intention to give a certain color to all matter sent by telegraph from the Philippine Islands. Such matter *must* support the local and Washington administration, right or wrong, in all their acts. It *must* suppress anything and everything which was in any way discreditable to the American army. It *must* avoid all that would tend to create an impression at home

that the army was anything other than fat, healthy, happy and contented.

A mistake was made by these gentlemen in their failure to support their cablegram by an explicit statement of their charges in detail. Some, if not all, of them wrote personal letters to their proprietors, and one or two of these letters were given to the public. I quote from that of Mr. R. M. Collins, the local chief of the Associated Press service:

The censorship enforced during the war and before the beginning of it was, according to newspaper men who had worked in Japan, Turkey, Greece, Egypt and Russia in war-times, and in Cuba under the Weyler régime and during our war, so much more stringent than any hitherto attempted that we were astonished that the American authorities should countenance it and were confident public opinion would be overwhelmingly against it if its methods and purposes became known.

For a long time we submitted to the censorship because of appeals to our patriotism and a feeling that we might be accused of a lack thereof if we made any trouble for the American authorities here.

But when General Otis came down in the frank admission that it was not intended so much to prevent the newspapers from giving information and assistance to the enemy (the legitimate function, and according to our view the only legitimate one, of a censorship), but to keep the knowledge of conditions here from the public at home, and when the censor had repeatedly told us in ruling out plain statements of undisputed facts, "My instructions are to let nothing go that can hurt the administration," we concluded that protest was justifiable.

Otis had gained the idea from the long submission

by the newspaper men to his dictation that it was a part of the duty of the governor-general to direct the newspaper correspondents as he did his officers. Much of the censorship was conducted by him personally, the censor sending a correspondent to the general with any despatches about which he had doubts.

In this way the entire American press was made the personal organ of Otis; we were compelled to send nothing but the official version of all events and conditions, even when the official view controverted the opinions of the great mass of the officers in the field and the intelligent residents, and was a falsification of events which passed before our eyes.

In this way every fight became a glorious American victory, even though every one in the army knew it to have been substantially a failure, and we were drilled into writing, quite mechanically, wholly ridiculous estimates of the numbers of Filipinos killed.

About the middle of June, I wrote a conservative review to the effect that every one here was convinced that it would be impossible to end the war during the rainy season and for some time thereafter, unless heavy reinforcements were sent.

The censor's comment (I made note of it) was: "Of course we all know that we are in a terrible mess out here, but we don't want the people to get excited about it. If you fellows will only keep quiet now we will pull through in time without any fuss at home."

He took the review to General Otis, who said:

"Tell Collins that if he will hold that for a week or ten days he will thank me for not letting him send it."

When I went to see him he repeated the same old story about the insurrection going to pieces, and hinted so portentously about having wonderful things up his sleeve that I almost believed him. The other men had practically the same experience.

So, after waiting a month for the general's predictions to materialize, we decided to send the statement we had framed without changing it, as the conditions had not changed.

The attempt to hold the newspapers by the throat was so unusual that unusual action seemed to be justified and demanded. As a matter of form we took the message to the censor. His comment was practically the same that he had made on my message. He did not question the accuracy of the statement of conditions, but said: "This is just the sort of matter the censorship is intended to suppress."

He, of course, took it to Otis, who, in turn, sent the messenger requesting Davis of the New York "Sun" to go and see him, doubtless thinking that as he had treated the "Sun" as his organ, and its correspondents being under obligations to him for special favors, he could work them to give up the plan. Thompson said he thought Collins and McCutcheon should go also. A committee was chosen—Davis, McCutcheon, Bass and I.

When we were ushered into Otis's room he said with some anger:

"Gentlemen, you have served an extraordinary paper upon me; you accuse me of falsehood. This constitutes a conspiracy against the government. I will have you tried by a general court martial and let you choose the judges."

We knew from experience with threats to "put us off the island" that there was nothing to be frightened about, and also knew that all officers who would be on a court martial would know we told the truth. Three hours of exceedingly plain talk followed.

Dealing with the specifications, we said that the hospital officers refused to give us any information as to the number of sick, on the ground that he had instructed them to withhold such facts.

His reply was that the hospitals were full of perfectly well men who were shirking and should be turned out. To send home figures of the numbers in hospitals would be entirely misleading.

In the matter of prejudice against the navy, it was stated on the part of the correspondents that all were compelled to change their accounts of the taking of

Iloilo, to make it appear that the army had done the work with immediate assistance from war-ships, and that only a few houses were burned. The unquestioned facts told in the original stories were that the soldiers did not land until three hours after the marines had raised the flag and chased the insurgents out.

General Otis explained that the navy was so anxious for glory that it disobeyed instructions by landing before the proper time, etc., although the correspondents could not have been permitted to send that explanation had they known it, and were forced to give in a false account.

Davis said: "When I returned to Manila I asked what I would be permitted to send, and you told me all facts, news about military operations not helpful to the enemy, and my opinions as opinions."

General Bates was present throughout the interview. At the close General Otis turned to him and asked:

"What would you do with these gentlemen, general?"

Bates promptly replied: "I would do what I said."

"Court-martial them?" Otis asked.

"No; let them send what you promised—the facts and opinions as opinions," Bates said.

These statements of the news-gatherers may have created an interest, though they effected little or no change in the system. But they appear to have led up to a somewhat curious incident—the announcement, purporting to be official, from Washington that the Manila censorship had been abolished, when, in fact, nothing of the kind had been done. Four months after the appearance of the round-robin, and two months after the announcement that the censorship had been abolished, I sent the following letter to the paper which I represented.



“MANILA, November 26, 1899.

“Manila cables more news matter to the world in an hour than she receives from the world in a week. We get our news of the doings elsewhere chiefly from American papers from four to six weeks old. For the last three weeks the mails have been sadly deficient, for some reason. We had received letters and papers dated up to the 5th of October; then came two or three weeks of utter vacancy. On November 23 the *Newport* and the *Tartar* arrived with mail; but in some marvelously interesting way the post-office department or the quartermaster's department, or some other department, had succeeded in losing, mislaying, or otherwise disposing of a collection said to include five hundred sacks. At any rate the mail dating from October 5 to October 18 has not shown up. It will probably come straggling along in a week or two. Mail matter for fifty thousand Americans who are ten thousand miles from home is a trivial thing, anyway. Frequency, continuity and regularity are of little importance.

“In that which did come yesterday some of us got what is technically known as a ‘jar.’ It was quite interesting for correspondents to get letters congratulating them upon the simplification of their work as a result of the abolition of the censorship. It was pleasant to read in month-old newspapers that Washington had announced that Otis had asked, on July 26, for

permission to do away with censorship of press matter, and that on September 9 that office had been abolished.

“Two questions arise: Is it the fact that Washington has made such an announcement, and, if so, in what way is so astounding a falsehood to be accounted for? No intimation of any such change has been made to correspondents here at any time. My letters have only reported a marked relaxation in the strictness of the official supervision, but to-day, as at all times heretofore, no cable message—news or commercial—goes from Manila until it has been submitted to the official censor. Excisions are less frequent than they were three months ago, but there has been no time when they have not been made. The wires are not open, and they have not been open. The position is not easily reconciled at this end. It would seem that either reputable publications have been led into a mysterious blunder, or that there had been a deliberate and unpardonable attempt to deceive the American public by a direct falsehood. I state the facts as they are at this end. Captain Greene, on November 26, is still the official censor. All cable matter must be submitted to him and approved by him before it will be accepted at the cable-office. Alterations and excisions are still made, though on very much broader lines than formerly. The exact state of the case at the other end we do not know.



“Moreover, there is here, in some parts, a double censorship. While in Iloilo recently, I wished to cable a news item to the representative of the Associated Press in Manila. Presenting my matter at the office in Iloilo, I was told that it must be passed upon by the local military authorities before they could send it. In Manila it was again examined before it could go to the United States. The notably interesting point was that the matter was from Jolo, from which point I had just come, and covered affairs about which neither the authorities at Iloilo nor at Manila knew anything at all. My statements were of things I knew, but they must be passed upon by people who did not know. No excision was made, and General Hughes, at Iloilo, told me that he was glad to see the despatch, and that he read it for the information it contained rather than from any other motive.

“The correspondent in the Philippines to-day encounters a difficulty which is perhaps even more serious than the censorship. He cannot send matter if he has none to send. With any concentration of affairs or operations, or with any number of such centers, news-getting is a comparatively simple process. It consists of either being personally on the ground or of being competently represented. With matters in their present state, the work is endlessly complicated and difficult. The troops are scat-

tered, and there is activity, and possibly important activity, in a dozen different and far separated localities. Iloilo is in a turmoil of 'scraps.' The vicinity of Imus is restless and occasionally active. News comes that a scrap is on at San Mateo. General MacArthur is resting in headquarters at Tarlak, which, a few days ago, was the Filipino capital. His troops are scattered, and some one or more of his commands may be in a scrap at any time. Lawton and Wheaton are scouring a country away beyond telegraph-wires, very much, I believe, to their satisfaction. The last heard from Young was that he was up in the vicinity of San Fernando de la Union, 'hot-foot' on the trail of Aguinaldo and two or three days away from a telegraph-wire. Then there is little Calamba, quiet just now, but ever a smoking little pocket volcano. And there are Cebu and Negros and Jolo and Zamboanga, to say nothing of the doings of the navy and the establishment and processes of civil government in Manila and sundry other places.

"All this, and a few other things, the American public expects to find on its breakfast-table, or served for its digestion after the evening meal. Patrick remarked that no man could be in more than one place at a time, 'barrin' he was a flea.' Yet the news-gatherer is expected to be in all these places, or, at least, in close touch with them. Offers of seven dollars Mexi-

can are made for an astral body which one could project from place to place and see and hear what is going on at all these many different places.

“For reports from some of these points the correspondents are mainly dependent upon the official reports at headquarters. That is something of a rub. It is easier to get things past a censor than it is to get things out of a censor. The spirit which prompts to censorship finds its best hold in being itself the sole source of information. It is far easier for the censor to take from me something that I have than it is for me to get something out of him that he does not see fit to give me. There is very little which does not, sooner or later, get around to the newspaper man. There is not a great deal of any special importance which he does not get, and often with surprising promptness. The channels which lead to newsdom are many and various. But when the main pipe runs only into the Manila ayuntamiento, it often becomes a matter of some difficulty to get a satisfactory tap on it. There may have been a half-dozen scraps, but if the censor should see fit to post on his bulletin a notice stating that there was no news, and decline to be interviewed on the plea of occupation, the news-man is up against a wall, and there he must stay until some one who loves him more than the censor does gives him a kindly ‘tip’ or a story.”

Three weeks later I forwarded another letter upon the same subject, though it dealt with another feature. That read as follows :

“MANILA, December 16, 1899.

“The matter of the Manila censorship is beginning to get a trifle musty, perhaps, but I submit herewith a new and somewhat interesting feature of that institution. It is not only the press matter cabled to the States which has been affected. All the local publications here have been under the club. They are not allowed to say anything which criticizes or reflects upon the doings or the policy of either the administration in Washington or the local authorities here. Many Manila newspapers are sent to the United States. Readers there assume them to be an accurate reflection of affairs in the island. As a matter of fact, they are nothing of the kind. All are flavored to suit the official palate, colored to please the powers that be.

“The Manila ‘Times’ is far and away the leading American paper here. It is well and cleanly gotten up and is edited by a man who knows his business. Its editor has seen nearly thirty years of journalism in the Orient and was for a considerable time, prior to his coming to Manila, the editor of the Hongkong ‘Telegraph,’ a widely known publication.

“Upon the receipt of the news by mail and

the home papers that the censorship had been abolished some six weeks before any one here had heard a word about it, Editor Cowan of the 'Times' prepared the subjoined article for his editorial page. Its publication was prohibited by the censor, whose reply to the editor is appended."

#### ABOLITION OF THE CENSORATE

The New York "Sun" and other papers publish a Washington despatch of October 9 announcing, on the authority of Adjutant-General Corbin, that the censorate in Manila has been abolished by General Otis.

This is very remarkable, for the censorate is in fact not abolished yet, nor ever has been. Some explanation is due from the authorities. The people of the United States may have been more or less acquiescent in the continuance of the censorate, but will certainly not acquiesce in the official assurance of its abolition while it continues in full force. How the erroneous statement could have been made it is difficult to understand. The enemies of the administration will very readily understand it in their own way and make the most of it. It is undoubtedly a mistake of serious nature, and should be rectified promptly, so as to minimize the harm done. For this was no casual remark on trivial topics; it was (according to the "Sun's" despatch from Washington) Adjutant-General Corbin's official answer to complaints about the censorate. Whether General Corbin had misunderstood what General Otis told him, or whether all the newspapers conspired to misunderstand General Corbin, we cannot say; but if he did not tell them what they say he did, he should have taken steps to protect himself from misrepresentation on such an important question. The people of the United States will be disposed to feel that they

have been deliberately deceived, unless something is done promptly to put the matter in a good light.

With all due respect, we are strongly of opinion that the time has now arrived when the military government of the Philippines can conveniently cease to trouble about what the newspapers say or do not say, in Manila or elsewhere. For a long time we have had our own opinion about the censorate, but in certain circumstances it was our duty to loyally support the administration in spite of having contrary views ourselves. We do not think it is our duty to do so any longer, and we respectfully urge the authorities to accept the view that there is now no longer any justification whatever for a censorate. The military necessity which existed before is certainly non-existent now, and, outside of military necessities, if we have to submit to a censorship for any other purpose, we will only submit under protest. If censors are necessary in war, critics are necessary in peace. Should criticism go beyond legitimate bounds, there are civil courts, and there is no further excuse for a military censorate. Martial law may be still desirable in such matters as police regulations, curfew, etc., but not in regard to the press—especially after the adjutant-general has declared that the censorate was abolished.

The censor's determination of this matter is indicated in the following reply. It will be noticed that it is dated December 2, nearly three months subsequent to the alleged abolition of the censorship. It will also be noticed that Captain Greene still signed himself "Censor," and that he admitted that the institution was "distasteful to the public." The reply reads:

EDITOR MANILA "TIMES": Upon what the statement as to the abolition of censorship was based is unknown.

Your conclusions as to the further continuance of the censorship justified as a military necessity are all

wrong. In the matter of urging this abolition you are guilty of an interference in matters entirely beyond your knowledge. You can rest assured that as far as the authorities here are concerned, the censorship, as distasteful to them as to the public, will not continue longer than in their judgment is absolutely necessary.

Very truly,

GREENE,

*Censor.*

December 2, 1899.

It is hardly to be denied that both cable news and official reports failed to present the situation as it really was. The wisdom of presenting a doleful picture may be called in question, although conditions might fully warrant such a presentation. I can personally testify to some of the results of trying to tell the truth about such situations. I became the target for the scornful tongue. I was called a "Little American." Now I can sit back and chuckle over the reflection of how much wiser in our day and generation were the newspaper correspondents than those official accounts which reported the "situation well in hand," and predicted that the war would be "over in ten days." The misfortune for the American people seems to have been that the official reports outweighed the correspondent's stories.

Covering the situation to a later period, I quote a letter from one of the leading correspondents in Manila:

MANILA, April 15, 1900.

The Manila editors and the correspondents of American newspapers here are hoping that the arrival of the Civil Commission will result in a reform of the



present censorship methods. Cable despatches announcing the appointment of the commission were received by two of the Manila newspapers, but the censor forbade them to print this news. He has asserted that he suppresses only news "inimical to the interests of the military government." Frequent friction arose between the correspondents and the previous censor, while the Schurman Commission was here, over messages relating to the commission, and there was sometimes much trouble in getting through news which the commission had given out for publication.

The editors of the local newspapers complain bitterly and unanimously that the censorship as it is managed inflicts upon them wholly needless hardships and great financial loss. The only Filipino paper which supported the American administration has suspended publication on account of the censorship, and the editor of the oldest and most respectable and friendly Spanish journal announces that he intends to close his business and leave Manila, because it is impossible to publish a newspaper under the restrictions imposed by the present government.

The editors argue that the publication of newspapers which support the government's policy, as all of the Manila papers do, is an enterprise that should be encouraged rather than harassed, that they pay almost prohibitive rates to secure cable despatches, that they are served by reputable and conservative press agencies, and that their own financial interests lead them to instruct their correspondents not to throw away money on cable despatches which could not be published. They argue that no correspondent could possibly foresee that such news as labor strikes or the appointment of a commission to the Philippines would be considered inimical to the interest of the government, and that, moreover, the news which comes to them is not suppressed, but merely postponed, because the Filipinos receive the leading newspapers from the United States and read them with the greatest care.



## VII

### *THE NOVEMBER DISPERSION*

The early autumn of 1899—The campaign in the north—Hardships of the troops—Filipino movements—Continuance of hostilities—The pursuit of Aguinaldo—Indications for the future—Filipino money—Spanish prisoners—Thanksgiving day in the Philippines—Merry-making under difficulties—What some of us were thankful for.

THE months of August, September and October, 1899, saw the return of all the volunteer troops serving in the Philippines and their replacement by an increased number of regulars and what may be called volunteer-regulars. Only a notably small percentage of the volunteers from the State regiments reënlisted for further service. No extensive movements took place during these months. A few petty engagements occurred, but such movement as there was consisted chiefly in taking position for the larger movement which was to follow. While the following letters, written at the time, do not enter into closely detailed description of the fighting and mention only a few of the numerous engagements, they are fairly indicative of the

whole. They also reflect the general situation as it was at that period.

“MANILA, November 24, 1899.

“There is, at the present time, a disintegration of the northern division of the Filipino army. Presumably it is general and permanent. There remains, however, the possibility of an unexpected cohesiveness which may yet bring some considerable portion of it together again. Here and there one hears the expression of belief that ‘this thing is about over,’ followed by optimistic views of the immediate submission of belligerent Filipinos and their early return to quiet and peaceful industry. But such an outcome is barely more than hopeful guesswork. It may or may not be realized, and there are strong possibilities against it.

“About October 1, General Wheaton was relieved of his command at Angeles, and summoned to Manila for some purpose which was supposed to be absolutely secret and somewhat mysterious. After a day or two of investigation and survey, the news correspondents reached a fairly established conclusion that Wheaton was to organize and command an expedition to Dagupan. Manila headquarters sought to keep this all hidden from the news-men, so that they should not interfere with great military plans by telegraphing them to the United States. It so happens that the whole plan was published in America, on infor-

mation from Washington, long before General Wheaton was called to Manila.

“During the latter part of September General Young was sent to San Fernando, where his brigade of cavalry was gradually assembled. Again the newspaper men did some fairly good guessing, while Manila sought to keep them in the dark, and Washington gave the whole thing away. General MacArthur was at Angeles with his command. Thus there began the three-jawed combination crushing-machine whose operation, within the last two weeks, has taken the American army into the territory previously held by the Filipinos, and scattered, temporarily or permanently, the northern division of the Filipino army. With the dispersion of that army there has come Aguinaldo’s withdrawal into the mountains to the northward. That is it is now assumed on such evidence as has been obtained, that the mountains of Nueva Vizcaya were the point to which he was moving. The jaws of the crusher failed to be an accurate fit, and Señor Aguinaldo is understood to have slipped out between the eastern set.

“The movement is only comprehensible by reference to a map. Young’s column, attended by Division Commander Lawton and consisting largely of cavalry, the Third and the Fourth, was to constitute a long extended arm or jaw. It moved northeast from San Fernando, via Aryat, Cabiao and San Isidro, to about Cabanatuan,

thence northward to about San José, and northwestward to effect a junction with the shorter arm of Wheaton's column moving from the head of Lingayen Gulf eastward. While this was going on, MacArthur was to move northward from Angeles, via Bamban and Tarlak, along the line of the railroad, to crowd out the Filipinos and connect with any American force which might come down from the north. None came, and MacArthur rode through the country with little or no resistance, the Filipinos dividing, some to the east and some to the west, as he advanced.

"Unless one could know with accuracy the number of troops on sick report and on special duty, it would be impossible to state the number of effective troops engaged in this three-column movement. General Wheaton has the Thirteenth and Thirty-third Infantry, General Lawton has the Third and Fourth Cavalry, under General Young, and the Thirty-fourth Infantry, two battalions of the Twenty-fourth (colored), part of the Twenty-second, the Thirty-fifth and three hundred Macabebe scouts. MacArthur has the Ninth, Twelfth, Seventeenth, Thirty-sixth, two battalions of the Twenty-fifth (colored) and some of the Third Artillery. Behind and south of all this is the Sixteenth guarding the railroad track, and the Third in garrisons in the Candaba country. Without counting the two latter, there should be upward of ten thousand effective fight-

ing-men engaged in the breaking up of the Filipino army and the pursuit of Aguinaldo.

"A considerable number and the most active portion of these troops are beyond telegraphic communication. Reports are meager and infrequent. The commands are broken up and scattered over a territory approximating, roughly, one hundred miles square. Many of them are living on the country, and for many of them hospital and transportation service are impossible. Occasional tales drift in of severe hardship, of forced marches over horribly rough and muddy country under burning sun. There are rumors of sick men dropping by the wayside or being left in native villages where their fate is uncertain. It may all be greatly exaggerated, but the known conditions of the country and the weather leave plenty of ground for fearing that more or less of it is only too true. There is more reliable foundation for stories of men who are shoeless, and of men whose clothes have been torn to shreds in forcing a way through the thickets and jungles. A tale has come of men reduced to a uniform consisting only of a cartridge-belt and a breech-clout. There is little room for doubt that some of the troops are seeing some very rough campaigning, and it is wholly probable that the casualty and sick list will be considerable, though the loss in battle or from Filipino bullets will probably be slight. Some have been drowned in fording streams and some are missing. All

this is to be expected. The troops are not up there for a picnic or a rabbit hunt.

"The question is whether that which has been dispersed will stay dispersed, or whether there will be a reassembling for further resistance. Is it the end of hostilities, or an incident in the course of hostilities? *Quien sabe?* Movements on a smaller scale heretofore have been but incidents. The scattered opposition returns and the game goes on.

"I sent a letter, I think under date of October 19, in which I commented upon the sweep which was made on the south line, under command of General Schwan. The opposing force in that vicinity was but little, if any, smaller than that which has now been dispersed in the north. It is true that the northern department was the focus of the Filipino organization, the center of that which they claim, with more or less of reason, as a government. But that mid-October dispersion in the south was of brief duration. Within two weeks there were stories of a reassembling. Within four weeks it was reported that matters on the south line were getting very uneasy. Within six weeks more or less of desultory firing was going on in the vicinity of Inus. It is now reported by American scouts that a body of Filipinos, variously estimated in the thousands, has gathered within that very territory which was said to have been so thoroughly cleaned out in October. If I remember rightly, my comment

upon that dispersion instituted a parallel between such dispersions and the Jerseyman's dispersion of the mosquitos which annoyed him. This new aggregation is said to occupy a stronger position than the old one.

"Word came a day or two ago of another massing ten or twelve miles to the northeast of Manila, in a several times conquered territory. The importance and seriousness of these assemblages are political rather than military. They are not composed of drilled and equipped soldiers. They are the people of the vicinity, the peasantry of the country, with perhaps, and probably, some nucleus of regular Filipino military organizations. The cheerful enthusiast who asserts the early end of the war now sees in them restless bands of robbers, the vicious and the criminal classes. My own observation is to the contrary, and I find support in my views from scores of army officers whose time is spent at the front. These are general officers, field officers and line officers, whose duties take them and keep them among the people and the homes of the people whom they are fighting. The formidable gatherings in the immediate vicinity of Manila are made up largely from the people of the neighborhood. The special significance of it all lies in the fact that so large a percentage of these bodies are the people who have been where they could see and where men have experienced what is commonly called 'the beneficent influence of American rule.'



“The cheerful enthusiast asserts the immense improvement in Manila, in Bakoor, Imus, Malabon and all the surrounding cities and towns. He talks of municipal, social and financial improvement and advantage beyond anything known or dreamed of in the Spanish days. Yet, within a twenty-five-mile radius of Manila, with all these alleged advantages staring them in the face, there are thousands of Filipinos who are blind to them and who assemble in front of the American lines to resist advance and to harass occupation. The contention that civil government is making headway may hold in the case of individuals, but it does not seem to hold with the masses. This city is full of conflicting reports. Juan José comes in with a tale of Filipino dissatisfaction with the government and the processes of the insurgents. He has a tale to tell of suffering, disaffection, disgust and desertion among the Filipino ranks. He is followed by José Juan, who reports the country as standing by Aguinaldo, whose forces he reports as well armed, equipped, fed and contented. The only definite thing about it all is its indefiniteness; the only certain thing its uncertainty.

“My own impression is that the trouble is far from being over, unless it find determination in righteous American legislation. I give that as an impression, not as a conviction. I discount the opinion of any man who has a conviction about it either way. In the long run, the Fili-

pino cause is, of course, hopeless as against the power of the United States. Wisdom cries aloud to them to desist, to submit. But there are sundry human attributes which even these 'savages' possess that arise to drown the voice of wisdom. There are such things as patriotism, prejudice, hatred, superstition and various other qualities, worthy and unworthy, which lead men to fight and impel them to continue fighting. A general realization of hopelessness may lead to an early collapse of the insurrection. Other influences may lead to its continuation. Aguinaldo's death or capture might end it. That very death or capture might stimulate it.

"There is a further consideration. There are those who assert the ending of the war would be achieved by the suppression of the Tagal tribe, whose territory is the immediate vicinity of Manila. I can see no sound warrant for any such assertions. I can but regard them as over-optimistic, though the possibility of their correctness should be admitted. There is some significance in the fact that outside of Manila Bay there is no port on the two thousand or more miles of Luzon's coast which is open to American entrance except by force. San Fernando de la Union, two hundred miles or so to the north on the west coast, is hostile. So is Vigan, one hundred miles or more farther northward. Aparri, on the north coast, the gateway of the vast and fertile valley of Cagayan, is also hostile. Little

or nothing is known of our probable reception in any part of that long peninsula, five hundred or more miles in length, that extends away to the southeast and includes the provinces of Tayabas, northern and southern Camarines, Albay and Sorsogon. Cavite, Batangas and Laguna provinces are unfriendly, and beyond them no American soldier has yet set foot. The territory over which we have been fighting, the vicinity of Manila and the Manila-Dagupan valley, is, perhaps, the most favorable in all Luzon for military operations; the Cagayan valley is not generally unlike it; but aside from these two regions, the vast extent of the island is wild, rough, mountainous, a region in which a small band of determined natives may easily play the mischief with an invading force greatly their superior.

“The ‘war’ in the Philippines practically ended last spring—in the north at Calumpit, in the south at Zapote River. Hostilities have continued, but it has been a chase whose operations have depended wholly upon American aggressiveness. It has been made a proud boast that the Americans have won every engagement. Speaking generally, that is a fact. Speaking literally and particularly, it is a—well, a tара-diddle. All worthy boasters to the contrary notwithstanding, official or unofficial, American commands have a number of times been forced to fall back in the face of resistance from the enemy. But, speaking generally, the Americans

have gone ahead whenever and wherever they saw fit, with little resistance, since the days of those two fights last May and June.

"Some time ago, I wrote that I looked for little or no more of organized resistance to American advance. I believe the 'war' is over, has been for some time. How long hostilities may continue is wholly another matter and is beyond the predictions of any man. Some of the guesses and not well-founded opinions will find realization, for all sorts of views are represented. The successful ones will then assert their superior wisdom and pose as Solomons and other prophets, whereas it will be but the fortuitous outcome of a narrow observation. I have my own opinion, but I admit that if it comes out right it will be only a lucky guess."

"MANILA, December 18, 1899.

"The last month has marked a very decided change in the military situation in Luzon. American troops, well armed, fed and equipped, have scoured the northern districts and scattered their puny opponents. A battalion of the Twenty-fourth (colored) crossed the divide and, striking a confluent of the Rio Grande de Cagayan, followed its course via Bayambong, Ilagan and Tuguegarao, to the river's mouth at Aparri, on the north coast of Luzon. Another body of troops, under the personal command of Brigadier-General Young, followed northward along

the west coast of the island to Vigan. At Candon, Major March with his force turned eastward, via Cervantes and Cayan, to the crest of the central cordilleras. Another force, mainly from the Twenty-fifth (colored), moved westward from the vicinity of Tarlak, crossed the Zambales Mountains, and came upon the coast at Iba, from which place they marched southward to Subig.

“While these larger movements were in progress, other bodies of troops, large and small, occupied towns and swept through the provinces of Tarlak and Pangasinan. Comparatively little resistance was encountered by any of the moving troops, northward, westward or locally. I wrote some two months ago that all organized resistance to American advance was probably at an end. My prediction seems to have been fulfilled. The American loss from bullets has been quite insignificant considering the number of troops engaged and the extent of the operations. The Filipino loss from the same cause has probably been less than has been reported.

“General Young’s movement has been, supposedly, a chase on the trail of Aguinaldo, who, wherever he may be, is a fugitive. There seems no very strong reason to doubt that Young’s party was actually on the trail of the Filipino leader, though there are those who assert that Aguinaldo got away into the southern provinces and that the man whom Young was chasing was only a blind, an impersonator, sent out for the purpose of

misleading the Americans concerning the real whereabouts of the man they wanted. Captain Bachelder's battalion of the Twenty-fourth appears to have gone off on an exploring expedition very much upon its own responsibility. A wholly reliable authority tells me that they had no instructions for their somewhat spectacular escapade. Fortunately, it has turned out all right, thus making it a brilliant military manoeuvre redounding to the credit of the authorities.

"The troops engaged in these expeditions have seen some hard service marching, particularly among the mountains. Excellent roads were found along the west coast, but the passages across the mountains were made by narrow trails with the troops in single file. Field rations were carried where they could be obtained and transported by means of pack-ponies and native bearers. Supplies were supplemented by such provisions as the country afforded. In many cases these were but scanty, as the hill-country is sparsely settled and such people as are found there are indifferent producers. Clothes and shoes suffered greatly, and many a man was barefooted and ragged enough before the trip was finished. But a 'glorious victory' has been scored, and the 'end' is predicted by the sanguine.

"That an end must come sometime is a foregone conclusion. Which end has really come is a more dubious question. A friend of mine here,

a major in rank, spends a good many useless hours in trying to convince me by argument that from this time on the Filipinos will fall over each other in their rush to come in and give up their arms and become, by some process which I cannot at all understand, excellent American citizens, peaceable, industrious, loyal and patriotic. He claims that everybody thinks so, whereas I can find no one else, among those whose time is spent out in the country among the people, who has such an idea. That many will be glad to resume their old accustomed life and will now do so is unquestionable. I have disputed the probability of any wide-spread anarchy to follow even so crude a government as might be operated by Filipinos in a wholly independent state. My argument has rested upon the very fact—for I believe it to be a fact—that these people are normally a peaceful race who prefer the domesticity and quiet of home life to the turmoil and misery of war in any shape. Therefore I believe that many will now go home and go to work.

“That their return to home and industry will mean any love for America and the American flag, anything more than an enforced acceptance of the rule of a stronger power, I do not believe. Until there has been a clear demonstration to the contrary, American government will be accepted by the majority of Filipinos only as the successor of Spanish, the same in intent and object. I



still hold the opinion which I have held and expressed in the past—that the form of government here is of little concern to the great majority of the islanders. Those in the larger centers are more affected and well comprehend the difference between good and bad government, justice and injustice, freedom and oppression. They have property or property interests upon which taxes may be levied. Even the daily life of the laborer in a city or a large town may be made a subject of revenue, as it has been. Away from these centers the life is little more than an existence, easily maintained and indifferent to the rule of a central government. Aguinaldo, America or Beelzebub might be governor in Manila; thousands throughout the island would neither know nor care, so long as they were left to the life of their preference. They have little which could be taxed, want little and have less. They live in a phase of Pig's Paradise, in which they probably find as much of that kind of happiness and content which they want as does the majority of the human race.

“As a political organization the Filipino government, what there was of it, practically exists no longer. It is denied by partisans that there ever was any such government, and not a little of ridicule has been heaped upon Aguinaldo's portable capital. But it is an undeniable fact that there was a very good attempt at a form of government. It was formally organized; it gov-

erned districts, maintained an army, acted under a written constitution and sought recognition from other powers. It was duly recognized and supported, heartily and willingly, by many thousands. Others accorded it but a half-hearted recognition, some objected to it and many were indifferent.

"To-day it is scattered. Its leader is a fugitive and some of its cabinet are held as prisoners by the American forces. Some of its records are hidden or destroyed, some are in the hands of Americans. Among the seizures by the Americans was a considerable amount of paper money issued by the Filipino government. I have seen no bills save those of one peso. They are crudely printed on common paper and ornamented by a geometrical combination of type, such as brackets, asterisks and the like, like that found on the stands of a job-printing office. All of the wording is Spanish. Upon both ends of the back of the bill is the notification that counterfeiting will be *castigado con todo el rigor de la ley* (punished with all the rigor of the law). A notification on the back of the paper states that this bill (*billete*) will be redeemed by the Filipino Republic and received in payment of taxes (*contribuciones*), customs duties (*derechos de aduana*) and all general obligations. The back also shows, in large type formed of what might have been made for printing quarter-notes in music sheets, 'Republica Filipina,'

and in small type, 'El Presidente de la Republica, Emilio Aguinaldo,' and 'El Presidente del Consejo de Gobierno, Pedro A. Paterno.' A useless inscription appears at the base, on right and on left, *Papel moneda* (paper money). The face of the bill reads:

REPUBLICA FILIPINA

Papel Moneda

de

UN PESO \$ 1 \$

Ley 30 Noviembre, 1898—24 Abril, 1899

El Delegado del Gobierno

"As a political organization the Republica Filipina, set up as the revolutionary government in Cavite during the month of June, 1898, may be said to have gone out of business. It exists to-day only as scattered fragments with no central directing head. How much of life force remains in the fragments none can say. My own belief finds support in the views of many of the army officers in the field, that enough life is left to keep the United States interested for some time to come. Whether right or wrong in the idea, I have felt that there were many in the Filipino army, and many who were contributing to the support of that army, who were imbued with an idea of patriotism. The type may be crude, the idea mistaken, but there was the idea, and patriotism dies hard and kicks while it dies.

The last list of Americans killed and wounded may be many a day distant.

“The same process of dispersion which has been effected in Panay and in northern Luzon is projected for the territory to the south of Manila. It has been in the air for three or four weeks and will probably take shape within the next few days. The result will be a repetition of the story of the northern campaign. Headquarters will officially report movements, battles, glorious victories and jubilant receptions tendered to the Americans. But the battles will be skirmishes, the victories a conquest of the weak by the strong, and many a man who cries, ‘Vivan los Americanos!’ will do so with his lips only. Headquarters may telegraph what it will of cordiality and friendliness extended to the advancing American army. The truth is that these people do not yet love the Americans, and none save the ultra-optimistic and those who have a purpose to serve will say that they do.

“One effect of this wide-spread movement in the north has been the release, estimated to date, of between four and five thousand Spanish prisoners who had been held by the Filipinos. For two weeks Manila has been full of them. Some have gone on board ship en route for Spain, but more are coming to take their places. There were probably twenty-five hundred of them in the city some days of last week. Many stories have been told during the last few months of the

terrible hardships endured by these men during their captivity, of suffering, of privation and of cruelty at the hands of the Filipinos. All that may be true, but I have seen a good many thousands of Spanish soldiers in Cuba and in Porto Rico, and I have seen none who looked any better fed, any more physically sound, than these same released prisoners. Here and there one sees a sick man. Sick men are common enough, Heaven knows, in the well-fed American army. Many of them are dirty and ragged. Even among more civilized nations it is not a common custom to turn prisoners of war into peripatetic sign-boards for tailoring establishments. But the long-drawn-out complication concerning these men is now settled. At least two thirds of those who still survive are now released, and the rest soon will be. A Spanish commission is here providing for their immediate support and their imperative needs. Each man gets a big loaf of bread every day, and is at liberty to drink all the water he wants from the city hydrants. A portion of the money due them for military service is also paid them. Many are reclothed, though I do not know at whose expense. The movement also effected the release of a number of Americans who had been held as prisoners by the Filipinos."

"MANILA, December 1, 1899.

"The necessity of paying some attention to Thanksgiving day in the Philippines has been

the occasion of one point of discussion, whether, so far as the Philippines were concerned, the people of America should celebrate a day of thanksgiving, or one more after the pattern of the old-time New England day in April, set apart as 'a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer.'

"With the exception of the newly arrived regiments, whose outfit seems to consist, in about equal parts, of military impedimenta and military enthusiasm, I have not seen many American exiles in the Philippines who are in any danger of wearing out the knees of their trousers through spending hours in an attitude of reverent thankfulness. I was chatting with a man in the morning. He hailed from Concord, New Hampshire. 'Well,' he said, 'I thank the Lord that I'm alive. I don't know that there is much else.' The talk drifted into turkey, mince-pie, sleighing, shagbarks, and empty chairs around the table, until the tears began to come in the man's eyes, and I switched the talk into another channel. There were jollity and uproariousness in the Philippines on Thanksgiving day, but there were also many a wet eye and many a hungry heart.

"The day was observed, officially, by an order suspending all save necessary routine duties for the troops. To many it was, and could be, no other than an ordinary day. The whole north line, numbering a force of some ten thousand men, is little more than one huge scouting-party. Some of the troops are in quarters in towns and

villages; many are out 'hunting niggers' in wild, rough country, tired, worn and footsore. There are thousands in the reserve and field hospitals. Wherever it was possible the day was recognized. Some dined on turkey and chickens; some dined on 'slum.' Some, in Manila, drank properly iced champagne in toasts to the dear ones at home. Some out on the line drank ration coffee out of a tin cup, and had some reason to be thankful that they had even that.

"Among the thankful in Manila few had more reason for thankfulness than the many Spanish soldiers whose release from Filipino captivity has been effected by the recent movements of the American army. Within the last few days these men have been much in evidence on Manila streets. In the case of many, perhaps of most, their appearance belies their stories. They are full of harrowing tales of privation and hardship, but the majority of them appear to be reasonably plump and hearty. Even had they been stall-fed, it is hardly to be expected that they would entertain any very kind feeling for their captors and jailers. Undoubtedly they have had no easy time, though such suffering as they have endured is probably due rather to the inability of the Filipinos to entertain them with more than a pittance, than to any vicious or inhuman desire on the part of the Filipinos to cause suffering among them. But after months of captivity, these men, having suffered much or



little, have sure ground for a large measure of thankfulness in their release and the prospect of an early return to home and friends.

“The causes of Filipino thankfulness are less evident and the matter is more complex. Beyond a doubt, many of them are not at all thankful. Long-cherished hopes of a larger life in which their manhood should receive fuller recognition are being shattered by a stronger power than their own. They may mistake the real purpose of that power; that purpose may be hidden from their eyes by the mistakes of blundering agents; but many of those hopes, whether grounded in fact or in fancy, bear the stamp, at least, of honesty and sincerity. To-day those hopes are broken and those who held them are not thankful.

“There are Filipinos who are thankful, not that the American army is triumphant, not that the Stars and Stripes float over them and offer them vague and uncomprehended promises of peace and prosperity, but thankful that they can see the beginning of the end of a hopeless struggle of weak against strong. It has been a struggle in which many took no part, for the outcome of which many cared little or nothing. That which the cheerful enthusiast asserts to be active friendship for the Americans is, in reality, usually no more than a passive indifference to the power which rules. Some time ago, in answer to assertions that American withdrawal

from the Philippines would leave the islands to hopeless destruction and bloody anarchy, I urged my disbelief in any such condition. I contended then, as I do to-day, for my belief that the great mass of the people—a naturally peaceable and domestic people, too greatly lacking in mental and physical energy to be other than peaceful—wished, more than all else, to live their quiet, lazy, home life, free from strife and political turmoil. These are more or less thankful that, after a few weeks or a few months, there will come an end to that which has disturbed the life they prefer to lead and into which they have plunged or have been dragged by their friends and their kinsfolk.

“My personal state was complex. I pleased myself with a conviction that there would be no necessity for me to stay here much longer and I felt thankful. But I was not thankful for an interference with my immediate plans. I have made two unsuccessful attempts to get ashore on the island of Mindanao. I had arranged for a third attempt and success was assured. A transport carrying the Thirty-first Infantry was to have sailed for that island on Thanksgiving day. I planned to go on her. But the ship ran into a fog of that huge and omnipotent *mañana* which affects the Philippines as it did the West Indies, and her sailing was postponed. I was obliged to return and eat turkey and drink—cold tea—at the Oriente, for which mercy

I was not thankful. We are to go to-morrow—or perhaps the day after. I hope to be able to offer my readers something of interest about that vast but little known island. There may be a fight there, but there should be none. If there comes a conflict, I believe it will be chargeable to the conduct of Americans rather than to the actions of the Moro or the Sulu people. I am only afraid of the behavior of the American rank and file. The Moros are not a good people to offend, and I shall be duly thankful if the new garrisons on Mindanao duplicate the experience of the old garrisons in Jolo.”

## VIII

### *INEFFICIENCY OF THE DISPERSION*

Disturbed conditions—Establishing military districts—Situation in Manila—A problem in the south—Inaccurate information—The business condition—Misleading statements—A “humane war”—Early days of 1900—Robber bands—An unsatisfactory situation—A general summary—A gloomy outlook.

IN the following letters I described the ineffectiveness of the dispersion of the northern department of the Filipino army. At the time of their publication they contradicted much that was being said and written about the situation. To-day I believe they will find a more ready acceptance as a fairly accurate statement. The story of this dispersion in the north, in its processes and its results, is practically the story of the dispersion, at the beginning of 1900, of the army in the south. Names, dates and commands are changed, but the stories are essentially alike.

“MANILA, December 27, 1899.

“I have greatly wished that it were possible for me to give my readers some fuller accounts

and descriptions of the Filipino land and the Filipino people. But the 'times are out of joint,' and one must either offer an incomplete or a distorted skeleton. Nothing of importance is gained by accompanying the troops on their long 'hikes' into the interior, and yet one cannot make excursions without the troops.

"These military expeditions have brought, of course, much new and valuable information as one of their results. Most of the information, however, is distinctly topographical and of special value only for special purposes. It has been ascertained that excellent roads are to be found for a considerable distance along the west coast, and that the passage across the hills, from the valley of the Rio Grande de Pampanga to the valley of the Rio Grande de Cagayan, is wild, rough and exceedingly difficult. Something, too, has been learned concerning the people. But throughout a large part of the area covered by the American troops a great majority of the inhabitants fled their villages and houses, some in fear and some in uncertainty of what was in store for them. Such conditions are unfavorable for the study of humankind and village life in Luzon.

"Comparatively little that was new has been learned regarding commercial or industrial possibilities. It was already known that rice-growing for domestic consumption is an industry general throughout the lowlands, while a greater

or less quantity of upland rice is grown in the hills. It was known that the finest tobacco in the islands is grown in the provinces of Cagayan and Isabella, the eastern half of the northern end of Luzon, with the western provinces of Union and Abra as second and the central province of Nueva Ecija as third in the list of tobacco-producing regions. The expeditions of Young and Bachelder through those districts have brought no new and important information along commercial lines. The sugar and the hemp districts have also been known; so has the general location and condition of the people. Little of change has occurred since the time of the conditions described by Mr. Foreman and little more is known concerning the people than was known at that time.

“Special interest, of course, settles upon present conditions and the probabilities of the immediate future. I have already said, in other letters, that much of all anticipation of days to come is purely guesswork. One important step has just been taken in Luzon. Two new military districts have been created. Under the existing state of affairs, and that is what must be faced, the step is doubtless a wise one. The developments of the situation through which we have blundered seem to make processes which are tantamount to imperialism a necessity. Having embittered and antagonized a people, we must, until they can be weaned to other views,

hold and control them *vi et armis*. The military districting is well because it is a step in a definite system which can be extended.

“The Sixteenth United States Infantry, under command of Colonel Hood, has been sent to Aparri, on the north coast. Colonel Hood has been placed in charge, as military governor, of a district which includes the provinces of Cagayan, Isabella and Nueva Vizcaya. This covers the territory drained by the Rio Grande de Cagayan, one of the richest and most fertile sections of Luzon. Garrisons will be placed at points along the river, at Tuguegarao, Ilagan, Bayambong and some lesser points. Aparri, the military headquarters for the district, is the gateway and almost the only outlet to all these miles of fertile land. Along the eastern coast extends a mountain range sloping sharply to the sea, with no desirable or even possible harborage along its base. Except in the time of floods, which make its passage highly dangerous, the Cagayan River is navigable for cascos and native boats for some two hundred miles. The products of all that valley go down the river for shipment from Aparri. Colonel Hood is instructed to ‘establish civil government in the towns within his command’ upon the same general plan as that provided for the towns along the railroad, Malolos, Polo, Calumpit and others.

“That is the tenor of General Orders No. 69, and General Orders No. 70 is like unto it, reading



as follows: 'Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young is appointed military governor of the provinces of northwestern Luzon, to wit: those of Abra, Bontoc, Benguet, Lepanto, Ilocos North, Ilocos South, and Union, with headquarters at Vigan. The troops at his disposal will consist of the Third Cavalry and the Thirty-third Volunteer Infantry. All others in that section of country will be sent to Dagupan for disposition under orders from these headquarters.

“Permanent stations will be established at San Fernando (de la Union), Vigan and Laoag, with such outposts and subposts as may be necessary for the protection of the inhabitants and the administration of public affairs.

“General Young will establish civil governments in the various towns within the limits of his command in accordance with General Orders No. 43 of August 8 last, from the headquarters of the department and corps. He will establish, through the appointment of officers and details of assistants, the customs and internal-revenue offices necessary for public administration, which will be conducted as prescribed in general orders issued from this office and the specific regulations issued from the customs and internal-revenue offices at Manila.

“Customs officers will be appointed for the coast towns of Laoag, Vigan and San Fernando, and internal-revenue officers for the more important coast and interior towns. Those ap-

pointed for customs duties can also perform the duties of internal-revenue officers at their respective stations.

“The chief officers of customs and internal revenue at Manila will transmit immediately to the headquarters of General Young, for the guidance of officers whom he may appoint to the positions indicated, letters of instruction, circulars and orders relating to their respective departments, and which may be necessary for these appointees to acquaint themselves with a knowledge of their respective duties.

“It is desired that speedy arrangements be made that the ports of Laoag, Vigan and San Fernando may be opened for the coasting trade by January 1 next.

“By order of Major-General Otis.

“THOMAS H. BARRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*’

“This provides for the military districting of some two fifths of the island of Luzon, including as it does all the country down to a line drawn eastward from the head of Lingayen Gulf. Between that line and Manila there are seven provinces—Pangasinan, Zambales, Tarlak, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Bulacan and Bataan—which are now in American hands. The provinces of Principe and Infanta, on the east coast, have not yet been entered by American troops. Such points as have been held in Morong province

have all been abandoned and we now have no troops in that district. These bring a line down to the parallel of Manila. In this region between the parallel of Manila and that of the head of Lingayen Gulf, American occupation does not necessarily mean peace and American control. The same is the case in the northern districts. 'Scrapping' goes on almost continually. Five petty engagements are reported as having occurred yesterday. The only real difference which exists between these and the 'battles' of former days lies in the fact that the other fellows are now officially styled 'bandits' and 'robbers' instead of 'insurgents' and 'rebels.' They used to be Tweedledum and now they are Tweedledee.

"Manila, from which, according to the report of the commission, 'all danger of an uprising had long since passed away'; Manila, where, according to the report of the commission, peace, law and order dwell and reign supreme; Manila, the city of great commercial activity according to the commission, has received an addition to her force of protection and defense. Ten companies of the Fourteenth Infantry have been brought in from their post at Bakoor and added to the strength of the provost guard; so, too, have two batteries of artillery recently brought from Honolulu. Colonel Williston, provost marshal-general, believes that the disintegration of the Filipino army in the north is likely to send into the city a large number of those who were

formerly 'insurgents,' but who are now 'bandits' and 'robbers.' He regards their presence as a menace and has asked an addition to the forces under his command.

"Thus the greater part of Luzon north of Manila has had a sort of tentative clearing up. It is not entirely clear and the days of reconstruction will be punctured with more or less minor eruptions. An unsolved problem lies in the country southward of the city. I have expressed disbelief of any further massed or well-organized resistance on the part of the Filipinos; but it must be admitted that the possibilities in Cavite province are such as to warrant some idea of a fight that will go beyond anything seen in the islands since the opening days of the conflict last February. It will probably have been determined before this can appear. I am more inclined to look for a continuance of the same tactics employed in the north—a brief resistance and a scattering, lightning change from the fighting *insurrecto* into the peaceful *amigo*, reorganization into guerrilla bands, and annoyance whenever it becomes possible. This guerrilla annoyance is likely to prove more active and more serious in Cavite province than elsewhere in the islands. What Santiago province was to Cuba, Cavite province has been and is to Luzon—the seat of many insurrections. The Spaniards were never able to stamp out the resistance to their authority. An officer, who

probably knows more of the situation there than does any other American, said to me recently: 'Every man out there is an insurgent, and they are fighting for liberty.' The conditions of the country are most favorable for guerrilla warfare. It is a region of hills, swamps, bamboo jungles and steep-banked creeks. Whether or not there be enough of a fight there to warrant the description of it as a 'battle,' Cavite province is quite sure to be the scene of a prolonged and active trouble.

"Beyond that region lies the long strip of little-known and wholly unessayed country stretching away to the southeast. The mass of the people there can hardly feel very kindly toward the Americans. The district includes the finest hemp country in the islands, and the American blockade has paralyzed their industry. But, unless the area be made a retreat by the fighting insurgents, comparatively little resistance may be expected.

"Much of the country is in a disturbed and uncertain state. There is almost no part of Luzon through which an American can travel in safety without a military escort. I am aware that such a statement does not harmonize with the trend of the report of the commission, which seems to be accepted as a statement of facts from which there is no appeal. Out here, I have yet to meet a man who has been here for any length of time, in the army or the navy, a

news-correspondent or a merchant, who regards that report as either competent or accurate, or even a fair statement of the situation. At any rate, it is not a good time to study either the country or its people, and there is little to be said or learned which would be of permanent value in a consideration of our new citizens."

"MANILA, December 29, 1899.

"One of the—to me—astonishing things in the Philippines is the arrival here of intelligent men, who, after a few days' stay, confess to finding a state of things which is in no way in accord with their preconceived ideas. Within the last eighteen months, acres of matter have been written and printed describing the Philippine Islands and the conditions existing in them. The principal result would seem to be either confusion or error.

"Naturally there are many views. No two men see a country or a condition from precisely the same standpoint; individual temperament enters as a factor. No one man is or can be absolutely right; probably few are absolutely wrong. Each tells what he sees as he sees it. Few have trained or developed powers of observation, and still fewer have the faculty of intelligibly describing the things they see. None, unless it be their editors, realize this more fully than news-men and correspondents. They are often dependent upon others for their stories of

happenings and are sought by hundreds who think they have a story to tell of something which they have seen or done, but whose obliquity of vision is often remarkable.

“Not long since, an army officer brought me a story that he had written and which he wished to have accepted by some magazine. It described things in the midst of which he had lived for six months. He described the boats used by people in a certain portion of the Philippines. He spoke of them as crude and clumsy dugouts, hollowed from logs. A few of them are such, but nine tenths of the boats of that vicinity are the lightest, most graceful things imaginable; they are often beautifully carved. The huge, clumsy dugouts had caught his attention; the others, though there were infinitely more of them, he had not noticed. He spoke of the women of a certain tribe as wearing a loose jacket. In buying costumes, male and female, of those people, the only thing I could not get was a woman’s jacket; this was because each one was made for the woman who wore it and was made skin-tight.

“Not only are the observant and descriptive faculties lacking or undeveloped in most men; the deductive and analytical are almost equally so. People come here and are amazed at the business condition. They have read and heard that business in Manila was active and promising endlessly. The commission, or rather two



fifths of it, reported it to be so when they left. Exploiters arrive to find it stagnant and unhealthy, dependent wholly upon the abnormal and temporary conditions of military occupation. The reports upon which they had relied were drawn by men of incompetent deductive and analytical powers. A multiplicity of small shops, a crowd of shoppers and a throng upon the streets are mistaken for commercial activity. There is physical activity in it, and, to some extent, there is financial activity, but it is superficial and dependent upon unstable conditions. Ask those who are here for business purposes. They will say that trade is purely local, the country is not open and it will be some time yet before normal conditions of country trade will be restored. They dare not buy for import because of the vagueness and uncertainty of the cost of goods laid down here. Tariffs, taxes, freights, exchange, are all factors and are yet indeterminate. A few are here who are making some money; they import beer for American consumption.

“Men and officers of newly arriving regiments get here to find that most of their dreams of glorious war and triumphant victory look much bigger under a quarter of a column of ‘spread head’ than they do in the island of Luzon. They find that most of their work is monotonous and dreary garrison duty, with perhaps an occasional ‘hike’ which has far more to offer in the way of mud and perspiration than it has in the

way of glory or distinction, or even excitement. In spite of all that has been written, many are rather surprised to find that the enemy is still within fifteen miles of Manila. They have read of long marches into the far-away interior and have lost sight of the fact that Mr. Filipino is still in very considerable force sitting on the side-door steps and the back fence.

“More or less of these mistaken views are comparatively simple of explanation. They are due to facts of omission and to sins of commission. The competent observers who are writing regularly and exhaustively are few in number. The news-men and the official reports send in their records of events and incidents; but their functions are limited to those processes. Such records are not, and are not intended to be, explanatory or comprehensive; that department is left to the mail-correspondents, whose work appears in the particular papers for which they write and only reaches a wider circulation through the copying of excerpts by exchanges. Of such men there is but a limited number here. Cuba and Porto Rico had many ‘special correspondents,’ some trained and competent, and many who were far from being so. But cheap men could be placed there cheaply on transports and many were sent out. The Philippines are another matter and the ‘specials’ who really come under that category are few in number.

“Aside from these there is what might be

styled a semi-official class, having a semi-official status in the office of one or more papers, and a third class, which consists of men, soldiers or civilians, who were coming out here and who have been requested by editors to send back an occasional letter. The third class probably is the most numerous and finds a wide circle of readers. The misfortune is that their work is often quite unreliable through their lack of opportunity for observation and their untrained perceptions. Of this group is the soldier-correspondent. There are exceptions, of course, in this group, but they are few.

“I say that I am astonished at the ignorance and inaccuracy of idea on the part of many who come out here. When I look over a good deal of the printed matter that comes back here I sometimes wonder that people know as much as they do, and that they are not even further from the truth than they are. Even those who presumably speak with authority do their share of misleading. Let me quote a bit and analyze upon the subject of a question which is often asked. In a speech made in Chicago on November 15, Professor Dean C. Worcester made the following statement:

““I hear it said, if only a small fraction of the Philippine population is in arms against us and if the great majority of the people are ready to accept American sovereignty, why is it that we are compelled to send a great army to the isl-

ands? I answer, first, because we are waging the most humane war in history. If it were simply a matter of killing, we should not need so large an army. Two regiments of troops could go where they chose in the island of Luzon to-day and kill to their heart's content without serious risk. It is because we are attempting to protect the peaceable inhabitants from the depredations of the lawless that we require so large a force.'

"It is true that 'only a small fraction of the Philippine population is in arms against us,' but the statement is wholly misleading. The numerical strength of the Filipino army is not accurately known, and cannot be determined, because many of their fighters are not enrolled as soldiers. They are the peasants who wield a hoe in the rice-fields to-day and use a gun or a bolo on the fighting-field to-morrow. The actual Filipino fighting force is greatly beyond the variously estimated armed soldiery. The estimates vary from thirty to sixty thousand men, some armed with guns and some with bolos. Assuming even the maximum as the true estimate, it is but 'a small fraction of the population.' So is the United States sending a small army against them; sixty-five thousand is but a 'small fraction' of seventy-five million. But we do not hear much about 'our small army in the Philippines.' One usually sees it alluded to as a 'large army.' Professor

Worcester may say that the Filipino army never reached the figures given above. For our military credit we would best make that army as big as possible—on paper.

“He says, and it is an official assertion which he is quoting,—his own, I believe: ‘The great majority of the people are ready to accept American sovereignty.’ I note that he uses the term ‘American sovereignty.’ Are these people quite so ready to accept? Are they not rather resigned? The officers who are out in the field and in garrisons in towns, the soldiers who are on outposts, those who come most closely in contact with these readily acquiescent people tell a different story. These people do not love the Americans, do not welcome them. A few, a very small fraction may accept the American authority from reasoning or from selfishly politic motives. The majority have been antagonized and embittered. We are decidedly unwelcome to the most powerful influence here, the brotherhoods of the church.

“He says again, ‘We are waging the most humane war in history.’ That humane war has already cost us one full regiment of American soldiers killed and dead from wounds and disease, and fully three regiments of men maimed, crippled, diseased and broken down. Thousands of Filipinos have fallen—not as many as the official reports indicate, but still thousands. A war that kills five thousand men on both

sides, maims, cripples and breaks down ten thousand and causes endless misery to countless thousands more, is a curious variety of humane war. If it really be humane war, one might say, à la Mr. Dooley, '*Abase humane war!*'

"Again, 'two regiments of troops could go,' etc. For the last three days twenty-five hundred American soldiers under command of Colonel Lockett have been operating within twenty-five miles of Manila, just beyond San Mateo, where General Lawton was killed. They are not killing 'to their heart's desire,' nor can they do so. Probably there is no 'serious risk' in an engagement, of about equal numbers, in which an American major-general is killed and a casualty list of a score is reported. If Professor Worcester holds to his idea, he might come back here and take a little trip, just for rest and recreation, attended by two regiments, down through the provinces of Cavite and Batangas. If only two regiments are sent on that expedition, I do not think I shall go with it. I have an average nerve, perhaps, but that 'hike' will be a more 'serious risk' than I want to take with the professor's 'two regiments.' I notice that it took a three-column movement to break up the Tarlak business. Any one caring to look over the reports of the operations will find the regimental numbers of some fourteen different regiments given as taking part in it. The fighting was going on at the very time that Professor

Worcester was talking—and there were more than two regiments in it.

“The professor fails again and again in his logic. His argument really is that three thousand troops can suppress the insurrection, but it will take sixty-two thousand to police the island. That is not the view which the military authorities have had of it for the last nine months. If it is, then our troops have been mishandled and frightfully wasted.

“Some day the American people will get a full and clear perception of the Philippine Islands and their people, and will know and understand all that has been done here. I can only think, from the attitude of many of the later arrivals and from their own acknowledgments, that much is still unknown and much more is inaccurately known. I have no wish to be personal, but Professor Worcester’s argument is too palpably weak and too fair a specimen of much of that kind of thing for one to hesitate in using it as an illustration.”

“MANILA, January 8, 1900.

“Those who assume that the disintegration of the Filipino army and the disorganization of the Filipino government are an immediate prelude to an era of peace and prosperity are quite sure to find their ideas disputed by facts. I have no wish to stand as a prophet of ill omen, as a painter of troubles to come, but there is



much in the immediate future of the Philippine Islands which it will be well for thoughtful Americans to understand. Rightly or wrongly, wisely or unwisely, the United States seems to be here to stay, and in the hands of the American people lies the future of the island people. From much that I see and hear, I can only believe that, blinded by many motives parading under different names, the people of America fail to realize the grave responsibility that rests upon them and have little clear knowledge of many momentous questions that confront them.

“Hostilities are not yet over. There remains a considerable territory which has not been essayed, and, despite the assertions officially made, I have little doubt that the next two or three months will duplicate the last two or three. For political reasons it has been desirable to announce the end of the ‘war.’ I have already indulged in the rash statement that the ‘war’ ended months ago. Stress is laid upon the dissolution of the organized government and various American officials are casting such reflections as they can upon the ability and the honesty of the man Aguinaldo. It has been asserted that when he got into the northern provinces he would be among a people who were hostile to him and who would aid in his capture, if they did not kill him themselves. This has not proved to be the case and Aguinaldo, wherever

he may be to-day, appears from the best military evidence obtainable to have made his way in safety through a considerable territory and perhaps even through the American lines. One thing is certain: he is still the idol of thousands of Filipino people.

“One fact is to be kept clearly in mind. We have to deal with a people who have been antagonized, and who, though many may seem to submit, are by no means reconciled. The idea so strongly emphasized, which has wide circulation,—that we were opposed by only a single tribe and but a part of that,—should now be well understood as a fallacy. Sixty or seventy thousand men are not needed to crush a small local revolt. The idea, so boldly but illogically advanced by Professor Worcester, that the troops are needed only for the protection of those who are friendly to us against hordes of robber bands, bears its own refutation in its manifest absurdity. It is quite certain that the savage tribes of the hills have taken little or no part in any of the operations of the ‘war’ and that it is not they who constitute these alleged ‘bandits’ and ‘robber bands.’

“There is and has long been here, as there was in Cuba, a somewhat numerous criminal class. They are here known as *ladrones*, *tulisanes* and *babaylanes*. But these are not names of savage tribes, nor do they commonly apply to members of those tribes. Professor

Worcester's statement would warrant a belief that the population of the islands consisted of a few little-known savages, a few peaceful Filipinos who were friendly to the American people, and a great horde of the criminal element for the restraint of which a force of sixty thousand American soldiers was a necessity. In his book on the islands he several times mentions the tulisanes of Negros and Mindoro. In what I believe is his only reference to these people in Luzon, he makes this statement (page 457): 'Tulisanes seldom go where there is any danger of getting hurt.' Yet we are now asked to believe that the opposition to the United States consists of a huge aggregation of cowardly criminals and ex-criminals, and that sixty thousand men are necessary to resist them and protect the peaceable.

"The reason for this presentation of the situation I do not know. I can only infer that it is political and that an effort is being made to hide the blunders of the administration and its agents under a condition which will not be analyzed by casual readers and superficial thinkers. But 'bandits' do not live in villages, nor do 'bandits' and 'robbers' go about in bands numbering hundreds, building intrenchments and using artillery. Names make little difference, perhaps, but if names be used as a cloak for the purpose of diverting public attention and for conveying a wrong impression, it should

be announced that the name is but a title given to a certain thing, and the thing itself clearly defined.

“Some two or three months ago I predicted that there would be no definite surrender of the Filipino army, that it was probable that there would be no further organized resistance, and that little more would be heard, officially, of ‘rebels,’ or ‘insurgents,’ or ‘insurrectos.’ Thus far my predictions have been verified, though there is just now a possibility that some more or less serious resistance will be encountered in the movement now beginning on the south line. Presumably, everything is quiet in the north. That is the fact—with limitations. Things are quiet within our lines by reason of a strong force to make and keep them so. Outside those lines it is not easy to report the condition. It is, however, certain that our scouting-parties are in almost constant movement and that many petty engagements occur which are not of sufficient importance, in themselves, to be worth reporting. The ‘quiet’ of that country is one of alert watchfulness, numerous expeditions and frequent encounters. Reports come, too frequently, of American soldiers, operating in small squads, losing one or more of their number; of attacks on supply-trains; of individual soldiers, on duty or straggling through the country, being caught and sometimes killed. Many of the people throughout that region are

undoubtedly returning to their homes and their industries; but it does not surely follow that they are doing so permanently or contentedly, or that they are not part and parcel of the frequent local attacks, where such attacks can be safely made. In these little attacks the Americans are not always successful. They are sometimes overpowered by numbers and forced to fall back with losses.

“It is somewhat curious that so much of the country in which the ‘war’ is ended and the organized government destroyed should be calling for additional troops, or that commanding officers should regard their commands as of insufficient strength for the work they have to do. Thus both General Young and Colonel Hood, recently appointed as military governors of extensive districts, may be able to garrison some of their towns and cities, but who is to protect the peaceful agriculturists against the devastating ‘robber bands’? Even the now pacified Panay, and Negros with its ‘smoothly working civil government,’ required a new regiment a few days ago, and the Forty-fourth was sent down. That gives to the now peaceful islands of Panay, Negros and Cebu a garrison of five regiments, the Sixth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-sixth and Forty-fourth, and one battalion of the Twenty-third. The area of their occupation is somewhat less than that of the combined districts of General Young and

Colonel Hood. Hood has the Sixteenth and Young has the Thirty-third and Third Cavalry. Negros is a very peaceful island under its new American government, but there are 'bandits' enough there to make a fair number of troops a necessity and to be able to make a little row every now and then.

"The commercial situation is unsatisfactory to the merchants and the church situation is unsatisfactory to the people. This is all a doleful picture, but it is far nearer to being an accurate one than the official reports of 'all serene.' I meet few here who do not look for a continuance of hostilities. I do not say of 'war.' War died long ago. Hostility lives and will live until the United States shall demonstrate their purpose to give these people that which they now withhold. Where is the promised relief from oppression, that release from exaction, that dismissal of obnoxious monastic orders, those concessions demanded from Spain by the Filipinos in July, 1897, and for which they were then fighting and have been fighting since? In what has the United States bettered their condition and what has the United States given to them save those promises that Spain had given to them? Spanish laws, Spanish tariffs, the obnoxious friars, are all continued and the Filipino regards the American as the successor of Spain.

"The future hangs on that too long delayed

action of Congress. Months, probably years, will elapse, and a new order must arise before there will be eradicated from the Filipino mind the idea that the American is no more his friend than was the Spaniard. Until that shall be done, America may look to the necessity of a large military force in the islands, continued disturbance and a repetition of the experiences of Spain.

“Much has been said and written by ‘patriots’ and ‘great Americans’ about the necessity of thrashing these people for the purpose of diverting the ridicule of other nations, of vindicating the honor of the flag and of demonstrating the valor of American soldiers. Does it not seem as if those points had been sufficiently well covered so that America could afford to be just and generous toward its opponents, the little brown men of Luzon?”



## IX

### *PROGRESS OF THE WAR*

Occupation of Luzon—Extent of American influence—  
Apathy of the ignorant peasantry—Professional criminals  
—Misguided patriots—Dangers of travel—Diplomatic  
policy advisable—Unthinking optimism dangerous.

**M**Y departure for South Africa, soon after February 1, 1900, ended my work in the Philippines. During my stay in the Transvaal, I heard no word of the developments in the Philippines. While in Hongkong, en route to South Africa, I sent back a letter from which I extract the following. On returning to the United States in September, and reviewing the records of our experiences in the Philippines subsequent to my leaving them, I was, more than by all else, impressed by the fact that so many of my letters might have been written, with almost equal appropriateness, at any time within those months. This letter might have been written on September 12 just as well as on February 12:

“HONGKONG, February 12, 1900.

“With the exception of the southern half of the eastern coast and the central strip of the southeastern peninsula, the island of Luzon is now nominally occupied by the American forces. I say ‘nominally occupied,’ because a considerable area, particularly the northern, is but thinly garrisoned and, so far as I can learn, American influence extends only about as far as a Krag will throw a bullet. The occupation is unquestionably a forcible one. The stories of cordial welcome to the troops, of festivities and entertainments, have some foundation in fact, but they are generally misleading.

“There are Filipinos who are tired of war and there are those who have never been keenly desirous of war. There are the passively indifferent, the stolid and the timid. These more or less cordially welcome anything which presents a possibility of quieter conditions under which they can go on with the dull and petty round of life to which they have been accustomed and which they very much prefer. As one becomes used to physical pain and it becomes endurable, so do such limited lives as those of many of the Filipino peasantry become more or less callous to political tyranny and oppression. Some become roused to a measure of activity by a hope of better things, but the fever soon passes and they sink into the usual helpless apathy and, out of policy, seek to

ingratiate themselves with a new ruler in whom they see little or no improvement over the old.

"There remain two classes. Officially, we hear little of one and much of the other. There are the veritable bandits, the ladrones and tulisanes, who may be called professional criminals. The class has existed for years in the islands and has held a recognized status. It is made up of men of criminal tendencies, depredators and sometimes murderers. It is impossible even approximately to estimate their number, but they are not to be counted by thousands. They may number some hundreds, but it is probable that comparatively few of them are encountered by the American forces. They prey upon their own people and upon the estate-holders as they always have. Their number has undoubtedly been augmented by the disturbed conditions of the life of the island.

"The other group consists of those who have been and still should be called 'insurrectos,' 'rebels,' 'insurgents,' or any other term which fits their particular operations. I am not sure that the inconvenient title of 'misguided patriots' would not be the most fittingly descriptive. As an army of such, the Filipino organization is disintegrated and, to some extent, disbanded. But the greater number of those who constituted that army, though many have returned to their homes and taken up some part of their

normal life habits, still retain their guns, and the best information available leads me to an assurance that they keep in very general touch with each other throughout the island. Many of the islanders are subdued, but it is not at all established that they are pacified. The evidence is strongly in favor of wide-spread dissatisfaction, with some unsuccessful effort at concealment of the real feeling.

“The headquarters view is, as it always has been, an optimistic one. I do not find it well supported by the facts. Old residents tell me that five years ago, and back of that, one might travel in entire safety throughout the islands, meeting cordial and respectful courtesy everywhere. There was but a minimum of danger from bandits or anybody else. To-day I find few army officers, no matter what their view of the question and the situation, who do not advise strongly against travel through any part of the islands without ample military escort. The American troops are still energetically scouting throughout a wide area and the reports of attacks on outposts and pack-trains and scouting-parties are still frequent. My letters of the past months have indicated just this condition and the probability of its indefinite continuance unless it finds solution through other than military processes.

“The final solution is undoubtedly nearer than

it was six months ago, but I have urged my belief that the full determination of the matter lay along political or diplomatic lines rather than through any channel of military operations. I see no reason yet to change my views. I believe that an indefinite continuance of the present policy can have no other meaning than an equally indefinite continuance of more or less active hostilities. The proposal to constitute, by military edict, all who do not accept and accede to the military terms a class of outlaws to be shot or hanged by scouting-parties commanded by more or less irresponsible junior and non-commissioned officers, is a proposition which is almost as brutal as it is un-American.

“Whether the Filipino resistance to American occupation has been an effort toward a direct end, that of national independence, or, as I believe it has been, but a means toward an end, that of relief from political and monastic tyranny, abuse and oppression, there has been resistance and it has had an aim and purpose. It has affected hundreds of thousands, and many thousands have given property and life for the accomplishment of some more or less clearly defined and understood end. It is beyond the bounds of reasonable assumption to hold that such a people would at once cease their struggle and extend a loving and honest welcome to their conquerors. It is equally unreasonable to claim that a man who was yesterday a patriot,

whether clearly intelligent or blindly led by others, should become to-day a member of the criminal class, an outlaw to be shot or hanged on sight.

“After seven months of experience, observation and investigation in the islands, it is my contention that the adjustment of the trouble here can be effected only through diplomatic and political channels. I believe that this is as true to-day as it was months ago, and I believe that it was as true then as it is now. The Filipino people want something, that is evident. They are not fighting and dying for the fun of it, or for the excitement they find in the simple fact of an armed resistance. Their desires are legitimate from the standpoints of humanity, civilization and democracy. I believe that the United States may make up its mind to a more or less active row out here until these people get something more than vague assurances that when they stop ‘kicking’ they will get something which somebody else thinks is good for them.”

With this chapter I leave the story of our military operations in the Philippines. We have been fighting for eighteen months. The account of any one month is the account of almost any other month. The end is not yet, and competent observers are frank to say that they cannot see the end. Optimism is a far

more satisfactory state than pessimism; but if a thinking pessimism realizes a serious situation and faces its facts while an unthinking optimism fails to do either, I shall prefer to be ranked with the pessimists, though naturally gifted with a fairly cheerful disposition.



## X

### *THE ISLANDS AND THEIR PEOPLE*

A lesson in geography—Areas of principal islands—Geology of the Philippines—Volcanoes—Earthquakes—Climate—Philippine zones—Philippine races and tongues—Distribution of population—The Tagal language—Filipino character—Cleanliness of the Filipinos—Apparel—Buyo-chewing—A musical race—The savages.

**G**EOGRAPHICALLY the Philippine archipelago is said to consist of anywhere from six hundred to twelve hundred islands. A variation of a few hundred, either way, from the actual number is a matter of no importance; there are too many of them anyway, and the majority are quite valueless and practically uninhabitable. This variation in the estimates arises from the fact that hundreds of them are small, unsuited for human habitation or for cultivation, miasmatic and without potable water. Writers and chartographers fail to agree upon those which should or should not be counted.

Taken together with the waters which surround them and are included within their outside boundary lines, they extend over an area embra-

cing, roughly, some 300,000 square miles of the earth's surface. Their actual land area is given by Domann's map of 1882 as 114,356 square miles. The table of areas of the larger islands stands as follows:

|                 | Sq. Miles. |                 | Sq. Miles. |
|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|
| Luzon . . . .   | 40,024     | Bohol . . . .   | 1,496      |
| Mindanao . . .  | 37,256     | Masbate . . .   | 1,211      |
| Negros . . . .  | 4,670      | Sulu Group . .  | 948        |
| Panay . . . .   | 4,633      | Busuanga . . .  | 416        |
| Palawan . . . . | 4,576      | Marinduque . .  | 348        |
| Samar . . . .   | 4,367      | Tablas . . . .  | 327        |
| Mindoro . . . . | 3,934      | Burias . . . .  | 190        |
| Leyte . . . .   | 2,716      | Sibuyan . . . . | 159        |
| Cebu . . . .    | 2,413      | Ticao . . . .   | 121        |

This list includes all of the principal islands of the archipelago and leaves an average area of about three and three quarter square miles for each of the rest of them. Some are named and some are not. Had Mr. Venns been a trader in islands instead of a manipulator of bones, he would probably have grouped the lot under the sweeping classification of "Islands, various." They range from little ones of the size of a door-mat up to those which are as large as a back yard. The area of the whole, large ones and small ones, is practically the equivalent of that of New York State and New England combined. Just what percentage of that area possesses any value whatever for productive or grazing purposes can be, at present, no more than mere

guesswork. There are productive sections, some of them richly so and capable of high development. Some of these areas are extensive, like the valley which lies between Manila and Dagupan in Luzon, but they are to be classed generally as "patchy." The wild roughness of the interior mountain districts bars the greater portion of their area from any possibility of fruitfulness in any department.

Geologically the islands are difficult of exploration by reason of the dense covering of vegetation, living and decomposed, which hides the telltale rocks. The evidence of volcanic force is clearly manifest and volcanoes, extinct and active, are numerous. Active volcanoes are found throughout the islands. Monte Cagua (3910 feet), in the north of Luzon, keeps fairly active as a smoker. Taal, forty-five miles south of Manila, is one of the show-places of the region. It is geologically notable from the fact that its altitude of 850 feet makes it one of the lowest volcanoes in the world. It stands in the middle of Lake Bombon, and it and its smoking summit are often visible from the deck of steamers running to the southern islands. It has had various times of special and sometimes dangerous activity, though none of them are of very recent occurrence; but it is certainly not dead and stands as a not very assuring neighbor.

Probably the busiest and most destructive of Philippine volcanoes is the Mayon, in the prov-

ince of Albay, in Luzon. It has been in active eruption a number of times within the present century and even within the last ten years has been the cause of hundreds of deaths and the destruction of a vast amount of property. Canlaúan, in Negros, is occasionally active. Mindanao has a collection about which comparatively little is known.

Earthquakes are a possibility at any time. Some of these have been widely destructive to life and property. Little jars are of frequent occurrence and pass unnoticed save by the seismometer at the Jesuit observatory in Manila. The years 1874 and 1880 were times of special energy and continuance. I encountered nothing during my stay that was at all fearful. We had a little shake one evening which sent many people running into the streets, frightened the ladies in the hotel and set many things rattling and swinging.

No general statement can be made with any accuracy concerning climate. The distance from Babuyanès, at the north, to Bongao, at the south, is about the equivalent of that between New Orleans and Milwaukee. It does not get as cold at Babuyanès as it does in Milwaukee, though it does not get much hotter at Bongao than it does in New Orleans. As Manila is the point of special center and interest, I quote the figures given at that point. Three seasons are recognized. For lack of better terms, though

two of the three are not wholly fitting, these are known as the cold, the hot and the wet. Mean temperatures are given as follows: cold season,  $72.32^{\circ}$ ; hot season,  $87.26^{\circ}$ ; wet season,  $84.56^{\circ}$ . November, December, January and February are included in the first group; March, April, May and June form the second; and the remaining months the third.

But thermometric records convey little idea of heat conditions. Speaking broadly, one is safe in saying that Manila is a hot place and that Iloilo is a hotter one. Yet I have seen as perfect days in Manila as I have seen anywhere in the world. My personal opinion, based on experience, is that one may live in Manila with as little of discomfort as will be experienced in most other places, provided one does certain things and refrains from certain other things. One should dress for the climate, avoid all forms of over-exertion, particularly at midday, avoid over-drinking and keep on the shady side of the street.

The Philippine Archipelago should be divided, as it almost divides itself, into three distinct districts or zones. Luzon constitutes the northern zone; the Visayan group, Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol and their neighbors constitute the central zone; while Mindanao, Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago form the southern. The Tagals dominate the northern zone, the Visayans the central, and the so-called Moros the south-

ern. The Tagals and the Visayans may unite against a common enemy, but there is little of harmony between them in their ordinary mutual relations. With the Moros neither of these has anything in common. They are of more distinct Malay type and of other religious faith. The Tagal and the Visayan, though not to be called industrious, do some work. That can hardly be said of the Moros, whom Spain was never able to bring under either its political or its religious influence. Scattered throughout the islands from northern Luzon to southern Mindanao, there are semi-isolated tribes who survive, in full or in partial blood, from the aborigines. Just what percentage of the population of the archipelago these form cannot be accurately stated, through lack of acceptable census returns. Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines has never been complete; in fact, full domination extended over a comparatively limited area, while little more than nominal sovereignty covered the major portion. Over a considerable territory and over a considerable number of people it had little or no authority. A notable percentage of the islanders lived after their own manner and under their own laws, which were established tribal customs rather than any process that may be called, in strictness, law.

It is said that there are more than eighty different tribes, each presenting distinct traits by which it is distinguishable from all others.

They are scattered over the various islands of the group and represent gradations from the best of the Tagals and Visayans, among both of which tribes there are more than a few men of high intelligence, wealth and broad culture, down to the barely more than animal Negritos, the wild Malays and the warlike Igorrotes. The Negritos are generally regarded as the surviving remnants of the aborigines.

Ethnological differentiation of these tribes is almost, if not quite, impossible. Here and there may be found individuals and groups representing distinct races. There is distinct representation of Chinese, Malay, Negrito and perhaps a few others. The great mass of the population of the islands is probably best grouped, ethnologically, under the head of mongrel. Cross-breeding by selection is productive, undoubtedly, of the best types of life, whether in men, animals or fruit-trees. Promiscuous cross-breeding and in-breeding among lower types result in almost inevitable deterioration. Animalism breeds downward. Civilization breeds upward. Probably few places in the world present a degree of complex hybridization rivaling that of the Philippine Islands. Few writers on the country have ever attempted analysis of the origin of the various tribes.

Probably the most numerous and widely spread are the Tagals and the Visayans. Min-



danao, the great island to the southward, and the Sulu Archipelago have a population which is divided between natives, half-breeds and a tribe or race known as Moros, said to have come from Borneo about the time of the first Spanish settlement in Zamboanga.

It has not been the custom of the Spaniards to make accurate census reports concerning their island dependencies, either here or in the West Indies. Such information as they have obtained regarding the Philippine people has come rather through ecclesiastical than through official channels. When I was there that source of information was not cheerfully opened to wandering newspaper correspondents. No reliable tabulation of any of the tribes is obtainable. It is even somewhat doubtful whether such a thing be in any way possible.

Some attempt has been made to classify them philologically, but the results are not to be regarded as remarkably accurate. Thus in five of the northern provinces the Tagal is the common language of some six or eight hundred thousand people. In the southeastern provinces of Luzon, down in the Camarines section, some three hundred and twenty-five thousand or more of people are given as speaking Vicol, a term which I do not find in the works of either Foreman or Worcester, neither of whom appears to have made any extensive researches in that vicinity. In Manila the population is conglom-

erate, ethnologically and philologically. The city probably includes upward of two hundred thousand that may be classed as Tagals by blood or by affiliation. There are one hundred thousand or so of Chinese and Chinese half-castes. There are a few thousand foreigners and a good many thousand mestizos and other half-breeds, besides many whose pedigree is wholly indefinite.

Tagal is also a common, though not exclusive, language in some six or seven other provinces whose population approximates a half-million, and it forms a less common tongue in many others. I have been unable to obtain anything which I could accept as a reliable statement of the numbers of the Tagal tribe. Estimates and calculations are at variance, ranging from one and a half to three millions, with a probability of the former figure being more nearly correct than the latter. This is the tribe which is incorrectly given as "the only one in revolt." The fact is that the insurgent army is not made up wholly of Tagals, and there are many Tagals who are not in revolt. Some of them are classed as "amigos." But the amigo is, at best, an uncertain sort of creature, and it is wholly probable that the mass of Tagal people are in passive, if not in active, sympathy with their own kind.

The Visayans, or rather those speaking Visayan, probably number not far from two million. The Ilocanos probably come third, with a half-

million or more. These figures are little more than mere guesswork; they are not to be taken as even approximately accurate. Following these tongues, though not in the order given, are the Pampangan, Pangasinan, Igorrote, Itanes, Idayan, Gaddan, Dadaya, Apayao, Malaneg, Tinguian, Ibanag, Ifugao, Ibilao, Ilongote, Zambal, Aeta, Cebuano, Panayano, Manobo, Coyuro, Agutaino, Calamiano, and very likely a few score of others, without counting the yelping of hundreds of thousands of cur dogs and the moans of the repulsive carabao. It is not to be understood that these are all distinct languages. Some of them are distinct, others partly so. Most of them are dialects, though sufficiently different to be practically unintelligible to those of other groups. There are certain common words which are much the same in many of them, and Spanish words have been adopted to some extent by a number.

In the Tagal language one notices the great preponderance of the vowel *a* and the consonants *m* and *n*. It is evidenced in the following, which probably few American Sunday-school children will recognize as the Lord's Prayer, but that is what it is:

"Ama namin sung ma sa langit ca, sambahin ang nagla mo. Napa sa amin ang cahavian mo. Sundin ang loob mo aqui sa lupa para nang sa langit. Bigyan mo cami ngaion nang amin canin sa arao aras [daily, or, from day to day].

Patavarin mo cami nang aming manga otang pava nang pagpapatravar namin sa nangag caca otang sa amin. At hovag mo coming ipahintolot sa toeso at iadya mo cami sa dilan masama."

This ends with the sixth petition and omits the ascription. It will be seen that out of the hundred and twenty-eight vowels which occur, eighty are *a*, against forty-eight of all the others. A little more than a quarter of the consonants are *n*, one seventh are *m*, and one eighth *g*. I take this from a Spanish work, and as *w* does not occur in the Spanish alphabet, it naturally does not occur in a Spanish rendering of Tagal. There is little Tagal literature, but there are newspapers, some entirely and some partly printed in Tagal.

The present is not at all a favorable time for the study of Filipino character or Filipino ways of life. Taken *en masse* the Filipinos are in an abnormal mood. Broadly, they are either engaged in efforts to adjust themselves to new and unfamiliar conditions, or they are striving to nullify those conditions. Because of this, the Filipino who comes under the observation of the visiting American is not rightly to be accepted as the typical man of the island.

Another point also arises. The view of the individual observer is affected by his own temperament and mental habit.

The Filipinos cut a telegraph-wire, run provisions through the American lines and fire

upon American outposts from the concealment of bamboo jungles. A calls them cowards, dastards and tricksters; B asserts their cleverness in adopting the only system of warfare by which they can hope to score any measure of success. A thinks the Filipinos a dirty lot because their domestic environment so often suggests the imperative need of a revision in its methods of sanitation; B thinks them a cleanly race because he notices so many of them bathing.

This matter of cleanliness is one of the inconsistencies of Filipino character. Their houses and surroundings may be on the verge of filthiness, but they are, as a very general rule, most careful in their attention to personal ablutions. Again there comes a curious inconsistency. They will bathe in the muddy Pasig and in the canals of the city and its vicinity. Some of these canals are but little better than sewers; they are usually foul in appearance and often unspeakably offensive in smell. American methods are strenuously seeking to change the custom of former days, but these sluggish, muddy-bottomed channels are still made the receptacle of a considerable amount of offal and refuse. Yet these people bathe in them regardless of their doubtful composition.

The Pasig is a less notably offensive bath-tub; yet it is the main system into which the canals discharge by tide-water, and the stream itself is often a rich compound of alluvial matter. Its

special advantage lies in its dilution by reason of its volume. The morning bath along the river-front is one of the interesting sights of Manila. Few visitors see it because of the early hour of the performance. I should not have seen it myself had I not been obliged to get on board a steamer one morning at a most unholy hour. Both sexes bathe together, but there is no immodesty about it. All are at least as fully garbed as the bathers at Coney Island or Rockaway. It is a common enough sight to see a native wash his feet and limbs in a street puddle, and some one or more, male or female, old or young, will usually be seen taking more or less of a bath at the hydrants in the outlying wards of the city. Except in the case of children, the bath is often taken with but slight change in apparel. The men who bathe thus publicly are not customarily overdressed anyway. The ladies come from their houses in the vicinity, wearing a single garment secured under the arms and above the bust. The bath is taken by pouring basins of water over the head and shoulders. This finds variation in a home bath by fetching the water instead of going to it. I have seen women sitting in a tub set on the ground in front of their houses, garbed as described, and pouring and rubbing with manifest satisfaction.

The beach along the shore of Ermita and Malate, the southern extension of the city, is

another well-frequented bathing-spot. There is little swimming. Many Filipinos can swim and some are powerful swimmers. I have seen men from the *cascos* in the Pasig plunge into a very strong current, for the purpose of carrying a line to some boat or to the shore, one or two hundred feet away. But for bathing they prefer to wade, splash and pour. Children take readily to the process. But the water is warm and even the sea water lacks that invigorating snap which comes from a dip or a plunge in more northerly waters. The houses of the better classes are supplied with bathing facilities, usually the shower-bath, though occasionally the tub.

Another evidence of personal cleanliness is in the apparel. Even among the poorer classes there is a noticeable neatness of garb. Across the street that runs beside the hotel at which I stayed there was a large cigar and cigarette factory. Most of the employees were women. They were of all ages, from girls of ten or twelve to women of forty or more. In New York their pay would make them an object for the efforts of a variety of philanthropic organizations. They used to file past my windows on their way to and from their work. I never saw one whose gauzy *camisa* and *panuela*, print skirt and *tapis* showed any great need of the laundry. There may be a measure of shabbiness, though even that is most unusual, but it is quite uncommon to see the Filipinos dirty.



I did not find either Porto Ricans or Cubans to be faithful church attendants. The Filipinos are remarkable for their fidelity in that respect and Sunday and various feast-days are times of a kind of dress-parade. The best of garments and the most of jewelry belong to the church service, and one notes preëminently the whiteness of the masculine clothing and the spotlessness of the feminine. The dresses of the women (I should call them gowns if I were certain of the range of that term) are of all imaginable colors and combinations of colors, from entire black to plaids of red, green and yellow. That applies to the skirt. The tapis, which may be called the Filipino overskirt, is usually of some black cloth.

Except in the case of the more wealthy, the stocking of the Filipino woman is almost exclusively a religious institution. Most of them wear the peculiar shoe of the country, the *chinela*, always on the street. Few wear stockings except on Sunday or on days of church feasts. All do not wear them then; many cannot afford even that much. But a pair of black stockings is to a Filipino woman very much what a pair of kid gloves is to an American, except that the American glove is in more common and general use than the Filipino stocking. One of the notable points about Filipino women is their modesty. Their standard of dress and demeanor is not as ours is, but I am not sure that their

modesty is not of a truer type than the American. It is certainly more honest, less self-conscious and perhaps less prudish.

There are few better ways in which to study the customs of any people than by spending an hour or two in their markets. I continually noted marked differences between the customs of this bit of Spain's former possessions and those of her possessions in the West Indies. In Porto Rico the market is virtually closed at noon. In Manila it is a busy spot throughout the day. It is a market and a restaurant. One may sit down to a dinner, in courses, of the most unattractive messes imaginable. He may buy, as scores of the natives appear to be doing all the day long, little bowls of "chow" in any number of varieties. He may buy a little slab of slimy, sticky-looking paste, of the type known as *dulce* (sweet), wrapped in a piece of banana-leaf, thereby courting almost certain indigestion and, from the general appearance of the stuff, possible death.

The prevalence of dirt and flies around the average Filipino market causes one to wonder that the death-rate of the island is not any number of times greater than it is. Apparently no part of an animal killed for market is thrown away. Everything is bought up and exposed for sale, exposed also to flies and the heated and humid air, in the markets patronized by the swarming thousands of the poorer classes. Fish

is a staple diet and a variety is offered. In the markets of the masses the fish-venders may be seen squatting, not sitting, before their broad, flat baskets of fish, large and small, fresh, stale, smoked or dried. The vegetables are of more attractive appearance, in considerable variety, though usually small in size through lack of proper cultivation. Many of the vegetables are familiar to American eyes; so are many of the fruits.

In the markets one will see piles of a wholly unfamiliar article. It does not look like a fruit; neither has it quite the appearance of a nut. It is an oval affair some two and a half inches in length, its skin battered and fibrous. There is nothing attractive about it in either appearance or smell, yet it is practically indispensable to the Filipino of the lower classes and equally so to many of the better class. They call it *buyo*. Properly it is the areca-nut, which, when its kernel is separated from the husk and wrapped in the betel-leaf coated with a bit of lime, is even dearer to most Oriental peoples than chewing-tobacco is to many who are supposed to be their white superiors. In the same vicinity will be seen the venders of the betel-leaf, while others prepare the combination in packets suitable for an individual "chew." Its use will also be illustrated immediately at hand, and the bright red stains which may be seen everywhere about are accounted for. The nuts are brought from the

country in large boat-loads, and the betel-leaves are brought in fresh almost daily. The Moros of Sulu are even more vigorously addicted to buyo than are the Filipinos. One rarely meets a Moro man whose sash does not hold a small metal box of Chinese make, stored with his almost indispensable buyo.

The Chinaman, both as a merchant and laborer, plays a prominent part in all the life of Manila. His shops and his stores may be seen anywhere where trade is to be had, though certain thoroughfares, like the Calle Rosario and Calle Santo Cristo, are almost distinctly his own. Industry is his habit, but thrift appears to be his nature. He wastes nothing, and one can but wonder what on earth can ever be done with the stacks of seemingly useless rubbish that may be seen heaped up in the dingy shops of some of the dealers in the things which even a poverty-stricken Filipino would throw away. If "Waste not, want not," be a true saying, its logical conclusion must be that there is no such thing in the world as a Chinaman who "wants" anything.

One may see a phase of Filipino life on the Escolta and the Luneta, but it will be largely the life of a class. To see the life of the masses one does well to go into the crowded and dingy streets of the Tondo district. It is not a pleasant place, and it does smell horribly; but there

are more Filipinos there than there are on the Escolta, and they are probably more representative.

Statements concerning illiteracy in the Philippines are apt to be greatly misleading. There are tribes among which there is no such thing as either literature or education. If the whole population be considered, the percentage of illiteracy is undoubtedly high. In Manila the percentage would be quite low; so would it in many other of the principal cities and towns. Considering only those tribes which would include, like the Tagal and the Visayan, those who are furthest advanced in the ways of civilization, and assuming that such represent from one half to two thirds of the island people, the percentage of illiteracy would probably be very much lower than that of either Cuba or Porto Rico, and perhaps below that of the negroes of the Southern States.

The Filipinos are distinctly a musical lot. A native boy will make some kind of an instrument out of a piece of bamboo or an old tomato-can and then play a very sweet tune on it. They are particularly fond of concerted music, and gather in little companies for musical evenings. The ear appears to be quick and accurate and tunes are readily caught up. While I was there, one was quite likely to be awakened in the morning by a shrill boyish whistling of "March-

ing through Georgia" or "Hot Time." The street-boys whistled, indiscriminately, Spanish marching tunes and American bugle-calls.

Ethnologically, the typical Filipino is described as of small stature, slender frame, brownish-yellow color, symmetrical skull, prominent cheekbones, nasal bridge low, nostrils prominent, eyes narrow, mouth large, with lips full but not thick, chin short and round, hair smooth, straight and thick.

The number of those who, for want of a more accurate term, are called "savages" is quite a matter of guesswork. With them, as yet, the United States has come into contact very little. It is assumed that the aborigines are represented in a decadent people, variously estimated at from ten to twenty-five thousand in number, found in scattered groups throughout the islands. They are known as Aetas or Negritos (little negroes). They are of small stature, about four feet eight inches in height, quite black, with close and tightly curling hair. They are dying out, and though interesting as a race type have no important place in American experience, politically or socially. They are inoffensive and rather cowardly. Other tribes are, in the main, the result of intermixture of other races with the Aetas. The Malay, the Siamese, the Chinese, the Japanese and the Spaniard are indicated among many of them. One group is known as the Igorrote-Chinese. The Tinguanes of the

northwestern coast are of a different and higher type. Some of these tribes will doubtless accept American rule with entire indifference and make no trouble so long as they are not unduly disturbed. Others may, at times, make things rather interesting.



## XI

### *PHILIPPINE TRADE AND INDUSTRIES*

Some general reflections—Gold-hunting—Real wealth of the islands—Sugar, tobacco and hemp—Philippine commerce—Lumber possibilities—Possibilities in imports—Railways in Luzon—The Philippines as a field for young men—Chances for the capitalist—Hemp industry and its processes—Manila wood-workers—Mining a speculation.

THE Spaniards, after their decorative fashion, had a way of applying to all their tropical and subtropical possessions such titles as “Gem,” “Pearl,” and words of that kind. A few centuries ago they girdled the world with a jeweled zone. If I am not in error, the Philippines were the “Pearl of the Orient.” It is a “real pretty” name — “La Perla de la Oriente.” For centuries the world has been led to believe in the immense wealth, the marvelous and endless fertility of these islands. It has become a settled conviction, and that fact has undoubtedly been a potent influence with those Americans who have clamored most loudly for the possession of the Philippines. Had they been as barren as Greenland little would have been heard

of the policy of expansion concerning this part of the world; the Pearl might have gone to any one who wanted it.

That wealth or property lies in availability, rather than in possession, is a proposition which few will deny. Robinson Crusoe, possessing an island and sundry doubloons and "pieces of eight," indulged in some very sapient comment upon this general principle. He would have swapped the whole outfit for a Cape Ann dory with a leg-o'-mutton sail.

That many of the islands are potentially valuable is unquestionable. But there is little in that fact which makes them in any way unique; the same may be said of a very large area of the surface of the earth. It is, moreover, a well-known fact that the great wealth of the world has come in but limited measure from the spots which are regarded by many as those of greatest fertility and productiveness. Much of the world's wealth has come from brain and brawn contending with adverse natural conditions. Sterile New England, with its long period of cold and snow, has done infinitely more for the world's wealth and well-being than has sun-kissed Cuba. Barren and rocky Sweden has added more to the world than has fertile Turkey.

Where nature is bountiful man is lazy. A basic proposition in political economy is that man will gratify his needs and his wants with

the least possible outlay of energy. Beyond that nature herself raises a barrier which has never yet been thrown down. She has established a physical law in those regions of her greatest lavishness. In those countries upon which she showers her wildest and richest profusion of fruit and plant and root, she says to man, "Thou shalt not." To exercise in the tropics the industry and restless energy of New England, of Ohio, Illinois and Minnesota, means physical deterioration, if not death. The native Filipino can work in the flooded rice-paddy under a burning sun; the American cannot.

The probability of American colonization in the islands is very remote. Even were it possible to endure the exertion, the American cannot and will not compete with the native in matter of wages or in profit obtainable from small holdings. The wealth of the few may be profitably invested here, if labor conditions can be successfully controlled. It is hard to see where the many will derive any benefit whatever from the possession of the islands. It will, of course, be contended that the market for American products will be extended, and thus the American wage-earner be benefited indirectly. This may be admitted, but there are a number of facts which greatly modify the general proposition.

Much the same experience was encountered in Cuba. Enthusiasts came out in shiploads—and enthusiasts returned in shiploads. Some went

home disappointed, decrying the whole outlook; others, dazzled by appearances through which they did not seek to penetrate, returned to paint Cuban rainbows for the edification of their friends. There also was the curling lip. In time these countries will be both buyers and sellers far beyond their present average; but their development will be normal and gradual.

In the Philippines again one finds the enthusiast. He is less abundant than in the West Indies, because it costs a pretty penny to come out. My experience has been that the greater the enthusiasm and the deeper the conviction, the less there is of actual cash behind it. It is usually some other fellow's money that the enthusiast wants to invest—less a reasonable percentage for his services in the transaction. One of the most positive of the tribe among those I met in the Orient now draws a weekly stipend from the proprietor of a bar-room.

Much has been said of mining possibilities in the Philippines. Gold, silver and gems are said to be there in soul-satisfying quantities. Some excellent authorities, through several centuries of time, have asserted their belief in the mineral wealth of the islands. I do not know why gold should not be there in vast quantities. It has been found abundantly in Australia, in Mexico and in California, and these places are only six or eight thousand miles away. That gold has not yet been found in quantities in the Philip-

pires, and mines developed, does not argue it to be non-existent. The special puzzle in my mind is this: The Spaniards have been a gold-hunting nation for some four hundred years. They have struck pay-gravel in many places. It seems a bit curious, if gold be as abundant in the Philippines as some persons claim it to be, that these keen gold-hunters, who would rather gamble or hunt for gold than raise corn and potatoes, should not have got on a very hot trail after it years ago. Still, it may be there, and many a man will probably "go broke" in hunting for it.

The real wealth of the islands lies in what will grow out of their soil and not in what lies under it, just as the wealth of California and Australia lies in their ranches, their vineyards and their orchards. Thus far the leading commercial products of the Philippines have been hemp, tobacco and sugar for export, with rice for domestic consumption. There was a time when rice was exported to some extent; but it is now, and has been for many years, an article of import, in spite of the fact that the islands are capable of a very large rice crop. Sugar and tobacco culture are both capable of almost endless extension. But thus far I have been unable to see any marked advantage for American investors in sugar. The estimated cost of production is below that of the cost in Cuba, but the difference in freight rates, even on raw sugar, would almost certainly bar the Philippine

product from competition with the Cuban in the largest market in the United States, and have little or no advantage over the Hawaiian product on the Pacific coast.

The extension of the tobacco industry does not, apparently, depend upon the production. Philippine leaf has long been in the market. It is no experiment. Its obstacle would seem to be the taste of the smokers. It has not thus far proved a popular flavor, and there is little reason to look for any radical change, unless it arise from the fact that American soldiers sent to the island smoke it because they can get nothing else. Many will get used to it and perhaps come to like it, so that they will continue its use after their return to the States.

In one product, and as yet only one, the Philippines lead the world. Nowhere else has it yet been found possible to produce a quality of hemp to rival that grown in some of the Philippine Islands.

Yet the hemp industry is not one of any stupendous proportions, nor is it one which is capable of indefinite extension. The possibilities of production endlessly outstrip the probabilities of consumption, and this fact must be taken into consideration by those who contemplate investment in the Philippines. Thus far little or no use has been found for hemp fiber save in the line of twine and cordage, although it probably has some possibilities in

the line of woven cloths for special purposes. These, under different and suitable treatment of the fiber from its initial stages onward, may yet be developed, though there are no immediate indications of any possible product which could compete in price and suitability with fabrics obtained from other materials.

The annual output of Manila hemp, using that term to cover the product of the various islands, may be taken, roundly, as a hundred thousand tons, which is probably a fair average of varying yearly crops. Its value, in the Manila market, varies according to grades of quality and the market supply on hand and in sight. The range is from forty-five dollars per ton for low grades in full market, to one hundred dollars per ton for high grades in short market. The average total value of the product may be taken as, approximately, eight million dollars. Unless new uses can be found for the material, any very great increase in product would only tend to a reduction in price, by which it could be brought into competition with materials now used as a substitute at lower figures. The loss would thus lie with the producer, unless he were saved by mechanical processes which would lessen the producing cost.

The methods now employed in growth and manipulation are of the crudest. The plant from which the material is obtained belongs to the plantain or banana family. In appearance



it bears a close resemblance to the source of the fruit of the push-cart. It sends up a stout trunk, or stalk, which reaches its maturity in three or four years. The petioled stalk will run from six to eight inches for an average diameter, and is crowned with the long, massive and arching leaves which are now familiar through illustrations. The general structure of the corn-stalk will serve as a suggestion for that of the stem of the *Musa textilis*, though, of course, very much smaller. There is the central body of pith, surrounded by filaments embedded in a sappy, vegetable matter. The filaments constitute the hemp of commerce and their extraction from their surroundings constitutes the process of hemp production.

Probably much the greater percentage of hemp is obtained by a coöperative system in which the landowner gets a big income for doing nothing, while the peasant gets very little for doing about as much or as little as he feels disposed to do. From first to last the work is done along primitive lines. The cutting is done with a single stroke of the bolo, the local knife, which corresponds to the Cuban machete. It is a tool in peace and a weapon in war. The fallen stalk is stripped of the fiber-bearing petioles, which are cut into ribbons of five or six inches in width and of the length determined by their growth. The next succeeding process is the one in which there is demanded the genius

of the inventor to devise an instrument or chemical process by which the sappy vegetable matter may be separated from the fiber without injury to the latter. Under the present system, a rude trestle is constructed, supporting a knife secured by a hinge at one end, while the other is operated by the upward pull of a flexible stick acting as a spring, whose force is counteracted by attachment to a treadle controlled by the foot of the worker. Thus by graduated release and pressure the operator regulates the bearing force of the knife and overcomes inequalities of thickness in the petiole upon which he is working.

The effecting of an economy in this department is of greater difficulty than is apparent to the casual observer. The obstacles to be overcome are mechanical, chemical and economic. There might be little difficulty in the construction of a machine that would adjust itself automatically to the varying thickness of the petiole and the varying tensile strength of the fiber, but it should also be an affair of ready portability and simplicity. It must, too, be free from danger of that discoloration of the sensitive fiber to which it is excessively liable and which lowers its market value. It must also be able to compete with the absurdly low rate of wages at which the native is willing to work. At present a reasonably diligent laborer may earn, as his share under the coöperative system

of cutting on the land of a proprietor, a matter of three or four dollars a week. But he will be better satisfied to work a little and loaf a good deal with a return of a dollar and a half. He probably will do no more work while any portion of the sum remains.

The denuded fiber is then dried and is ready for the market. Local buyers usually purchase this product in the small lots in which it is offered and dispose of it to agents of the Manila business houses. These houses are chiefly English, and although the United States is a large purchaser, it makes its purchases at second hand. The enthusiastic American says that this will soon be changed and all the business go through American hands. This may be, but the enthusiast is disposed to overlook such a little difficulty as the fact that the trade is in the hands of old established houses, who know the business, know the people with whom they have to trade, and have their equipment and connections. It would be no easy matter to effect a change.

One may not be particularly astonished that hemp should be grown and treated by primitive methods, but it is somewhat surprising to see it treated in Manila warehouses, for export shipment, by a system which dates back to Archimedes and Egypt. The material arrives in the small rough bundles in which it is packed by the peasant. It is sorted and weighed out in

lots of two hundred and eighty pounds weight in each, for baling. These lots are stowed in roughly made cribs and are then trampled down under the feet of a couple of active men who jump and dance upon it until the suitable quantity is in the crib. The outfit is then moved under a rude screw-press, operated by four men who stand upon a platform and turn the screw by capstan-bars. This effects a partial compression. The crib is then moved to a second and more powerful press, also a screw operated by capstan-bars. This affair is worked by some twenty or thirty men. When this gang has reduced the mass to the prescribed size, it is bound with bamboo withes, the screw-pressure is released, the crib knocked away, and the bale of hemp is ready for marketing and shipment. There may be some special reason for treating the fiber in this way, but unless there be such reason the process could be greatly simplified and facilitated by any one of a number of American compressors.

Up to a certain point hemp-raising presents opportunities for investment; but it is no sure thing and obstacles to success present themselves. Typhoons may blow down the plants and destroy them, and the labor question, as in all other fields here, presents its own difficulty for the planter or landowner.

Like Sea Island cotton and Vuelta Abajo tobacco, it stands almost without competition

for particular uses. Sisal may take its place for certain purposes and wire rope has been permanently substituted for it for many other purposes, but there is no immediate probability of Manila hemp being crowded out of the market. Its culture and development by improved mechanical processes is probably the most encouraging of all the Philippine industries.

The labor question is one of exceeding seriousness. The American cannot work in the Philippines, and the native will not labor with that degree of regularity and diligence on which commercial and industrial success so largely depends. The industrious Chinaman, in combination with American brains and American capital, could readily turn the islands into a beehive of production and profitable industry; but it is most unlikely that those of the present generation will live to see that combination played.

The wealth of the Philippines is potential. Its increase and development depend upon factors which are not readily available and not readily controlled. There is room for capital if it can secure labor to go with it. The man of small means will do better in either Cuba or Porto Rico, and he will do quite as well at home as he will in either one of them, unless he possesses some exceptional qualifications for the life of a tropical colonist.

The total value of the imports of the Philip-

pine Islands is given, for normal years, at an average of about twenty million dollars annually. As the dollar of the Philippines is of silver and represents a fluctuating value when compared with the dollar in gold, the only way of obtaining an accurate estimate of the gold value of the imports would be by the conversion of the silver into the gold at the particular date of each entry. Up to 1892 an average might be struck which would give the silver a value of about eighty cents on the dollar. Since that time it has, of course, been much under that. The years preceding 1892 may be taken as a fair representation of normal commercial conditions and the gold value of imports at that time may be set at not far from sixteen million dollars.

I believe this to be an outside estimate and it is probably ample enough to cover a large share of those irregularities practised here by importers, as in all of the Spanish custom-houses of my experience. In dealing with figures of this kind one encounters in the Philippines the same difficulties found in Cuba and in Porto Rico. Consular reports and published statistics are all at variance, sometimes widely so. This may be accounted for, to some extent, by the fluctuations of silver values, and perhaps somewhat by consular efforts to reconcile import values in Spanish ports with the accounts of export values from the port of shipment. At all events, be the Philippine import trade ten,

fifteen or twenty millions, it must needs be vastly augmented before it becomes a business that is worth any very great commercial struggle or any very heavy national outlay. It merely approximates the import business of the little island of Porto Rico with its one tenth of the Philippine population.

Enthusiasts have already determined, on paper, that the islands are to constitute a desirable market for some of the surplus products of America. Enthusiasm and a knowledge that the population of the Philippines is generally estimated at some seven or eight millions are an inadequate working basis for the decision of trade possibilities here. Unquestionably, the trade of the islands can be, and under new and better conditions will be, greatly increased. But the average American leaves certain factors out of his calculations. It is not usually the business man with goods to sell who reasons after that manner. It is likely to be the man who knows but little of commercial processes and difficulties; it is the man who thinks that commercial transactions consist of four routine processes—displaying samples, taking orders, receiving payment and making a consequent and inevitable profit. The man with the goods to sell sees it all in another light. He sees such minor contingencies as heavy expenses in soliciting trade, sharp competition in prices and the possibility of bad debts.



The heaviest item of Philippine importation has been cotton goods, including both white and prints. Of this trade the United States has as yet obtained a share which is entirely insignificant—less than one third of one per cent. of the whole. Spain and Great Britain have held the rest. There seems little probability of any great change in that department, within the next ten years at any rate. Article 4 of the Paris Treaty reads as follows: "For the period of ten years, counting from the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, the United States will admit Spanish ships and merchandise into the Philippine ports with the same conditions as the ships and merchandise of the United States." England must share the same privilege, under the "most favored nation" clause. Some grades of American cotton goods may find an increased market, but the encouragement is trivial.

Cotton is the common material of the native costume, whether it be for the breech-clout of the semi-savage or the more elaborate get-up of the Tagal or the mestizo. Linen finds a limited sale and woolen a very limited market. Native-made fabrics of very light and open texture, like the piña muslin and the coarser *jusi*, find wide usage. To supplant these in the native garb would involve a revolution in native fashions. That will probably occur at about the same time that the Ethiopian changes his skin.

Nor is the market for flour one of great en-

couragement. The mass of the people are either semi-savage or impecunious agriculturists. A poor man who can raise, by his own industry, all the rice that is needed for his family, is hardly likely to squander any great sum in the purchase of wheat flour. Rice is one of the staple foods of the masses. The islands should raise, and in the past have raised, it for export. Of late years they have imported large quantities annually, nearly one half of the supply in fact. In competition with native-grown and Rangoon and Cochin China rice, the Louisiana product can have no chance. At the present time rice is selling at what is regarded as a very high figure by reason of the disturbed conditions and their interference with local production. Saigon rice is quoted at four dollars and a half to five dollars (Mexican) per picul. This is equivalent to a little more than one and three quarter cents the pound (American money). Quotations on native rice are fluctuating at all times, but their ruling in normal times is quite below this figure. Even free of duty, wheat flour could hardly be laid down in the Philippines at double the cost of rice. Yet some flour trade will undoubtedly be developed.

Coal finds some use, principally for consumption by steam-vessels, coasters and others. Bar-iron finds a small market, and there is some field for corrugated iron for roofing and siding. The old-fashioned Spanish tile has been found

dangerous in times of earthquakes and the corrugated, galvanized-iron sheets are used instead. In the rural districts the thatched nipa hut will probably hold its own for many years to come. Lumber is found in amply sufficient quantities, and a moderate number of mills, with a capacity of from twelve to fifteen thousand feet per day, would probably find a profitable return for a capital of twenty thousand dollars. Wide currency has been given to reports of the vast extent of forests of hard wood, which offer flattering inducement to lumbermen. So far as I know, these reports all come from men who have never been in the lumber business. I have not been in it myself, but I spent a number of years in sufficiently close touch with it to learn that heavily wooded hillside and valley do not always mean a profit for sawmills. Wood there is, and much of it, but its possibilities of commercial exploitation are for the determination of expert timber-hunters and men who have "made sawdust." The immediate demand for our Pacific coast timber is not likely to be extensive.

Kerosene oil is one of the heavy exports of the United States to the East. China is a heavy buyer and the Philippine trade is capable of extension. Its lines of limitation occur in the increase of electric lighting in cities and in the more economic use of the locally produced cocoanut-oil, which, though it does not produce a dazzling glare, serves the native purpose well

enough. There is also the matter of competition with the Baku oil. This may be eliminated by the adjustment of "spheres of influence" between the Baku people and the Standard Oil Company.

There are also limitations in other and general lines, which will only be affected by the gradual development of what are regarded as steps in civilization. Some market may ultimately be found for rugs, but carpets are inherently objectionable for various reasons. I should say that ninety-five per cent. of the people now go barefooted, though many of them have, and sometimes use, the locally made sandals, of various patterns and material. The custom of going barefooted finds its reasons in both comfort and economy and it will probably be many years before Lynn and Brockton will find it necessary to run overtime in order to keep up with their Philippine trade. It is seldom that one sees a woman wearing a hat. Some men go bareheaded, some wear a twisted cloth and some wear hats; but the hats are of all sorts and kinds, from umbrella-like structures from China to a variety of locally made straws. A modest trade is found in the cities in the sale of felts and funny little "billycocks." Rubber coats and mackintoshes are uncomfortably hot, but there ought to be a good market for ponchos, as there already is for umbrellas.

Beef and mutton come in refrigerator-ships

from Australia. Beef is quoted at about twenty cents per pound, American money. Grand Rapids might place a moderate amount of furniture, and Chicago should find market for lard and butterine. Soap is either of local manufacture or of Spanish importation. Some paint is required, but the bamboo hut and the nipa shack limit the paint-market. Bicycles are useless until there are better roads. Saddles and harness of local make will undersell the imported. The native does not drink much whisky, and the islands produce their own tobacco. Beer—well, as for beer, we must wait and see the results of American education.

In thus briefly summarizing the Philippine demand for various staples, I fail to see just where there is room for the enormous increase in commerce which some assert will be the immediate result of American occupation. No nation changes its customs, its habits, its needs or its desires, simply by a change of government. Political processes may facilitate economic processes, but development of races comes by degrees. South Africa and the Western States have grown rapidly, because they were peopled by those who brought their own standard of human needs and wants to the new land which they were to occupy. Filipino life must be revolutionized before great change can come in its possibilities as a market for American products. Local industry must be stimulated and

local production must be increased. The people must have money to spend and they must greatly increase the range of things for which they wish to spend it. Generations of so primitive and simple a life as that of the Filipinos and habits formed under a life which presents itself under the easiest and simplest of conditions are not liable to sudden and radical alteration simply as a result of new political conditions.

Philippine trade conditions will be developed and improved. That is inevitable. But I can see no ground upon which to rest any beliefs or hopes that the mere flying of the American flag will immediately change customs and natures which are the result of three centuries of Spanish rule and the effect of life under a tropical sun. New life must come in or the old life be awakened to new motive and new purpose, to wholly new accomplishment, before any "boom" may be expected in the Philippine Islands.

I believe that there is but one wise view to take of the Philippine Islands as a field for commercial exploitation. That view is the strictly conservative. To the sanguine and the enthusiastic this seems pessimistic; but enthusiasm is a poor working basis for commercial enterprise. It is supposed to be a patriotic sort of thing to paint these islands in glowing colors as a place of endless value, of untold wealth. But patriotism is patriotism, and business is business. Too much of general confidence is placed in the

statements of men whose business judgment is not competent, though they may be good lawyers or soldiers, or successful politicians. Does some reader come back at me and say that the business judgment of a correspondent is equally questionable? I was a newspaper man *pro tem*. My training and experience have been in commercial lines for twenty-five years.

The basis of industrial development in any country is facility of transportation and economical distribution. Luzon has one hundred and thirty miles of railroad, running northward from Manila to Dagupan, through a richly fertile valley. Thus far it has been a failure as an investment. Sixty miles of the southern end traverse a low-lying and often swampy country, which diking and ditching turn into productive rice-fields. The rice is for home consumption, and, in spite of the miles and miles of cultivation, the production is barely more than half of the consumption throughout the islands. Northward of the rice area of this valley there is a higher ground with a considerable production of sugar. From here northward sugar and tobacco are the productive crops, with rice for local consumption.

The Manila-Dagupan Valley is drained southward into Manila Bay by the Rio Grande de Pampanga, and northward by the Agno River into Lingayen Gulf. These streams are navigable, except in very dry seasons, by the native



crafts used for river freighting. The territory to the northward is a point of discussion by many who wish they had money enough to build a railroad up the west coast to Laoag and from there eastward across the mountains to Aparri. Others go further and extend their line southward, along the course of the Rio Grande de Cagayan, to cross the divide somewhere in the vicinity of Caranglan, and tap the present line at about Calumpit, via the valley of the Rio Grande de Pampanga. That, on a map and in a speculator's mind, would make a very pretty loop-line between five and six hundred miles in length. Of course it would be quite desirable to have a few branches, some to run up tributary valleys and one to touch the east coast at Baler. A thousand-mile railroad would probably be about the proper thing.

Such a road would traverse and open up many thousands of square miles of fertile territory. But there is another side to it as a business proposition. Let us consider the present situation. A very large percentage of the arable land is already under cultivation for the maintenance of a people who want very little, get about what they want and are entirely satisfied with it. Almost the entire territory is now open to water communication. For about one half the year this is unavailable from lack of suitable harborage during the time of the monsoons. But their products, sugar and tobacco,

are not immediately perishable and can be held until shipment is possible. A railroad would make shipment possible at any time.

The government might build a railroad for the benefit and education of its new "savage" citizens, but the capitalist will go into figures. What will it cost and what dividends will it pay? The road, with side-tracks and a few necessary short feeders, would not be much under eight hundred miles in length for a minimum. Its route would cross two mountain-ranges, rough in character and of considerable altitude, probably fifteen hundred to two thousand feet at crossing. Innumerable streams, which during the times of rain turn into torrents, would necessitate the construction of innumerable strong bridges. Six or eight cities, having populations of from six to ten thousands each, might be touched along the route. Rails and rolling stock must be brought out. Chinese labor could be used economically in grading and construction; but such a road could not be built and equipped for less than \$25,000 per mile, probably would not be so built and equipped at less than \$40,000 and might go up to \$60,000. Here is an almost impossible minimum of \$20,000,000 of actually invested capital, with a possible \$48,000,000 at the other end. Who bids for this glorious opportunity to run a railroad through the greatest extent of fertile territory in Luzon? Where is the profit

of from \$600,000 to \$1,000,000 a year to come from to pay a three-per-cent. dividend? Cut the proposition in two and stop the road at Aparri. There still remains the fact that unless the road be run for amusement, at a tremendous annual loss, the freight rates must needs be placed so high that shippers could not afford to use the line at all. I am not a railroad expert, but these are simple figures and need no expert knowledge.

Let us now look southward from Manila. There is a long and roughly broken mountain-range running three hundred miles or more southeastward through Laguna, Tayabas, North and South Camarines, Albay and Sorsogon provinces, to the Straits of San Bernardino. I think I should want about \$100,000 per mile for that contract. A road built, winding up and down, through and around those hills and mountains, would give an opportunity for a trip that would be one continuous dream of loveliness. It would give a panorama of scenic beauty beyond description. Hills, mountains, valleys, tropical verdure, gulfs, bays, rivers, streams and the vast Pacific Ocean would form a part of its advertising capital for the tourist travel. But when that utterly prosaic duffer who spends his time raising the finest hemp in the world wants to send his hemp to market, he would send it by a prosaic and probably dirty, but economical, cargo-boat. His hemp would not

care enough about seeing the scenery to pay the necessary rates.

The city of Manila could well stand an improvement and extension in its street-railway system. The present murderously overworked ponies should be exchanged for trolley-wires. The line should be extended southward through Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas, Bakoor, and so on around to Cavite. It could be advantageously extended in the suburbs in other directions. A good return might reasonably be expected from a considerable system. An adequate service would find liberal patronage. But I have a sort of idea that the scheme is already well in hand. A small suburban system might also prove a good investment in the vicinity of Iloilo. But I know of no other point in the islands where any railroad, steam or electric, offers any glaring attractions to investors.

But a railroad is by no means of vital importance in the industrial development of the Philippines, though it might be a great convenience and a desirable object-lesson to the inhabitants. The fertile river valleys and the rich lands of the coast-line are readily accessible by water, and water routes are known to be economical transportation lines. One need not hesitate to go into sugar, or hemp, or tobacco, or coffee, or cattle, or anything else, except timber, in the Philippines through trouble or cost of getting his product to market. I except timber. I

realize that in doing so I touch upon one of the Philippine products most lauded for its golden promise. I have heard farmers, and lawyers, and politicians, and naturalists, and soldiers, and beer men, and tobacco men, and dry-goods men and one or two newspaper men, tell all about the timber resources of Luzon and other islands. I am waiting to hear from some old timberman who has made sawdust in a mountain country. For several years I was in pretty close touch with some loggers and sawmills in the Blue Ridge Mountains. I saw there, as I see here, hills and mountains densely wooded to their summits. I saw hundreds of thousands of dollars go into that country. I saw logs and boards go out. I have heard a good many mill men use bad words over vanishing capital. I shall be quite conservative over the vast resources and mighty profits of the timber business here until I hear the testimony of a few men whose business it is to "see into a tree," and who can properly estimate the cost of cutting, hauling and a few other things that have to be done in the timber business.

I believe it is Mr. Barrett who advises young men not to come to the Philippines for a livelihood unless they have at least three thousand dollars of capital. I would like to ask Mr. Barrett to publish a list of all the names of the young men of his acquaintance who have gone to Ceylon, to Java, to Siam, to Sumatra, to

Borneo and other lands in that neighborhood presenting similar conditions to those found in the islands. I would like to see that list checked off to indicate the number of three-thousand-dollar capitalists in those parts of the world who have made enough to pay them for all that they left behind, and the number of those who have "gone broke" unless they could draw considerable additional sums from home. My own minimum figure would be ten thousand dollars and I would advise second thoughts even at that.

With conditions of equal if not of greater promise in the West Indies, I do not think that "young men with three thousand dollars" are going out to the Philippines in any great crowds. Those who do contemplate such a course should keep in mind two or three things which are facts. Outside of government positions, salaried situations are harder to find than they are at home. Now and then some one strikes a speculative snap, but these are exceedingly rare, especially those which are strictly honest. General commercial business, particularly in retail lines, is, like that of the West Indies, in the hands of those who know their business, their customers, the language and the wants of the people far better than any American new-comer. These merchants can and will live in ways which no American with three thousand dollars would accept. If a man gets stranded he is a long way from home and in a very deep hole.

The special opportunities are in production. A few lines of petty manufacture may be open, but in such lines the young American is handicapped by the native workman, either at a trade or as proprietor of a small shop. In lines of agriculture, in sugar, hemp, coffee, indigo, tobacco and the like, it is to be remembered that time is to be taken into account. Beyond the necessary capital for investment there must be resources upon which one can live for two, three, four or five years. Sugar is wholly out of the question for all save the capitalist with hundreds of thousands at his command. In work on a small scale in hemp, tobacco, coffee, copra or any other local product, it will be impossible for the American to compete with the native.

The industrial development of the Philippines is work for the capitalist, and the pertinent question follows: Will the capitalist improve his opportunities? The cheerful enthusiast, who seldom has any money for investment, asserts vociferously that under the benign shadow of the starry banner the Philippines will at once begin to assume the aspect of a modern financial Garden of Eden; that Manila is to become, within a brief decade, the chief commercial emporium of the East, and the Pacific Ocean a highway thickly dotted with ships of trade coming to and returning from these blessed islands. How absurd this exag-



generation looks when printed! Yet I have heard men urge these propositions. The preliminary report of the commission falls but little short of them and indicates a lack of business judgment on the part of those who prepared it.

Sound business develops normally along normal lines. The Philippines are new territory to Americans, but they are not new territory to nations that have known them and traded with and on them for decades. England, Spain, France, Germany, and even little Portugal and Holland, have been in business in the Orient for a number of years. It is my opinion that the Philippines will find such development as may come to them through foreign rather than through American capital. The investors of England and the Continent must go abroad for their investment. They, and not the Americans, have developed Australia and Borneo, India and Ceylon, Java, Sumatra and all else in the East.

Undoubtedly bamboo is the most important wood in the country, and yet it is not a wood at all. It is the material more used than any other and for a greater number of purposes. It is used for building houses, bridges, fences, and for repairing roads. It is made into beds and chairs and tables, into hats and baskets and mats. It is used in a thousand common and uncommon ways. It makes a fishing-rod or a flagpole or the shoulder-pole by which the coolie carries his load. It makes a water-jug or

a scaffolding, for the erection of a four-story building. It is a provision of nature for endless uses and it grows in endless quantity, almost at every Filipino's back door, if it does not form the shade of his front door or a hedge of forty feet in height around his hut.

One may do a good bit of prowling around the Binondo and other districts of Manila without realizing the extent of the woodworking industry of the place. Courses that were once streams through swampy meadow-land are now practically canals, muddy and often sewer-like, through the wards of the new city which surrounds the walls of old Manila. Certain stretches of these canals are filled with logs, bound together, raft-like. Piles of logs upon the banks at once suggest to the observer the presence of sawmills, and he listens for the buzzing of the saw and the sound of the moving carriage as it runs the log forward against the flying teeth; but the sounds are not there. One looks for a smoke-stack which will indicate an engine and boiler to drive a saw; but there is no stack. Yet there are logs—sawlogs—up to fifteen and eighteen inches in diameter and here and there a larger one. There are the logs, and in large, shed-like buildings there are boards, planks and joists. There must be a connection between the two.

Somewhere around these buildings you will find perhaps one, perhaps several, of those logs

mounted on trestles some two feet in height and strongly built. The log is held in position by pegs driven down into the top of the trestle. The log has been cleaned and marked with lines. The lines are guides for the sawyers and the spaces between the lines show the thickness of the boards to be cut. The sawing is done by hand, two men operating a saw, dragging it back and forth. The saw is a light, narrow blade carried in a rectangular oblong frame. One can but wonder what these chaps would say to see an American double-band sawmill pile up one hundred and fifty thousand feet of lumber in a day's work. Board-making is certainly a slow job in the Philippines.

Suppose the wood being cut to be cedar for the making of cigar-boxes. Hundreds of thousands are required annually. An American novelty wood-works would be fitted with resaws, gang circular saws, band-saws, table-saws, pony-planers and sandpapering-machines. A rapid and systematic routine would turn the log into piles of small pieces of all the requisite sizes and shapes for tops, sides and ends. Any one of scores of American woodworking concerns would make in a few months all of the millions of cigar-boxes that Manila would use in years. In the Philippines the wood is all sawed down by tedious hand processes, and one may see half-naked Chinamen doing, as a last process, that which the American would have done among

the first. I stood in a doorway and watched a row of these chaps at work. Each sat on a sloping bench some four feet long and dropping from an eighteen-inch elevation at one end to about twelve inches at the other. Beside each was another low bench, upon which were little piles of pieces sawed down to the sizes required for the different parts of a cigar-box.

These pieces were to be planed, one little piece at a time, upon both sides. The Chinaman sat at the upper end of the bench, placed one of the little slabs against a chock on the top of the bench a little way in front of him, lifted a foot and clapped his heel upon the piece to keep it in position, and scraped away with an awkward little plane requiring the use of both hands. To do this an arm extended upon either side of the upbent leg, underneath which the work was done. It was scrape, scrape, scrape until one side was dressed, and then the slab was turned for the same process on the other side. On the floor in another room sat another Chinaman putting these pieces together. From beginning to end, it was all a slow, tedious and apparently an expensive process; yet when one figures labor at its probable cost of little if anything over twenty-five cents per day, it is perhaps not so expensive after all.

Watching this and other woodworking processes, the manufacture of camphor-wood chests, various articles of furniture and the many other

purposes for which wood is used in small pieces, one is struck with the idea that a novelty wood-works could hardly fail of being a highly profitable enterprise. Yet it is somewhat doubtful if it would be quite the success which one so easily imagines. It would involve, at least, skilled or half-skilled labor for the operation of some of the machines. A bright boy quickly learns to run wood over a table-saw, but lathework needs a trained man. Skill and judgment are needed for many processes. All this, however, could be easily overcome. The more serious question would be the possibility of getting enough business to keep the place going. Profit in wood-working lies in keeping the machinery active. The field is one of considerable extent and I should be disposed to advise its investigation by a limited number. Cabinet-work, store-, office- and bar-fitting, doors, cigar and other boxes, and kindred lines, present some field for American enterprise in the Philippines.

The possibility of success in boring for oil or in mining it is useless to discuss. What lies hidden in the ground is not known; what it would cost to get it out of the ground is even more indefinite. Coal, iron, copper, gold and oil are all found in the islands. The possibility of the successful exploitation of any one of them is a matter for practical investigation by capitalists and experts.

## XII

### *THE MOROS OF MINDANAO*

A mysterious island—Zamboanga—The Calle de la Marina—American occupation of Zamboanga—The request of the people—An official delegation—A letter from a datto—Cottabatto—A close shave—Davao—Datto Mandi—Palawan—Polygamy and slavery—Future relations with the Moros.

FOUR hundred miles southward from Manila there lies the great island of Mindanao, vast, wild and semi-mysterious. For three hundred years Spain fought for its conquest and secured but a foothold upon its margin, with precarious filamentary lines of occupation toward its interior along the courses of the Rio Grande and the Butuan rivers. The recorded history of Mindanao consists chiefly of military reports of Spanish operations, supplemented by some accounts of the efforts of Roman Catholic missionaries to effect a religious establishment. Spain made vigorous attempts, with but limited success, to colonize the island, particularly upon its northern coast, by emigration from the Visayan Islands, which lie at varying distances of

from twenty to fifty miles across the bay to the northward.

From the northwestern corner of the island there extends an arm which, dropping southward, forms the peninsula of Zamboanga. Near its southern tip, Spain maintained a military post established some two hundred years ago. A well-built stone fort stands just outside the town. Across the strait, on the island of Basilan, the port of Isabella was used as a naval station, second in importance only to that at Cavite, near Manila. Probably owing to the presence of the Spanish garrison, there had sprung up in Zamboanga a considerable settlement of Chinese, Tagais and Visayans. Upon the outbreak of the last insurrection the Zamboanganians took the part of those whom they called their "brothers in the north." They also stayed with their brethren in the conflict with the United States later.

The peninsula of Zamboanga is practically a range of hill and mountain, with small tracts and limited areas of level lands along the coast. One's first sight of the land in sailing southward from Manila is in the vicinity of Point Sindangan, about a hundred miles from the city of Zamboanga. From Point Santa Maria, fifty miles north of Zamboanga, the course takes a vessel quite near to the shore, and the densely wooded hillsides of the coast, fringed with the cocoanut-palms, are clearly visible from the



deck. Rounding Point Botalampon, one enters the straits of Basilan, through which passes the ocean highway for ships trading between China, Japan and Australia.

Ten miles north of the land's point, the hills and mountains drop away into a broad stretch of level land, some of which is swamp, while some is cocoanut-grove. Upon the southwestern border of this level land there lies the old Spanish town of Zamboanga, settled, I think, in 1635. There is no real harbor, anchorage being made in a roadstead of strong tide current and sheltered from wind and water only by two small islands, Great Santa Cruz and Little Santa Cruz. North of the town there used to be, and there soon again will be, a Moro settlement of huts and houses, many of them built on slender piles out over the water. Scores of the light and graceful Moro boats (*vintas*) are drawn up on the shore. Two piers extend from the shore in front of the city. The northerly one is of some pretentiousness, built of masonry, but of little practical use because of shallow water. The other is a rather tumble-down affair of wood with a little greater depth of water at its end.

Parallel with the shore and in front of the houses whose rear gardens show from the water-side, there runs the principal street of the place, Calle de la Marina, which will very likely some day be Americanized into Water Street. When the town is cleared up it will be a pretty

street. Zamboanga has the working foundation for a most attractive little place. Through the middle of the Calle de la Marina runs a little stream some twelve or fifteen feet in width. Along its borders are fine large shade-trees, and it is crossed at short intervals by graceful bridges. The whole effect is a pretty picture and some of the bits of play of light and shade are exceedingly artistic. The street really runs from the fort on the south to a point above the town, a mile or more in length. Inshore from it are two other streets running parallel with this, all being crossed by others at right angles. Along these streets are two-storied houses, most of them an upper story of wood built upon a lower story of masonry.

Behind all this is a broad tract which shows evidence of having been burned over. It was formerly the home of the "masses," the people of the village. It was a town of nipa and bamboo huts. At the time of the Spanish evacuation all were burned. The native people were at war with the Spaniards, and the embarking Spaniards feared the shots which might come from these huts. They therefore set fire to all the tents, thus leaving behind them a clear space across which a small guard could maintain a protecting fire while the main body and the possessions which were to go with them were moved on board the ships. That destroyed a large part of the town. After the Spaniards

had gone, the local people came in and did much damage on their own account to the buildings formerly occupied by the Spanish civil, military and religious officials. It is said that they sought treasure of plate, etc., which they thought the Spaniards might have hidden. Few buildings in the whole place were left really habitable after both sides had had a crack at it.

During the course of the disturbances between the local people and the Spaniards, the Moros, several thousand in number, under the leadership of Datto Mandi, had scattered. Mandi, with the larger number of his followers, moved to the island of Sacol, some ten miles away. Their village, near Zamboanga, was almost entirely destroyed. The market of Zamboanga was burned to the ground. The church, an unimposing edifice of some size, was but little damaged. Little harm came to the leading official residences. The walls of the fort could not be hurt, but most of its interior wooden buildings were knocked to pieces or burned. When the American troops landed there on November 17, 1899, the first military occupation, the place was a scene of desolation, a rank and weed-grown wilderness.

The situation at that time was a tender one. The Moro people of the vicinity were friendly. The Zamboanganians were divided into two factions, one of which had been openly hostile toward the Americans. Their leader, Alvarez,

was still among them, and many were hurt and angry over the killing of their second in command, Calixto. Fortunately, the work of occupation and the primary steps of restoration fell to the lot of an efficient man. Captain Nichols of the Twenty-third Infantry was sent in command of the garrison of temporary occupation. Through a half-year or more of experience in Jolo he had gained a clear knowledge of the people among whom he had come. Some differences existed, but the people and the problem were much the same as those of Jolo, and the differences were chiefly those of detail. Captain Nichols is entitled to great credit for his administration of affairs during those early days of the occupation. He found a wilderness and proceeded at once to make it a place of habitation. He succeeded so well that when I reached there two weeks later the people of the region came and went freely and confidently; streets and parks were being cleared and set in order; stores were being opened and stocked; a rude market had started up on the site of the old one; and wholly amicable relations had been established with the people.

A few days after his arrival, he was waited upon by a delegation representing the people of the vicinity. They presented the following report of an official meeting which had been held by the headmen of the neighboring towns. All were represented except the town of

Mercedes, which had been the center of the insurgent operations and the site of their camp.

## RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

In the town of Zamboanga, the 20th of November, 1899, came together in the government house the members of the local assemblies of the towns of the province, according to call. . . .

Señor Nestorio Arquiza, being recognized by the presiding officer, stated that in his opinion it would be to the advantage of the province, its well-being and its prosperity, to entreat the United States government to concede the following points:

1. The continuation in the province of the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion, professed by its inhabitants.

2. To respect the usages and customs of the country, under the American laws.

3. Absolute liberty of lawful commerce.

4. Exemption from all manner of taxation until the province recovers from the state of ruin in which it now finds itself, in consequence of the calamities which it has suffered.

5. Individual security and the free use of *armas blancas* (the knives and weapons of the country) in outlying districts.

6. Consideration for the rights of property.

After considering these propositions, the assembled delegates adopted them and gave their unanimous approval.

The President then requested that, in view of the fact that the American commandant of the forces of occupation wished to make no change in the internal government of the towns, the *jefes locales* would continue in office the same persons who have filled them heretofore, and who will in future be responsible for the order and tranquillity which should prevail in their respective districts.

For the repression of minor offenses committed by

the inhabitants of any town, the *jefe local* is authorized to administer punishment according to the Spanish code now in force. If the offense is grave, the *jefe local* must institute prompt inquiry and submit the result to the *jefe provincial*, with the author or authors of the offense, in order that the *jefe provincial* may decide as to the procedure. This form is adopted provisionally, pending the arrival of the general who will be charged with the government of the province. Unanimously adopted. (Copied from the translation at official headquarters.)

This is signed by Presidente Isidoro Midel, Nestorio Arquiza, and all the *jefes locales* of the province, with the exception of the *jefe* of Mercedes.

A few days after the arrival of General Bates, he was waited upon by a delegation of the leading officials and citizens of the neighborhood. About fifty were in the party, which was headed by Presidente Midel and represented a population of probably ten thousand in the immediate vicinity. They simply called to pay their respects, and the occasion was wholly informal. General Bates made a brief talk outlining the purposes and aims of the new government. I watched the faces of his hearers during his remarks. They were evidently gratified by what they heard. Frequently some one or another of them would turn to a neighbor and by an expressive look or nod show his satisfaction and approval. The company was an interesting one to watch and study. The costumes

were various, but there were some fine, intelligent faces at the upper end of a number of them. One of the gentlemen called me aside and wished me to explain privately to General Bates that no reply was made to his remarks and no general statements made because there were among them a few of whom they did not feel wholly certain and they did not dare to talk with entire freedom.

A few days previous to this, a smaller delegation had called and expressed a desire for an early establishment of a parish priest. The former incumbent had gone away during the troubles and they now wanted another. Their request was proffered with a slight hesitation, and they were greatly pleased to find General Bates ready to do all that he could to further their wishes in the matter. They expressed a desire for an American priest, though I am not at all sure of their entire sincerity in the matter; it savors of a form of Spanish courtesy. But they evidently wanted a priest for services, christenings, marriages, burials and other priestly functions, and they were told that some one would be installed as soon as possible. They were told also that schools would be maintained from public funds, but that churches received no such aid and must be supported by personal contributions. They had no objection to offer and seemed quite inclined to be satisfied with the plan.



Official relations with the Moros are on a more concentrated scale. Datto Mandi represents his people and acts for them. He called one morning while I was there. He had received a letter from Datto Piang of Cottabatto, a man of importance in his own territory. The body of the letter was in Spanish, the signature in Arabic:

COTTABATTO, December 3, 1899.

TO DATTO MANDI OF ZAMBOANGA.

MY DEAR AND DISTINGUISHED FRIEND: Although you do not know me, I have taken the liberty of writing these short lines with the sole object of informing you that your new servant desires to serve you in all ways. At the same time I inform you that I am waiting from moment to moment for the new government of North America to take charge of this district, which is to-day in my charge, having been turned over to me by the Spanish government when it evacuated this point. You are yourself to-day under the orders of the said government, and I desire to be the same. In view of the above, I hope from your kind attention that you may say something to the American authorities who are in your port, and from whom I daily expect, with anxiety, the sending of American troops to this district, and to offer to the said government my person and all my people, if they are desired. In one word, I desire to be subject to the American nation.

(Signed) DATTO PIANG OF COTTABATTO.

Almost due eastward from Zamboanga, across the bay or gulf formed by the land contour of western Mindanao, lies the village of Cottabatto. The name means "the stone fort" and is given because of the small Spanish fortification erected

there. The distance is about one hundred and fifty miles from shore to shore. The Rio Grande de Mindanao flows northwestward from the inland lakes and empties at Cottabatto into Illana Bay. Piang is the ruling man of the place and vicinity, though his home is twenty-five miles up the river.

Piang's desire and request had been anticipated. Before his letter was received plans had been formulated for the sending of a garrison to Cottabatto. On the night of December 10 the United States steamship *Manila* started for that place, carrying General Bates and some of his staff. He went to pave the way for the arrival of a portion of the Thirty-first Infantry, which followed on board the *Churruca* the next morning. There have been some interesting spectacles out in the Philippines, but few have equaled those of the two days' stay of the *Manila* at Cottabatto. Dattos appeared from all directions. The harbor was alive with native canoes, varying in size from little dugouts up to stately barges propelled by fifty rowers. At one time something of a row was imminent.

It appears that the Datto Piang is a self-made man. His case is an exceptional one, like that of Datto Pedro Cuevas of Basilan. It is said that Piang is a Chinese mestizo (half-breed) and that he was formerly a slave. The Datto Baqui of Parang-Parang, a neighboring village, says that Piang is a bad man. Baqui and Piang are

not friends. While Baqui was on board the *Manila*, presenting his respects to the official representative of the new government, Piang and his numerous suite were seen putting off from the shore. Baqui's men became excited. Their cutting weapons were loosened in their sashes and the few who had guns proceeded to load them. The situation became a bit tender on board the ship. A United States naval vessel is not an appropriate ground for the determination of dattoical rivalries; men who have been badly slashed with heavy sword-knives make an awful mess on a ship's deck.

A ship's officer acted as master of ceremonies and effected a successful division. The canoe fleet of one datto was drawn up on the port side while the other was sent to starboard. Both dattos being on board, they, surrounded by their men quite ready for a fight, were kept on opposite sides of the ship, while General Bates took a hand and told them a few things. He did not quote to them the words of Dr. Watts,—“Let dogs delight to bark and bite, for 't is their nature to,”—but he gave them the sentiments of that happy expression and then did the fatherly with them, and made them shake hands with each other and at least go through the form of a reconciliation. Then he looked very solemnly at these two naughty boys and told them something of what the United States might do to them if they did not behave themselves. One's

sense of the tragic found food in the opening. A strong bit of humor pervaded the next chapter—General Bates, tall and dignified, making those brown chaps shake hands. Diplomacy triumphs in the dénouement—if it lasts.

Among the petitions and testimonials presented at Cottabatto, one of the most important was a document of welcome and acknowledgment of American authority. It closed, after the effusive Spanish fashion, thus: "We shout with all our hearts, 'Long live the American government, and may the God of heaven guard it many years!'"

On the morning of December 13 the *Manila* sailed for Davao, some three hundred and fifty miles farther on. The place is near the head of the Gulf of Davao, on the southeastern side of the island. It is the most isolated garrison yet established, and will be in command of Major Liggett of the Thirty-first. Upon arrival the American flag was seen to be already flying there. The Jolo influence had reached even there and a flag had been obtained and raised. A delegation of the people extended a hearty welcome. It was stated that there were two thousand Christians in the vicinity, and some fourteen thousand who were spoken of as *salvajes* (savages), though they were said to be peaceful and submissive to local authority. The "Christians" are those of mixed Filipino and Spanish extraction, Tagals, Visayans, etc., who,

like the Zamboanganians, follow the religion as a result of a long period of Spanish occupation and influence. The *salvajes* are Moro and native tribes. There are said to be seventeen different groups or tribes in the immediate neighborhood, all speaking different dialects.

The Spaniards left Davao about the middle of February, 1899. After the evacuation the local people made a very fair shot at self-government. They maintained a military police of thirty men, one half of whom had rifles. The place has a church, a school-house, barracks and various public and semi-public buildings; there are also some very good residences, that is, good for that part of the world. Hemp is the staple product of the region and a considerable quantity is raised. The region is said to be entirely healthful. The people desire a regular monthly steamship service, and the return of their old spiritual adviser and leader, a Jesuit priest.

Leaving Davao, a southward course was taken, and then a northward, rounding Cape San Augustin to Mati, a run of a hundred miles or so. This is an even more far-away garrison than Davao, which was made battalion headquarters, but it has Davao for a neighbor. Mati and its vicinity show about a thousand Christians and a large but unknown number of *salvajes*. The town itself was, upon the arrival of the Americans, in bad condition and its build-

ings much in need of repair. It is said to be generally healthful.

Zamboanga is now the military headquarters of the entire district, and is unquestionably destined, by reason of location and natural advantages, to be the chief seaport and commercial center of the region. It is one of the points of Spain's earliest occupation in the islands and has been the center of Spain's many and frequent attempts toward sovereign establishment on Mindanao.

The Moro people of Zamboanga are under the leadership of the Datto Mandi, a man of ability and strong character. Mandi is a statesman. The world in which he moves and the community which he governs may be small, yet in that world and community he manifests those traits and characteristics which, in wider fields, stamp men as statesmen. It has been my good fortune to meet him upon different occasions, and he impressed me strongly, as he has all of the officials who have come into contact with him. He is, moreover, a gentleman. He may dress in the garb of his people and wear the local turban, though he sometimes appears in the costume commonly worn by Europeans here; but whatever his clothes may be, he is a gentleman of dignified and self-respecting bearing and a grace and courtesy of movement and demeanor which many of white skin might well envy. His age is probably between thirty-five and forty years.

The Chinaman is the merchant of the region. His little shops form the bulk of the retailing business of the islands, and he buys largely of the local products of hemp, copra, sugar and a few other things. A few Tagals and Visayans are to be found in the vicinity of all points of Spanish garrison occupation. At some of those points this foreign population forms a large percentage. The island of Palawan, the long and narrow stretch of land which separates the China and the Sulu seas, was used by the Spaniards, in some measure, as a penal colony for felons from the northern islands. Some of these *deportados*, as they were called, were used as soldiers and some became a sort of quasi-colonist. Naturally they are an undesirable element and may prove a source of trouble. That question, however, is rather one of police than of politics. They are far from the center of political activity, and in but infrequent communication with that center. Some of them appeared to know of the affairs in the larger islands and were in sympathy with the movement headed by Aguinaldo. But they are capable of little resistance, even if so disposed. They have greater capacity for mischief by and by as disturbers of peace and order.

The greater number of the Palawan islanders, as well as I could learn from the meager details obtainable, are Malay people who are in closer affiliation with their race in Borneo than with



those of the central archipelago. That fact introduces to some extent a feature of British influence. Many of them make no distinction between the newly arrived people who call themselves Americans and those of longer acquaintance, the English, whom they have learned to respect and trust. "These people," they say, "call themselves Americans; but they are the same as the English, and to us they are English." That gives the United States an excellent opportunity to parallel England's record in North Borneo.

Spain's influence with or power over the people of these islands has been of the slightest, both politically and religiously. It is safe to predict the appearance of many engrossing problems, and the Moros will undoubtedly prove a very interesting people. They present such interesting little questions as polygamy, wife-purchase and a form of slavery which is rather vassalage or feudalism than that form of absolute ownership which was manifested in the United States and the West Indies. Speaking exactly, the condition of many may not be described as slavery, but it is a state which is far removed from individual independence. Apparently there is no discontent or desire for any change, but if we go ahead and own the Philippines, it may become necessary to pass laws which would either be a dead letter there or, if enforced, arouse antagonism on the part

of the people. At any rate, there is a strong probability, if ownership of the islands be maintained, that the United States will be for some time denied the privilege of the proud boast that under her flag no man can call another man his own. Commercially, the people of the section are appraised at a value of from twenty to forty dollars apiece. The Moros hold as a religious belief the unpleasant idea that if they die in killing a Christian they go at full speed to a heaven of delight, where they are provided with an outfit of sixteen wives, or something like that. When the thirst for death and polygamy becomes keen, the candidate goes through certain ceremonies, records an oath with the *pundita*, or priest, and becomes a *juramentado*. Then he goes on the war-path and "does" his man. If he gets "done," he receives the welcome of his houris. Spanish officials evidently did not like the Moros. In their official reports they blackguarded them awfully. They called the Moros by a long list of uncomplimentary names, such as liars, treacherous, superstitious, voluptuous, stupid and ignorant and dirty. One writer calls them "an uncultured people who should inhabit some other planet." But that is an individual opinion and, consequently, is not to be accepted as conclusive. No form of absolute or even general self-government is possible for the people of that section. It is equally impossible that they should be governed or in any way controlled by

Tagal, Visayan or other native people or individuals. It would even be an error to include them in a system generally applied to the island group. Religion, race and past history join in making them a thing apart. Except in a limited way, these people do not know and are not known by those of the central and northern islands.

The future relations of the United States with the islands, be they brief or protracted, present a serious problem with a simple solution. It may become imperative to separate them entirely from the general Philippine question. To give them in any way into the hands of a Filipino government would, in all probability, be tantamount to a national crime. The Filipino, upheld and guided by America, may make a very fair shot at a considerable measure of self-government. There is no question of his utter unfitness to govern another people so different in type, character, habit and religion as the Moro. For our own dealings with these people, we may well read over the history of our relations with the North American Indian. Guided by the mistakes, follies and crimes which blot that history, the United States may easily learn to deal wisely with a race which, in not a few ways, presents a strong resemblance to the American red man.

No better opinion upon the subject is possible than that of General Bates. He knows the American Indian through years of experience.

He has now had the opportunity, of which he has taken careful and thoughtful advantage, to observe and study the Moro. He has noted the common people and has held numerous conferences with their leaders. He says: "The chief requisites for successful dealings with these people are the maintenance here of a military force of sufficient strength to indicate clearly superior material power, and a policy in which firmness, absolute justice and strict fidelity to promises given shall govern in all relations with them."

I think I may say that during the time of my stay in the islands I made a more exhaustive investigation of the conditions of Moroland than did any other visitor. I made three trips through the district, during all of which I was in constant association with Major-General John C. Bates, then military governor of the district, with the commanding officers of the garrisons and with Captains Sperry and Very, commanding, respectively, the gunboats *Yorktown* and *Castine*, then stationed in those waters. During that time I formed the distinct impression, and so reported it, that trouble with those people was avoidable. I made my third trip to the district on board the *City of Peking*, transporting the Thirty-first United States Infantry for garrison duty in that department. I am confident that during the voyage I made myself a nuisance by my persistent assertions that if trouble came the respon-

sibility for it would rest with the soldiers of the United States. Trouble has come and more and worse may be in store. A well-known correspondent, who visited the islands last April, writes as follows :

Another possibility of danger lies in the temper of a portion of the soldiers. One of them, who was a representative of this class, thus described it. "Our officers are trying to get along with these people without a fight," he said. "We boys want a scrap; that's what we enlisted for. We crowd these people all we can when we get a chance, and we are bound to get them stirred up some time."

General Kobbé is now in command of the department. It has been my good fortune to know him personally. I know him as a brave soldier and a kindly and thoughtful gentleman. I know him as a man of tact, with a sincere interest in and consideration for those who are under his supervision. I know his earnest desire to avoid any strife with the people of his district. But if he is up against that American element which this correspondent notes and which I saw myself, his efforts and aims are almost hopeless. The Twenty-third United States Infantry, officered by men of the regular army, occupied the island of Jolo for nearly a year, among the most turbulent of the Moros and within a few miles of the residence of the sultan. Up to the time of my departure in February, 1900, and, so far as I can learn, up to

the time of their own departure, all trouble was avoided and relations were those of peace and mutual respect. The work in that department is for men of the regular army who have known and dealt with the American Indian. I am fully aware that Major Brett was recalled from his command at Cottabatto; but I know Brett, and I know that his mistake was an error of judgment arising from the kindness of his heart and his keen desire to prevent a fight, and not from any purpose or desire to provoke one. As a general principle, none but men trained in relations with the American Indian should be assigned for duty among the Moros. While there their special aim should be to keep their troops well in hand. The Twenty-third succeeded admirably in Jolo and Siassi.

## XIII

### *THE MOROS OF SULU*

Our Mohammedan people—Spanish garrisons—Jolo—A city of trees and flowers—A stroll among the people—Moro weapons—Bargaining for curios—A coffee estate—The datto and the deserters—The datto as a witness—All Americans look alike to him—A good-natured people—The universality of child-nature—A Moro trader—Love of color—Boats and blacksmiths—Island fruits—Pearl fisheries—The religious question—The sultan.

**A**LMOST due south of Manila and distant a little more than five hundred miles, there lies a little island named Sulu, or, in the Spanish, Jolo (pronounced ho-lo'), which gives its name to the minor archipelago of which it is a part. The island itself does not amount to much. It is a spot in the sea, some thirty miles in length from east to west, with a maximum width of twelve miles. The archipelago of Sulu numbers about one hundred and forty islands, one half of which are uninhabited. It is said to have been occupied during the early years of the sixteenth century by a Borneo chief who fled after a defeat by his brother in a contest for suprem-



acy. The new-comers brought their Moham-medan religion with them, and it has lived and dominated almost absolutely throughout the intervening years. Jesuits, Dominicans and others, all backed by the official and military arm of Spain, have sought foothold there, with only the slightest measure of success. The island of Jolo is the headquarters of the Sulu sultanate.

Although politically dominating some portion of the islands of the Sulu group, the sultan is rather the spiritual head of the Mohammedans of the region than the political ruler. The great island of Mindanao gives him no political allegiance and some of the lesser islands yield him little or none. The island of Sulu has a population of about a hundred and twenty thousand. The people of this and the neighboring islands are decidedly a fighting lot. The men are emphatically opposed to labor in any form. Their religious fanaticism has been the cause of frequent trouble to Spain in her relations with them. Their attitude has been one of implacable hostility to and hatred of the Christian.

For centuries the islands were a hotbed of piracy. The followers of the sultan ravaged the coasts and ruled the seas of the vicinity. It was only upon the introduction of steam-vessels that the Spanish authorities were at all able to cope with these vigorous and vicious sea-robbers. Not until 1860, when a strong force of steam-

gunboats was sent out against them, was piracy stamped out. At no time in the history of the islands has Spain exercised more than a nominal sovereignty over these people.

Throughout the Mussulman territory, which includes Mindanao, Palawan, and the islands of the Sulu archipelago, Basilan, Jolo, Tawi Tawi and the rest, the tribal system prevails. The tribes, headed by chiefs, or *dattos*, recognize the spiritual supremacy of the sultan, whose position is hereditary. Their relations with each other are amicable or otherwise just as it happens at any particular time. The relations of the United States with these people are not unlikely to be greatly similar to its relations with the Indians of North America. Some tribes may be friendly, but it is quite probable that the hatchet will be buried in a very shallow place and very near at hand. Much will depend upon the vigor displayed by the nation and the missionary societies in efforts to civilize and Christianize them. The process will not prove locally popular.

Maibun, on the south coast, is the official city of the island of Jolo. It is a dirty and rather insignificant little place, but it is the home of the sultan. Jolo, on the northwest coast, is the chief city of the island. In a way, Jolo is an accident. The Spanish General Arolas was sent to the place as a sort of compromise between a reward of merit and a punishment for political offense. He could not well be ignored, yet had

the audacity to be of outspoken republican tendencies; therefore he was sent to govern Jolo. He found the city wholly conventional, from the Sulu standpoint, in construction and dirt. It held a Spanish garrison and was surrounded by a kind of bamboo stockade. Arolas was a really remarkable man, particularly for a Spaniard. He possessed strong force of character, energy and ideas. Virtually banished to Jolo, he proceeded to convert it into the gem spot of all the Spanish colonies. He turned a filthy coast village into a beautiful park.

In front of the city lies a bay, formed by adjacent islands, with good anchorage and generally safe harborage. Along the shore runs a low sea-wall, with sentry-boxes on corners and in angles. From about the middle of the wall a gated pier extends seaward, with a signaling-tower at its outer end. The bamboo stockade has been replaced by a brick wall of some eight feet in height, built upon a rock and concrete base some three feet in height. The wall is liberally perforated with perpendicular slits for rifle use in case of assault. Sentry-towers stand at the corners and boxes occur along the wall. The inclosure thus formed is irregular, though angular in its shape. Its greatest length is about fifteen hundred feet and its greatest width seven hundred and fifty. The ends are narrower than the middle, by reason of an area of made land which extends into the bay.

The streets are all laid at right angles, are of good width and heavily shaded with palms and other trees. Among these are many of the brilliant red-flowering *flamboyant*, which is also found in extensive use along roadways in the West Indies. Running inshore from the pier is a broad, shaded plaza. Small parks, a mass of foliage and blossom crossed by paths, occur at frequent intervals. The road-beds are sand, and upon both sides gutters of concrete provide for the discharge of rain-water by an easy gradient to the shore. Most of the buildings are of wood, two stories in height and of good though not elaborate construction. The upper stories serve as the residences of the merchants who occupy the ground floors for commercial purposes. Hemp-bundling and copra-drying indicate a moderate export trade. The city has running water supplied from a near-by stream, good in quality and ample in supply. Near as it is to the equator, almost exactly upon the sixth degree north latitude, there is nothing of uncomfortable heat. The nights are entirely comfortable for sleeping, and mosquitos are not seriously troublesome. I have found it a charming, a fascinating place. There are many little restaurants, but no hotel or anything that takes the place of one. Not many civilians have yet visited the place. The few who have arrived have been cared for by the courteous officers of the Twenty-third United States

Infantry, to whom I gladly acknowledge myself deeply indebted for an endless number of delightful courtesies; their hospitality and kindly attention have known no limit.

But charming as the place itself undoubtedly is, its chief interest centers in the people of the vicinity more than in the people of the city. Exclusive of the American military garrison, the population of Jolo (the city) is about twelve hundred. Of these all save a few are Chinese. Only a limited number of the natives have been allowed residence within the walls. The Spaniards evidently distrusted them and feared them. One day two army officers and I took a walk into the country. I asked if it had been the custom of Spanish officers to do that sort of thing. I was told that no Spanish officer ever went more than a few rods from the city walls without a strong military escort. We were totally unarmed. We visited two villages, watched the people at their work, sat down with them and made such efforts to talk with them as we could in a few words of their language and a few more of Spanish. We laughed and joked with them, played with the children and had the very jolliest kind of a time together. We were gone for some four hours, and there was no minute of it that was not filled with interest. To see the people one must go to their homes and villages. A limited number—one hundred from the land side and fifty from the

water side—are allowed to enter the city daily for purposes of trade. This is the continuance of a Spanish law and does not seem to be at all resented. They are accustomed to it and accept it. But there are always enough of the Moros about the streets of the little city to add much to its attractiveness by their brilliantly variegated garments.

The special center of interest has been the *lanceria*, a little square structure, roofed but not sided, a few rods behind the city on the road to the inland gates. In Spanish days, and the custom is continued under the American rule, no Moro was allowed inside the walls wearing his weapon. Exception occurred, and continues, in the case of the *vigilantes*, or native police, in the town. Every Moro man carries his weapon at all times. So do many of the women and children. The weapons are swords, or knives, variously known, according to the shape, as the *kris*, the *barong*, the *campilan*, the *bangkong*, etc. They correspond to the bolo of the Filipino and the machete of the Cuban, except that their purpose is more generally warlike. The Spaniards obliged every Moro who desired to enter the city to deposit his weapon at this *lanceria*, ten rods or so outside the gate. Upon going away the knife was resumed. A dead-line was indicated between the gate and the *lanceria*, and any Moro crossing that while wearing his knife was shot without question or parley. The

armed Moro would not be allowed to pass the guard at the gate to-day, though he probably would not be shot at the dead-line; but they do not seem to try any experiments on it.

This *lanceria*, or spear market, as it is now termed, has become a trading-spot for curios and souvenirs. The American thirst for the odd and the curious, and the American readiness to spend money, have appealed to these people, and the trade in *kris*es and *barongs* has run into thousands of dollars already. It is beginning to establish an industry. A notable percentage of those now offered are newly brought from the quaint little blacksmiths' shops in which they are made to meet the new demand. I confess to being a well-developed kris fiend myself; but all of mine are old ones, the weapon of the country that has been worn in the sash of the native.

Trading for these things is an interesting process, though not a novel one. It is an old process of bargaining. The novice gets well roasted; the old hand lies low and watches out for bargains. A Hebrew clothes-dealer will give one an experience of just the same character, but there is much less of fun in that case than there is when the seller is a dirty, betel-chewing Moro, dressed in the picturesque garb of his country. The articles offered are the knives of various shapes and patterns, spears of various shapes, native bridles, native hats and embroi-



dered cloths. Even at the prices asked, any of them would be cheap enough from an American standpoint; but a judicious indifference to the article desired, coupled with an offer of about one half of the seller's price, will probably secure it after due time. Old coats of mail are also an occasional offer. The price varies from about three to ten dollars American, according to the condition and the decoration of the coat. The knives range from two to twenty dollars American. The arrival of a steamer, which is not a frequent occurrence, is the signal for an increase and a stiffening of prices; it announces a fresh crop of Americans with *mucho dinero*.

The Chinese trader and workman of Jolo is just what he is elsewhere—patient, stolid and industrious. He will make me a suit of white cotton drill at three dollars American, and a pair of white canvas Oxford shoes for an American dollar. The cost of living, of clothing and probably of the conveniences of life in Jolo will not, perhaps, for a long time be as low as they are to-day. The most immediate result of American occupation in all the places of my experience has been an enhancement of the cost of living. In the West Indies the native mind soon acquired an idea of *Americano, mucho dinero*. The Moro already believes that an American, if he spends the last cent in his pockets, need only go to his house or on board his ship and get money to any extent.

To the eastward of Jolo are two coast villages, built partly on shore and partly on posts over the water. Their chief industry appears to be fishing—fresh fish for the Jolo market and dried fish for the general inland market. I should not be believed if it were possible for me to describe some of the fish which I saw brought into the village of Busbus. Color-drawings of them, if colors could reproduce their rainbow and opalescent tints, would be pronounced by most to be the fancy sketches of a fertile imagination. The variety was great, and the coloring of many was marvelous and often exquisitely beautiful. The boats used for fishing are exceedingly graceful in structure, long, very narrow and often showing fantastic carvings at bow and stern. Without the buoyant support of the projecting outriggers they could hardly be kept upright on a mill-pond.

Some three or four miles west of the city an experiment is being made in coffee-raising on an extensive scale. Of the quality of the berry I am unable to speak, as none was to be had that was in condition for use; but I saw some seventy acres of coffee-trees of most vigorous and healthy growth. They were not shaded as is the West Indian custom, but were set out like an orange-grove. Coffee usually requires a third or a fourth year for its maturity. I was assured by its owner that this grove was but from a year and nine months to two years and

three months old. On tree after tree the branches bowed to the ground with the weight of the berries along the stems. Many branches broke down entirely, and many a tree had fallen prostrate, broken and partly uprooted from its top weight. The father of the present proprietors, the Messrs. Schuck, set out a much smaller grove some twelve or thirteen years ago, but it became neglected. Many of the trees were still there, and I saw them standing in the heart of a dense tropical jungle, trees of twenty feet in height, with trunks of six and eight inches diameter. They were still in full bearing, but useless from the difficulties of picking from such a height. There are evidently remarkable possibilities in coffee-growing in Jolo Island. The expense of marketing and the market value of the product are not yet well determined.

The Moros have their distinct language, but as yet there is no Moro-American or Moro-any-thing-else dictionary.

The only serious objection which I can find to Jolo is its distance from New York. Could the island, together with about three miles of its surrounding atmosphere, be towed up to the entrance to New York harbor, it would be a possession of endless value. But that would cost the place the greater part of its special charms. The picturesque and dirty Moro would exchange his multicolored turban for a "dicer," his kris for a walking-stick, and probably essay tight boots,

high collars and a red necktie. That would spoil him.

Jolo gave me two or three interesting experiences which illustrated, each in its way, something of the life and character of the people of the vicinity. One matter in particular was suggestive. Three American soldiers deserted from the garrison at Siassi. The leader of the trio was a man who enlisted in the Philippines, where he had been living for some years. He spoke both Spanish and Tagal. He seems to have induced two of his comrades to desert, and they started for some unknown point with some unknown purpose as their object. They took their guns along with them, hired a native boat and went to sea, sailing northward. Somewhere near Jolo they were capsized, losing, so they claim, their guns and outfit. They were rescued by some of the people of Datto Jokainin's tribe and taken to that chief, who turned them over to the garrison at Jolo.

While I was in the place the case came up for examination. Jokainin and some of his people were summoned as witnesses. At the preliminary examination Jokainin persisted in answering questions which were put to some of his attendants. He was told that that would not do; each witness must answer for himself. A little bickering over the point led to Jokainin's leaving the room in indignation, asserting that his word was doubted, that he was, in effect,

charged with lying. They are not, I believe, a lying people. Shrewd and not over-scrupulous in trade they certainly are, but I think I am right in crediting them with notable fidelity to words seriously spoken, to promises given and assurances made. To lie to the datto appears to be a crime. In the streets of Jolo one sees quite frequently a certain Moro, a petty ruler in the near-by village of Busbus. The lower part of his face is always hidden in a cloth muffler. If the muffler be displaced one sees that the man's mouth is cut from its corners far back into the cheek. He lied to the datto, and the opening in his face was made large enough to allow the passage of the truth. Jokainin's men had told him what they knew of the case of the deserters; he believed that they had spoken truth; his replies to questions submitted were therefore competent and correct, and he saw no reason why they should not be accepted. That it was hearsay evidence made no difference to him. When it was declined he felt that his word was doubted, and resented what he thought a disbelief of his word. Offended at that, he marched out, followed by his attendants.

He was mollified after a little, and returned for further examination. I do not know just what he thought. Sometimes he seemed puzzled, sometimes amused. The forms of our court procedure were new to him and some of them evidently struck him as ridiculous. Some

appealed to that sense of humor which is a Moro characteristic. At times he smiled in amusement, at times he laughed heartily.

THE COURT. What is your name?

ANSWER. My name? Jokainin. Why do you ask that? You all know my name.

THE COURT. Where do you live?

ANSWER (with a hearty laugh). You know where I live. You have all been out there.

Of course, each of the deserters had a separate trial. When the same questions of name, residence, etc., were repeated in the second and third trials, the witness was somewhat puzzled. "Why do you ask me what you already know and that which I have already told you but a few minutes ago?" was the substance of his answer. Of a truth, the ways of the heathen be sometimes more direct than our ways. If they lie to their chief, their mouths are enlarged. If he is reasonably satisfied that an offender is guilty, the chief orders the removal of the criminal's head without fuss or loss of time. The system has merit of its own kind.

Another point came up in the same case. There are few Americans who can readily identify any particular Asiatic. All Chinos, all Japs, all Malays, all Filipinos look alike to most Americans. There was, therefore, a rather suggestive idea in Jokainin's reply to the question, "Do you recognize the accused?" "No." "No? Why, you brought him in here." "I

brought three soldiers here, but all Americans look alike to me." A few he could individualize.

There is one thing about these people which I greatly like. They can laugh. They seem quite a cheerful and jolly lot. Taken generally the Tagals seem a solemn race. The Visayan is a bit more cheerful than the Tagal. The so-called Moro grins, chuckles and roars. One of the lieutenants of the Twenty-third had three monkeys and a little puppy as household pets. One day they were all out in the park adjoining the house. Twenty or thirty Moros stood about with the American soldiers watching the antics of the animals. A Tagal group might have grinned a little. These fellows yelled and shrieked in the heartiest of enjoyment. Their glee was audible for a couple of blocks.

They laugh easily and evidently appreciate a certain form of joke. If I went to the sword and spear market and spent every penny in my pockets, declining further purchase on the score of *no mas dinero*, that was a joke. It was an absurdity to them; it was ridiculous. They did not believe me. They had their laugh, felt of my pockets and, if they discovered no weight or clink of coin, sobered down for a moment. They realized that I had spoken the truth. They do not laugh at that. But they laughed again when they told me to go to my house or my ship, where I or any other American could get *dinero* in endless quantity.



During a visit to Jolo, I strolled out to a near-by coast village in company with two officers of the army. We were doing a little trading for curios and quite a crowd was around us. I felt a touch on my arm and looked down to see a small brown urchin of six or seven years, naked as on the day he was born. He held up a little common shell which he had picked up from the sand. It was a pretty thing, but as common as a beach pebble. I took it and examined it carefully and seriously. The proceeding caught the interest of the crowd and everything became quiet while they watched to see what I would do. After my examination I propounded the customary question, "Pela in ini?" (Sulu for "How much is this?") The child did what most American children would have done. He hung his head, stuck his thumb in his mouth and dug a hole in the sand with his toe. I renewed my examination and at last said, "Mariao" (Sulu for "Good" or "All right"). I drew out a big copper cent and gave it to the lad, who again did just what an American boy would probably have done. He grabbed the coin and scooted for home as hard as he could go. That was a joke. The crowd saw it and yelled with delighted laughter. I like these people for the way they laugh.

While I was there the Moro whom I regard as, of all the Moros, the most extortionate trading rogue, got an idea that I was in the

market for attractive cloths of native make. He was right enough. My expenditures overdrew my salary and mortgaged my future, but I have a pile of gorgeously glowing fabrics that is a feast to my eyes and makes me an object of envy to all who see them. I heap them up, and they are a blaze, a bonfire, of reds, greens, yellows, purples. They are a tumbled-up rainbow. Probably nothing save the hemp that forms a part of the fabric of some of them is of local production. The cotton and the silk are bought from the Chinese merchants. But the cloths are made by the people in their own homes and on the crudest imaginable looms.

Some cloths are worked in designs that are wholly artistic. Among the things which I bought from my pet commercial robber are two strips each some twenty feet long and thirty-three inches wide. Lined with silk, they will give me two sets of novel and artistic, though somewhat brilliant, curtains or portières. One pair is a deep orange color, with crossing lines of brown. The other is an Indian-red ground, with designs in silk worked in three-inch squares. The designs are all geometrical and both pieces have a broad base in design of artistic pattern. They look as if they might be fairly expensive. My rascal charged me fifteen pesos for one piece and eight for the other. I paid him fifteen for both, equal to seven dollars and a half, and the scamp went away to chuckle

over his success in getting more than the market price. I had a quiet chuckle myself; I would have paid his full price rather than lose them.

I am still puzzling in wonder how it is that a people who so revel and wallow in color can be so content also to abound in dirt. Their clothes and cloths seem always dirty. I think it was the color which first struck me about them, but am not wholly sure. It probably was, as color shows farther than dirt. With the exception of some of the Spanish steamers that sail the Philippine waters, I know of few places which are dirtier or which smell worse than did one of the houses in which I watched the native women spinning thread on the crudest of wheels and weaving gorgeously brilliant cloths on even cruder looms.

Here and there one finds a progressive chap who is learning English. When I was in Bongao in September, the Datto Tantung was evidently rather proud of a few Spanish words which he controlled. Now he is learning English. While the official party was there a ball was given, a native affair. Tantung was present in all his greatness. During the dancing some bit of it pleased him and he expressed his satisfaction: "Ver' good." He was heartily congratulated on his linguistic attainments by the American visitors. A little later his approval was again stirred, and, probably in ignorance, he turned his enthusiasm loose in a hearty "Goddam."

Of course it was wicked, but it was awfully funny.

The Moros are in no way an industrious race, yet they do some things and do them well. The canoes which they build are marvels of grace and lightness, finely finished and often carved with no little of elaboration and skill. Not a few of their larger boats, fit for a cruise of considerable distance, show the same delicacy and grace of line as the smaller ones. The Moro blacksmith, with an outfit of exceeding crudeness, will turn out a knife of graceful curving lines and smooth finish. The smith is an interesting man to watch as he turns such bits of iron, often only scraps, into one of those wicked-looking krises or the more generally serviceable but less artistic barong. The shops which I have seen have consisted of four corner posts and a roof. The anvil is a small block of iron set in the ground, its surface some three or four inches above the ground-level. Two or three rude hammers of different weights and two or three pairs of equally rude tongs appear to compose the smith's working outfit. He sits on the ground as he works, and his forge is a fire built on the ground. His bellows illustrate one of the myriad of uses to which the bamboo is put. Behind the forge stand two hollow sections of bamboo of eight inches or so in diameter and some five feet in height. Sometimes they show a carved band around top and bottom. These

are connected, underground, by a single pipe which reaches into the bottom of the fire. Each tube holds a packed plunger. Upon a properly elevated seat behind the tubes there sits a helper who, with a plunger in each hand, pumps, first right and then left, just as one might work two of those old-fashioned upright churns that may still be seen in remote necks of the American woods. This furnishes a constant current whose force may be easily regulated by the operator at the word of the smith.

The lines of the knife are formed with the crude implements and gaged wholly by the eye. The surface is pounded to as accurate a level as can be obtained by hammering. The knife is then passed on to other workers, who, also sitting on the ground, with endless patience rub and rub the blade upon a large block of some suitable stone which serves the same purpose as our familiar grindstone. It is, of course, a tedious and monotonous process, but it does the work and time is no important matter in Moro life. Most of the handles of these weapons are made by the Chinese. They are often of elaborate design in ivory, silver or some richly grained and colored wood. I cannot say how long it takes to make an ordinary kris, but the prices at which they have been sold would indicate small wages for the workman. I have been buying some of the knives, six inches or so in length, used by the betel-chewers for cutting

the areca-nut chewed with the betel-leaf. They are worth about five cents apiece, and I doubt if more than three or four could be made and finished in a day. Some are a little clumsy, but I have seen none that was not graceful in its lines.

The Moro is not a good agriculturist. He does not have to be. Nature gives him the greater part of what he needs. He buys much of his rice. I have seen few rice-fields in the southern islands. Such as I have seen produced the kind known as mountain or upland rice. But he buys the rice with some of nature's products. The soil of these islands is good for vegetable-farming, though such as are raised show lack of proper cultivation. In no other of the tropical countries of my experience have I eaten bananas which might be compared with those of this vicinity. Two of the many varieties are particularly notable, one for its richness, the other for its delicacy of flavor. The mangosteen, deemed by many the finest fruit of the earth, is here in abundance. Oranges, limes and pineapples grow wild. The waters about the islands teem with fish, large and small, in endless variety. Cocoanut-palms, ylang-ylang, mango, and the rubber-tree, ebony and mahogany, all are here in more or less of abundance. Various trees furnishing some of the commercial gums are also indigenous and in considerable numbers. There is much that might easily be

made of commercial value, but its development means exile from all for the sake of mere gain; it means the possession and use of a fair amount of capital and the discovery of a solution of labor problems. It is no land of sudden fortunes with speedy return for the enjoyment of invested income.

There are vast pearl fisheries when pearl-fishing shall be made an open industry. The shell of the oyster in which the pearls are found is the mother-of-pearl of commerce. Its sale would constitute the backbone of a pearl industry, with the gems as a sort of gambling by-product. Occasionally there is a valuable find. With the islands free and safe for the sportsman, there is game for the hunter. The small spotted deer are in considerable numbers and there is plenty of keen sport for an enthusiastic pig-sticker. There is also a variety of bird game. The horses of the island are generally small, but from thirty to forty dollars (gold) will buy a stocky, active and cleanly built pony, good for any weight up to one hundred and seventy pounds and serviceable for even more than that.

The Spaniards called the inhabitants Moros, probably through some confounding of them with the Moors of northern Africa. No reason is apparent for it, except that both are dark-skinned Mohammedans. But the name will probably stick to them, as that of Indian has clung to the red man of North America.



The religious question is a serious one. Missionary work, the Christianizing of so-called "heathen" by means of sectarian agents sent out by Christian organizations, is a work which is imperative in many American minds and dear to many American hearts. To intimate a political necessity for abstaining from mission work in any country is to cause many a head to shake in sad disapproval. Yet it is hardly to be questioned that missionaries to the Moros would at once mean a bloody war. Their Moslem fanaticism has resisted three hundred and fifty years of effort made by the Jesuit, the Dominican, the Augustinian and the Franciscan, and it may be questioned whether the average Protestant missionary is any wiser in his day and generation, whether he is shrewder, keener, more diplomatic, than the men who dotted the wilds of North America and the unknown Orient with their mission chapels, unsupported by Krags and Mausers, long before anything was heard of the "white man's burden." The African aborigine, the Hawaiian and the Fijian may tolerate or welcome the gospel of Christianity. When it is spoken to the Moro, he draws his kris and his barong and goes on the war-path. It will probably be well to let matters get a bit settled down there in Sulu, to let the people get a little measure of acquaintance with us and confidence in us, before trying to change their religion as well as their government.

The population of this southern zone is largely guesswork, but it is estimated to number a million and a half. Their nominal head is the sultan. He wears a long string of names, the principal of which appears to be Muhamed Kiram. He has probably never been so called, but for convenience I will refer to him as Mr. Kiram. He is not a very noble character and is neither greatly loved nor greatly respected by his people. He is, however, the legitimate ruler and the acknowledged representative of the Mussulman religion. Mr. Kiram holds his position by hereditary succession and has duly made the trip to Mecca, which is a necessary qualification for the job of sultan. Nominally, his domain and spiritual authority extend over a part, at least, of North Borneo; but the effect and influence of the British North Borneo Trading Company has done much to make the sultanate a figure of speech rather than a fact in that country. On the island of Mindanao there are two or three sub-sultanates. The scope of sultanate power is not easy to define. It is perhaps best described as spiritual power with political influence as by-product. Nor is the spiritual power at all absolute. It is quite a long way from it. A certain general regard for it is manifest, though that regard would appear rather as the effect of tradition and life habit than as a clearly recognized regard for an active principle.

The actual rulers of the people seem to be the dattos, or chiefs, of the tribes or clans. The system is a sort of combination of these two organizations. Counting a tribe as an aggregation of people of the same race and language for mutual benefit and protection, and the clan as an organization which involves something of the old patriarchal and family idea, it will be found that both features appear in the Moro life. The heads of the various and numerous bodies are the dattos. In normal process they constitute a Moro nobility and the rank descends like a dukedom. Occasionally an outsider fights his way into the circle and secures recognition and authority.

In many ways the position is analogous to the Indian question. An arrangement with the sultan may or may not be confirmed and accepted by individual dattos. Upon our arrival at Bongao we found that the people of the Datto Tantung had been erecting a stockade for purposes of defense. It was rumored that the sultan was to send a body against them because of their acceptance, without his definite consent, of the overtures made a few weeks before by General Bates as the representative of the United States. They came at Mr. Kiram by saying that they equally resented his arrangement with the same gentleman without consulting them. Mr. Kiram might propose punishment, but it would not be tamely accepted. The

Indians had no such central authority, but the actual leadership of each group of Moros lies with the datto rather than with the sultan and special arrangements with individual dattos are far more likely to be effective and permanent than any general arrangement made with the sultan.

## XIV

### *IN AND AROUND MANILA*

First impressions—A mongrel place—Description of the city—Vehicles—Cigars and cigarettes—Filipino garments—Local trade—Banking business in Manila—An awkward system—Theaters and grand opera—A drive in the suburbs—Ecclesiastical barracks.

MY first impressions of Manila were distinctly unfavorable and although they became somewhat modified, I found nothing in the place which made me long to take up a permanent residence. I arrived from Hongkong and our ship was quarantined because of the plague at that port. The day after our arrival, a storm set in. Within three days the rainfall measured twenty-two and a half inches. To those whose experience in the world is chiefly limited to the towns of Goshen and Hillville there is a natural attraction in any form of life which offers novelty. To the wider observer all things become comparative. A Spanish city may be horribly dirty, but there will be the light and color and architectural lines which make Seville and Cordova and Barcelona places of keen interest and

attractiveness. Chinese cities may be dirty, but in them one may revel in the pleasure of unique and picturesque surroundings. The busy workmen in the Chinese fields, the sampan life on Chinese rivers and the teeming life of the streets of Chinese cities are stamped with their own distinctive character. A planter's house and the nipa hut of the peasant, out in the hills and valleys of Luzon, are both in harmony with their surroundings and therefore are usually pleasant to look upon.

But Manila is neither this nor that. It is a mongrel place, which offers little that is attractive to either eye, ear or nose. The Spanish life of the West Indies does not seem to be here. In normal times the Spanish population of the city numbered less than two per cent. of the inhabitants. Other white foreign residents were in the ratio of about one in a thousand. To-day it is estimated that at least two thirds of the Spanish people have left the island.

Manila is a double city, the parts being distinctly different in their features. The two parts are divided by the Pasig River, with three bridges to serve as connecting-links. Manila proper is the old walled city on the southern bank of the river. It is distinctly ecclesiastical and official. Nearly if not quite one third of its area is owned and occupied by the church and the religious orders. There also are the governor's palace and, scattered throughout the

section, various buildings of civil and military organizations. Rather less than one half of the area is used for residential purposes. There are a few corner stores, but no distinctly business streets. To the east of it, outside the walls, there is a section known as the *Jardin Botanico*. Southward, also outside the walls, lies the *Paseo de la Luneta*, the Central Park of Manila. Beyond that lie the suburbs of *Eremita* and *Malate*.

To the north of the river lies the new city, with the greater mass of the population and the active business. It is divided into districts, somewhat on the ward principle, each of which has its distinct title, such as *San Nicolas*, *Tondo*, *Binondo*, *Santa Cruz*, *Quiapo*, *San Miguel*, *Sampalog*, etc. Of these *Binondo* is the focus of life and activity. It is the trade center. Here are the hotels and the principal retail street, the *Escolta*.

Across the street that runs beside the *Binondo* church, one enters the *Calle Rosario*, which runs southeastward to the river. This is the street of the Chinese merchants. The stores are little more than small and dingy boxes, devoted mainly to the sale of European goods. The narrow sidewalks are crowded with the merchants, their clerks, the buyers and the passers-by. The place is not attractive to the eye and the nose suffers violence. Next to the *Escolta*, this is the chief business street of the Philippine Islands.



At right angles with the Calle Rosario, within a block of the river and parallel to it, runs the Escolta. In some way I had it fixed in my mind as a broad and well-paved avenue bordered with shops filled with the wares of the Orient. Alas for my dreams! I found this famous Escolta a street of some thirty feet in average width from wall to wall, with narrow sidewalks and roughly paved roadway. American soldiers, natives and Chinamen jostled and crowded each other on the narrow footway and the street was a tangle of the local carriages and wagons. *Carr-matos*, *calesas* and the *quilez*, which is a sort of bobtailed herdic, wound and twisted their sinuous pathway through the crowd. These are all two-wheeled vehicles, drawn by the native ponies. These ponies are rather interesting beasts. They are about the size of a Newfoundland dog, being much smaller, even, than those of the West Indies. Like those of the West Indies, most of them are half starved and cruelly treated. The two-pony *carruage* is a high-toned four-wheeler, and, though less common, is well represented along the Escolta. So is the dray, drawn by a single carabao. The carabao is, presumably, of the bovine family; but it more closely resembles an overgrown and repulsive black hog with huge, recurving horns. The pace of these animals is of the slowest and their presence is a serious obstruction to traffic. Mingled with all movement of vehicles are the

Chinese polemen with their shoulder-poles supporting baskets or packages at either end. They dodge in and out as best they can, now on the sidewalk and now in the street, with an astonishing dexterity and freedom from collision.

Midway from the Escolta, a street running southward crosses the Bridge of Spain, a structure some three hundred and fifty feet in length leading over the Pasig to the old city of Manila. The Binondo approach is by a gradient hardly equal to that of Wall Street at its Broadway end, yet the stalling of these little vehicles is of frequent occurrence. So, too, is their slipping backward down the grade, with confusion to followers and voluble Filipino profanity. A wretched tramway helps to block both the bridge and the Escolta. The cars are small, but four ponies, three men, three whips and yells fit to raise the dead are usually needed to get the cars up the slight rise to the bridge.

In the best tobacconist's shop in the place, I called for the finest grade of Manila cigarettes. For a package containing thirty "coffin-nails" the price was three and a half cents, American money. I called for the finest and most expensive Manila cigar. An affair of about the size of a telegraph-pole was produced. It was wrapped in tinfoil and tissue-paper. The price was ten cents, American. The ordinary run of cigars sell at from three to five cents. One of the leading factories advertises forty-eight brands

and sizes at prices from fifty cents to five dollars per hundred, the higher figure representing its best grade under the brand of "Incomparables." But prices of cigars are rising. The cigars, even the best, are to be recommended only to those who like them. They are usually so fresh as to be spongy and some are difficult of ignition.

The Chinese are the workers in Manila. They are the bearers and the laborers, the workers in wood, iron, cloth and leather. Señor Don Filipino will drive a carruage, a carromato or a quilez. Some Filipinos will do manual labor. Most, however, seem averse to it.

One gets an idea that the average Filipino, male or female, is only about half dressed, from our standpoint. The customary male body-covering is only an undershirt. Those of higher social rank and greater wealth wear also a cotton shirt or a garment of gauzy texture of some locally made material. But the garment will be worn, like a coat, in the full measure of its beauty, outside the trousers. A higher step in the social scale brings the substitution of the coat for the shirt. A Filipino dude with a cane and a little billycock hat, a pair of black trousers and a gauze shirt worn outside of them, is a resplendent spectacle, and he has the air of being entirely conscious of it.

From our standpoint, there is the same half-dressed look about the women of the poorer

classes. The Negrito woman of the mountains may use only a cloth extending from waist to knee. The Mangyan woman of Mindoro may wear a contrivance of braided rattan which is even more abbreviated. These garments do not suggest the half dressed. They are distinct. There is no suggestion of European costume. It is not so with the Filipino woman of Manila. Her garments are neither dress nor native costume. Pieces of cloth cover her from the waist downward by a system which not infrequently displays the leg as high as the knee-joint. The shoulder- and body-covering varies in the number of articles and detail of construction. All are cut somewhat low in the neck and on a plan which gives them a "list to port or to star-board," leaving a shoulder and an upper arm wholly bare. In the upper circles there is exercised a greater care in adjustment, and a handkerchief, folded diagonally, is laid across the shoulders and pinned in front. This tends to steady the outfit and keep it in place. The sleeves are gathered at the shoulder and flare outward, broadly bell-mouthed, to a little below the elbow. But these garments are always scrupulously clean, and as for modesty of demeanor, I have nowhere seen that of the Filipino women surpassed.

John Chinaman, of whom there are thousands in the city, largely retains the essential principles of the garments of his native land; but there

is a wide latitude in that. The high-class man covers whatever he has beneath it with a silken garment like a butcher's frock, which reaches nearly to his ankles. The laborer may wear but a nether garment, cut, as is the Chinese fashion, very full in the fullest part. When it rains he rolls this garment as high on his legs as it can be made to roll. His hat may be anything from the castaway and dilapidated campaign hat of the American soldier to the braided bamboo "mushroom" of twenty-four inches in diameter. A common Chinese costume more closely resembles a suit of pajamas than anything else. Sometimes it is of cotton, sometimes of silk. I encountered one of a pale robin's-egg blue silk.

In point of size and appearance of the stores, there is scarcely a city of twenty-five thousand people in America that would not immeasurably excel the Manila outfit. What cannot be bought on the Escolta, excepting provisions, is hardly to be found in the city. Harness and hardware, dry goods and diamonds, beer, whisky and cigars, stationery, clothing, drugs, books, notions and wares from India, China and Japan, all find representation among many other things along this short line, which represents the aristocratic retail trade of a city of more than a quarter of a million of people.

The retail stores for the masses cover a much longer line. They fill the Calle Rosario, Calle San Fernando and the Calle Santo Cristo, with

more or less extensive outcroppings in scores of other places. These are the stores that are of special interest to the observer, whether his motive be idle curiosity, entertainment or special investigation. The Escolta is for the wealthy native and the foreigner. The other localities are for the people. Rosario and Santo Cristo are preëminently the streets of the Chinese merchants. San Fernando has many Chinese, but it also harbors numerous native proprietors.

The first thing that one notices is that these stores are but little boxes which would hardly make an office for an American; the next thing noticed is the number of attendants; and the third is the manifest duplication of stocks and their arrangement. The native stores on Calle San Fernando are rather booths for the sale of specialties. They are little stalls perhaps six feet by ten, presided over by native women. A broad platform or counter bars the entire width. Upon these the venders sit, usually busy with embroidery-work when the counter is not in use for the display of goods to the customer, who stands on the sidewalk or else sits, comfortably and sociably, on the counter with the vender. It is to these native stores that visitors go to buy the jusi and piña cloth and the piña embroidery. Their trade is largely in those articles and they are patronized by the native women, who purchase from them their *panuelas* and *camisas* or the materials therefor. It is a

good place to see hair, if one be curious that way. The Filipino women share St. Paul's opinion that "if a woman have long hair, it is a glory to her." On San Fernando one will sometimes see a decidedly pretty face, often crowned by a head of hair, uncoiled and unconfined, that demands a second look and elicits a "By Jove, what a head!" or some similar expression. One may also see some excellent specimens of nature's handiwork in dentistry, if the chaffering over a bit of piña-work be properly managed. I think that the uninitiated purchaser can save money by trading with a Chinaman, though John has no conscience when it is a matter of profit; but it is a lot pleasanter to be just a little bit swindled by a raven-haired, clean and neatly clad Filipina maiden.

Some years ago, in 1881 I think, an extensive fire swept over the area in the angle formed by the Escolta and the Calle Rosario. A few months ago much of the space was still a mass of ruins. Within that time ground has been cleared and one-story wooden buildings have been run up to accommodate some hundred or more of these little shops of the money-hunting Chinamen, in addition to the many hundreds which existed before. But the new ones are just like the old ones. The stock is the same—prints, cheap silk handkerchiefs, undershirts and a few other things. There is the same multiplicity of attendants.



The wholesale trade and the export business are largely in the hands of a few houses, most of them English. They are the channels through which flows an annual business of from six to seven million dollars' worth of hemp, half that value in sugar, and enough of other commodities to make a total of fourteen or fifteen million dollars. The import trade is more scattered. Certain lines of commodities come in through these same foreign commission houses, but a very notable percentage of wares comes in in comparatively small lots consigned to the small Chinese dealers.

Manila has either three banking institutions, or two institutions and a ghost—I do not know which. These are the prominent and acknowledged institutions of deposit and general banking. There are also individuals of different nationalities doing more or less private banking. The “ghost” is *El Banco Español Filipino*, about which few foreigners have any knowledge save that of handling its most materially objectionable currency—the only paper, except a limited amount of American, that circulates in the islands. I am told that the bank is solvent in itself, but that, for greater public assurance and security, its issued notes are practically guaranteed by the English banks.

The English concerns are agencies, or branches, of houses established in several cities of the Orient. The Chartered Bank of India,

Australia and China displays its name in Hongkong, Shanghai, Peking, Han-kau, Yokohama, Kobe, Java and elsewhere. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation displays its only slightly less imposing signboard in the same places, and in others such as Siam, Penang, Singapore and Bombay. Both appear to be as solid as rocks and there is no visible reason why they should not be—from the standpoint of their customers. The first-named advertises a fully paid up capital of £800,000, a reserve of £500,000, and a reserve liability of shareholders of £800,000. It is an old concern with a royal charter dated 1853. The other is a newer creation, incorporated in 1867, with paid up capital of £1,000,000, reserve of £1,100,000, and reserve liability of shareholders, £1,000,000.

Personally I have no complaint to make about these banks, or the system, except that I know I am “done” on every draft I make, just as all others are. But I have had none of the trouble of which many complain. I go to the bank, present my letter of credit, and a courteous young man, who is probably a Spanish mestizo, offers a seat and asks how much I want. I name the amount and have no other word with him except a few remarks of courteous sociability. In a moment or two he comes to me with a draft, in duplicate, upon Brown, Shipley & Co. of London, upon which I make as close an imitation as I can of the signature upon my credit-letter. He

goes to various other clerks who figure things and sign things and initial things, and returns with the credit-letter and an order on the cashier for a certain number of Mexican dollars. I pay him a peseta for stamp duties. It has taken less than ten minutes, and we bow and part.

The amount of the order on the cashier is variable, though the drafts, in pounds, may be for the same sum at different times. A draft, made this week, for £50 sterling, may call for \$492.60 Mexican, or it may call for less, or for \$500. The variation is in the rate of exchange on London and the fluctuation of silver value. I have never tried to figure it out; I could n't. It requires an expert. The novice, or the victim, whichever he may be, accepts thankfully that which is given him and goes away. My impression is that at the present rate of silver, if the calculation were based on the actual quotations, I should get about \$520 Mexican for my £50. In other words, I am out from \$20 to \$25 on every £100 for which I draw. The bank makes it, and the other bank would do the same. Protest is useless; one has no choice. Oriental banks are not health resorts established by their proprietors for the benefit of clerks and managers.

At the cashier's window I also find a courteous reception. I present my order and say that I want bills and not silver. This is a lie. I don't want bills. They are clumsy, coarse,

dirty, unacceptable in all ways save that they are money and will buy things. But they are better than the "dhobie" dollars. One cannot carry five hundred or a thousand silver cart-wheels "in his inside pocket." I think that a Manila experience has cured quite a number of free-silverites. But bills are scarce. Sometimes the bank has none at all; sometimes it has a few. They can give me American gold (which is fairly abundant here), but they must charge me a premium for it. The Mexican or dhobie dollar goes in general trade at two Mexican for one American. The bank will give me, to-day, \$2.03 Mexican for one American, but if I want to buy gold, or get a portion of my draft in gold, they will give it me on a basis of \$2.06, or three per cent. premium, against one and a half per cent. if I wish to sell.

Assume that my order on the cashier is for \$494.30. I may get \$250 in the miserable paper, in fives and tens. I take \$100 in gold, \$206 Mexican, and \$38.30 in silver. The great "wad" of bills, printed on paper as thick as heavy wrapping-paper, bulges one half of my pockets and the silver bulges the other half. I go on the streets looking as though I had goiters all over me. Then I have to lock the stuff in my satchels in my room. It has not yet happened to me, but sometimes, in Manila as elsewhere, thieves do "break through and steal." My little bunch of yellow bags is fairly convenient and

compact—but. If I spend it in a store or pay my hotel bill, I lose \$3 American on the \$100. If I take it to the bank some day and buy Mexican with it, I lose \$1.50, because they will give me only \$203, whereas I have paid them \$206 in Mexican.

There is another rake-off for the bank by which the unwary are sometimes caught. One pays a visit to Shanghai. He changes his good American gold for local bills of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. He goes to Hongkong lugging a few hundreds of that kind of currency with him. Will the same concern in Hongkong accept these bills? Will anybody to whom he wishes to pay money accept them? Certainly—at a very jolly discount. In Hongkong Mr. Traveler accumulates a load of bills issued by the Hongkong branch of the same benevolent institution. Perhaps he has those for which he exchanged his Shanghais—at a discount. Let him not take these to Manila. He will there have to pay another discount at the agency of the same bank. He cannot exchange them for Manila bills and he must pay a premium if he would buy gold with them. He can buy Mexican dollars with them, dollar for dollar, and the Manila value of these will be the same. But two or three hundred silver dollars are not handy things in a trunk or a satchel, which may be lost. They pound about as the trunk is thrown around and they make

a satchel as heavy as a guilty conscience. But why complain?

The real agony comes in if one has more complicated relations with local banking institutions. Perkins & Co. of Manila give me their check on one of these banks for \$500 Mexican. I wish to remit \$100 American to Coats & Co., my tailors in New York. In New York the process would consist of personal identification, verification of the check, and the delivery of the draft and a cash balance—the work of a few minutes. Here there is also the identification and verification, but they are a work of time. When the check is properly certified by the proper functionaries, it is returned to me for presentation to the cashier. He will pay the check, perhaps in bills, perhaps in silver dollars. Then I must go to the exchange department and file a written application for my draft on New York. I must then go to another department and pay there enough of what I have just received from some other department,—I am getting mixed, but that is just what one does in the bank,—but I pay to somebody the equivalent, in silver, of \$100 in American gold, plus exchange or minus discount or something. Having paid my money, I go back to the exchange department and wait until I get my draft.

As I prepare to drag away my cash balance, I look at my watch and find that I have whiled

away from an hour to an hour and a half of time, and I note also that I have paid a commission that will swell the dividends of the bank,—I am too much mixed up to compute it and see its amount,—and I have lost enough nerve force to run a freight train. That is banking in Manila.

Manila has theaters and a circus. At the circus I saw some very clever riding and tumbling by Filipino lads of from ten to twelve years of age. They were being trained and instructed by a Japanese professional acrobat. The Teatro Filipino usually employs foreign talent. In earlier days Spanish troupes, operatic and theatrical, were accustomed to make occasional trips to the far East. Sunday is the great theater day, as it is in all Spanish countries. I was a bit taken in on one occasion by the advertisement of the Teatro Libertad. It proclaimed a "Gran Exito! Novedad del Dia! Filipinos no olvidarse!" *Exito* means an "end," a "termination," and its use in this connection is idiomatic. The rest of it means, "The novelty of the day! Filipinos, do not forget!" The bill went on to say (in Spanish) that, on such a date, there would be given a "representation of the magnificent Tagal tragedy, in four acts and eight pictures (tableaux), of the great scenic spectacle entitled 'Aïda.'" It also stated that "because of the enormous cost of producing this magnificent work" the prices had been *elevado*. Thinking it to be an old favorite, I



saved up my money and went. Alas! it was but a "representation," mostly in recitation. I got my money's worth, but I did not hear the "Céleste Aïda" by a Tagal tenor, as I had hoped. I did hear some good voices and an excellent native orchestra.

"Malo camino" (bad road), said my driver. The little phrase carried me over more than ten thousand miles of land and water. It brought up a vision of Cuban and Porto Rican *cocheros* who had rattled my bones over many a *malo camino* and used the same expression to inform me of what was but too evident. And here in the Philippines it crops up again in all its wretched familiarity. It was only too true. Philippine highways are of two classes, the *malos caminos* and the *muy malos caminos* (bad roads and very bad roads).

Luzon is evidently very much behind even the West Indies on the good-roads question. Both Cuba and Porto Rico did have a few miles of good highway radiating from some of their largest cities and running a few miles into the country. Naturally the roads around Manila have fallen into a wretched state during the disturbed conditions of the last few years, but I have been unable to find signs that the place ever had a highway system. There are highways which become fairly passable during the dry season, but which the wise man will avoid during and after the rains.

Kalookan is, or was before the war, a village of some eight thousand inhabitants. It lies about four miles north of Manila. The most noticeable feature of the route is the evidence of the destructiveness of war. Once houses, churches and nipa huts made the road to Kalookan a populous thoroughfare. It is now an avenue of ruins. The walls of stone-built houses remain, but the nipa hut leaves no sign save the little plot of ground baked by its ashes. The ruined wall and the site of the hut are soon overgrown with vines and the rank growth of tropical weeds. One might well think that several years had passed since the destruction which had taken place barely six months before. As I drove along that Cuban road over which Maceo swept with sword and torch until hardly a building was left, I thought I was looking at a picture of desolation; but it bore no comparison with that of the Manila-Kalookan road after the passage of the American army.

The country of the vicinity is low and flat—often marshy. Rank grasses, thickets of flowering weeds and vines and the dense clusters of tall bamboo were relieved by occasional trees. A wild rankness characterized it all. Mingled with the growth were the young banana shoots. The ruined walls of the yards of ruined houses were a tangled mass of verdure. Destruction may sometimes become a necessary measure in warfare, but as one sees the work of fire in the

suburbs of Manila, the question involuntarily arises whether all of it was necessary.

A disused tramway follows upon one side of the highway. It would certainly be a prosperous institution if all who now walk over that road were to pay a nickel for a ride. All along there was formerly a continuous procession, or rather two, for the passage was both inward and outward. Some were buyers and some were sellers. The majority were women carrying upon their heads the broad, flat basket common with the country people. Most of the men carried the shoulder-pole, with its load pendant from both ends. Some carried rice in baskets; others, jars of oil or other fluids; still others carried grass or fagots in bundles. Some of these little men, both Filipinos and Chinos, will trot along under a weight carried on these poles that would make many a much larger American stagger for a few rods and then quit his job.

Many of the women carried umbrellas to shelter their heads and preserve their complexions from the burning sun. The parachute seemed rather a superfluity, inasmuch as the diameter of the basket, which might be said to be worn on the head, was very little less than that of the umbrella. Most of the women were shoeless, though many carried sandals or chinelas in the hand or in the basket for service in the city's streets. Many of the women were

smoking, some cigars and some cigarettes. The weed, in one form or the other, is almost as common and seemingly almost as necessary to the feminine inhabitant as to the masculine. At frequent intervals, in the shade of ruined wall or thickly leaved tree, enterprising souls conducted refreshment-stands, if stands be the word to apply to an institution where the wares are in flat baskets set upon the ground, while buyers and sellers squat around on their haunches. The Filipino motto is evidently that of the East Indian: "Why sit on an uncomfortable chair when you can squat so much more comfortably?"

There is a certain picturesqueness about it all, though I should hesitate to pronounce it artistic. The brown roadway is bordered with the rich green of foliage and verdure, while along its track move the native figures, garbed in white, blue, black, red and yellow. At two or three points along the way the road was blocked, when I left, for half its width, by the remains of breastworks, dating perhaps from the Filipino siege of Manila, perhaps from the time of resistance to the advance of the Americans. Here and there were signs of return to the former life. Lightly clad natives were setting up the light bamboo framework of the nipa huts, some tent-like on the ground, others like slightly exaggerated bird-cages upon posts five or six feet above ground. No nails are used.

Bamboo furnishes a framework which is lashed together with bamboo cording. The walls are usually woven strips of bamboo, while the nipa palm furnishes a dense and massive thatch. The result is a well-ventilated structure with a water-tight roof. But the whole thing looks as if a high wind would blow it into the next county.

Just what Kalookan may have been in its palmy days, I cannot say. At the time of my visit it appeared to consist of a somewhat battered church, a few nipa huts, some ruins and some railroad sheds. A few houses of the better class remained.

From there I drove across country to La Loma Church, whose dome showed plainly two or three miles to the southeast. I am not yet able to determine whether that trip was a carriage drive or a sea voyage. The motion of the carromato over the rough roadway, and the passage through long stretches of flooded country and road, gave me an idea that I was voyaging over or through some inland sea in a unique sort of sailing-craft. Where the road was not under water it consisted of deep and tenacious mud. It was not at all a pleasant trip. Except that there were, or rather once had been, fewer houses along the way, the route was much like that of the Kalookan road. Lovers of bonfires had evidently had a jolly good time in burning those flimsy little huts which make the homes of thousands of native Filipinos.

At La Loma I found the Twenty-fifth (colored) United States Infantry. Its headquarters were distinctly ecclesiastical, being established in the church. The building had been dismantled by previous occupation for military purposes, but high upon the wall behind what had once been the altar hung the sacred emblem with the figure of the crucified Christ looking down upon the piles of stores and munitions of war. In place of the kneeling worshipers were the burly forms of the black men of the Twenty-fifth; instead of chanting voices the click of the telegraph instrument. We lunched in the shade of a tree out in the churchyard. In the rough life of campaign one may notice these incongruities, but they soon become matters of indifference.

## XV

### *AMERICAN VS. FILIPINO GOVERNMENT*

Filipino self-government in operation—Conflicting reports—Journey of two American naval officers—A tribute to Aguinaldo's government—Balls and receptions—Order and industry—Testimony of Mr. John Barrett—American methods—Manila in August, 1899—The civil government order—American administrators—Filipino obstinacy—A provisional city government—San Fernando—A Filipino residence—Scenes in a provost marshal's office—The purpose of the administration.

ON August 20, 1896, the never wholly quenched flame of rebellion against an obnoxious rule broke out afresh in the Philippine Islands. Although interrupted at times, and seemingly ended by the treaty of Biak-nabató, the fire still burned, and it is now known that at the time of the arrival of the American army in Manila in June, 1898, almost the entire area of the Philippines, practically all with the exception of one or two of the larger coast cities, was in the hands of the insurgents. Not only were they in control of the country; they were administering its political affairs as well. This



they continued to do for the greater part of the island throughout the following year, practically until the autumn of 1899. Up to that time the territory occupied by the forces of the United States in the island of Luzon was confined to a very limited area in the vicinity of Manila, with a filamentary extension northward for some fifty or sixty miles along the Manila-Dagupan railway. Very much the same condition obtained on the other islands. One thing is certain: although greatly disturbed by the conditions of war, this territory was under some form of governmental administration. Luzon is approximately as large as Ohio and the principal islands of the Visayan group cover an area a little less than that of West Virginia. I leave out the southern islands, Mindanao and the rest, because they never had much government anyway. That this sixty or seventy thousand square miles of territory in Luzon and Visaya is not inhabited by savages is now apparent. Between the downfall of Spanish authority and the American military occupation there was an interim of more than a year. Who governed the country during that time?

Few facts are known concerning the administration during that period. Conflicting reports reached Manila. Official headquarters reported the receipt of many complaints of a state of anarchy. Private sources reported a state of law

and order. Personal observation and investigation was impossible for foreigners. The latest wholly reliable information was obtained by two American naval officers, Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, who made an extended tour through northern Luzon in the autumn of 1898. Their trip was made before the opening of hostilities between the Americans and the Filipinos and after a Filipino government had been established and in operation for several months. Mr. Sargent's story of their journey was published in the "Outlook," and because of its value and exceeding interest I take the liberty of quoting a review of it here.

Mr. Sargent, in opening his article, recalls the conditions in October and November, 1898, when the journey was made:

It will be remembered that at that date the United States had not yet announced its policy with regard to the Philippines. The terms of the treaty with Spain were being negotiated by our commissioners at Paris, and the fate of the islands hung in the balance. In the meantime, the native population, taking matters into their own hands, had declared their independence from all foreign jurisdiction and had set up a provisional government, with Aguinaldo at its head. Although this government has never been recognized and, in all probability, will go out of existence without recognition, yet it cannot be denied that, in a region occupied by many millions of inhabitants, for nearly six months it stood alone between anarchy and order. The military forces of the United States held control only in Manila with its environs, and in Cavite, and had no authority to proceed farther; while in the

vast remaining districts the representatives of the only other recognized power on the field were prisoners in the hands of their despised subjects. It was the opinion at Manila during this anomalous period in our Philippine relations, and possibly in the United States as well, that such a state of affairs must breed something akin to anarchy. I can state unreservedly, however, that Mr. Wilcox and I found the existing conditions to be much at variance with this opinion. During our absence from Manila we traveled more than six hundred miles in a very comprehensive circuit through the northern part of the island of Luzon, traversing a characteristic and important district. In this way we visited seven provinces, of which some were under the immediate control of the central government at Malolos, while others were remotely situated, separated from each other and from the seat of government by natural divisions of land and accessible only by lengthy and arduous travel. As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey throughout in perfect security and returned to Manila with only the most pleasing recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found the natives to be leading under the new régime.

In his descriptions of the many towns they passed through Mr. Sargent leaves on the mind only a picture of peace, order and happiness among a bright, intelligent and ambitious people, although their knowledge of the affairs of the world was limited. Quotations from the article will illustrate this effect upon the reader:

From Nueva Vizcaya for the next three weeks of travel we passed from one hospitable town to another and enjoyed a round of novel entertainments. Our route now carried us through the valley of the Rio

Grande Cagayan—probably the largest area of level country in Luzon Island. With the exception of the region in the immediate vicinity of Manila and of the narrow strip of land along the western coast, this valley, previous to the revolution, was the firmest and most ancient seat of Spanish authority on the island. Its towns throughout give evidence of the labor that has been expended on them. There are comparatively few nipa huts and many substantial frame buildings. Each town, moreover, has an elaborate church and convent, usually built of brick. Many of these churches date back into the last century, one which I remember particularly bearing the date of 1780 as that of its completion. Our entertainment in the different towns varied according to the facilities at hand; but in all cases music was a leading feature. In the absence of all accessories, the village band would be called into the building in which we were received, and would play tune after tune well into the night, while we conversed at our ease with the village fathers. At the little village of Cordon, which has a population of only a few hundred, we passed one of the pleasantest evenings of our journey. In this instance four accomplished little girls gave the entertainment its particular charm. Soon after our arrival the entire village trooped into the large room of the public building that had been turned over to our party. The floor was cleared for a dance and the band commenced with a waltz.

The towns of Ilagan and Aparri, with their wealthy and pleasure-loving population, provided the most elaborate entertainment. Ilagan is the capital city of the tobacco-raising province of Isabella and is situated near the head of navigation of the Rio Grande; Aparri is situated at its mouth in the province of Cagayan and is the only seaport of the valley. These towns are laid out in regular streets and have many squares of substantial frame buildings. They have each a population of between ten and fifteen thousand. We spent three days at Ilagan and I think that it was here that we were brought into closest touch with the

Filipino character. The cultured class, which I have spoken of before, was strongly in evidence; and I think that before leaving we had discussed views with nearly every member of it. They all realized that they were passing through a crucial period in the history of their people and young and old were eager to acquire all possible knowledge that might assist them to think clearly at this crisis. Their realization of the gravity of their position did not, however, rob their character of its natural gaiety, nor make them forget their duty as hosts. On the evening following our arrival a ball was given in our honor, which was attended by all the élite of the town. There were present about fifty young women and twice that number of men. All were dressed in European fashion. The girls were pleasant and intelligent; the men comported themselves in all respects like gentlemen. It was hard to realize that we were in the very heart of a country generally supposed to be given up to semi-savages. At intervals between dances many songs were sung, usually by one or two of the guests, while all frequently joined in the chorus. The national hymn was repeated several times with great enthusiasm. The ball lasted until nearly three o'clock in the morning and broke up with good feeling at its height.

On the second evening we were invited to attend the theater, where two one-act Spanish plays were presented by the young society people of the town. The theater itself had been constructed by the villagers only a few weeks before. It was a large bamboo structure, one end of which was used as the village market, while the stage occupied the other end. The stage arrangements were good; curtain, side-scenes and foot-lights all *en règle*. In the performance of the play we saw our friends—these typical young Filipinos—in a light in which very few of our nation have had an opportunity to view them. They comported themselves with credit in a position where humor, intelligence and artistic ability were the requisites of success.

During our stay at Ilagan we lived at the house of the

mayor. This building was of great size and was built of magnificent hard wood from the neighboring forest. One wing, containing a reception-room and two bedrooms, was turned over to us. The reception-room was very large, with a finely polished floor and with windows along two sides. It contained a piano and a set of excellent bamboo furniture, including the most comfortable chairs and divans imaginable. There were two tall mirrors on the wall and a number of old-fashioned pictures and framed paper flowers. . . . There was one form of hospitality which we met at Ilagan and Aparri that we would gladly have avoided. I still shudder to recall the stupendous dinners that were spread before us night after night. The Filipinos pride themselves on their cookery and it is indeed excellent.

Mr. Sargent, in testifying as to the drinking habits of the natives, says he did not once see an intoxicated man on his journey. He continues:

Our party proceeded on the *Oslo* from Aparri around the northwestern corner of the island and landed on the coast near the northern end of the province of South Ilocos. From here we proceeded by land southward through the western provinces. During this part of our journey we were thrown into closer association than previously with the military element of the population, of which I hope to have an opportunity to speak further in a subsequent article. The towns on the western coast are even larger than those on the Rio Grande. Vigan, the capital of South Ilocos, has a population of about twenty-eight thousand, and Candon, farther to the southward, is not far behind this figure. The mayor of Candon was of the hustler type and was evidently on the outlook for an opportunity to "boom" his town. On our departure he presented us with a written description of its exceptionally desirable location from a business standpoint. Every town gave evidence of



the bitter fighting that had taken place between the natives and the Spaniards, many of the larger buildings, which had been used for defense, being riddled with bullet-holes. We no longer passed from town to town through unsettled stretches of country. The fields on both sides of the road were under cultivation, and were dotted with laborers, while on the road itself there were always many travelers. The laborers in the fields worked in the shade of large screens of nipa-leaves, which they carried with them from place to place.

In conclusion Mr. Sargent says:

I cannot see what better gage we can obtain at present of the intelligence and ambition of the whole Filipino race than the progress that has been made by its favored members with the limited opportunities at their command. Throughout the island a thirst for knowledge is manifested, and an extravagant respect for those who possess it. I have seen a private native citizen in a town in the interior exercise a more powerful influence than all the native officials over the minds of the inhabitants, simply because he was known to have been educated in the best schools at Manila, and was regarded, for that reason, as a superior man. The heroes of these people are not heroes of war, but of science and invention. Without rival, the American who is best known by reputation in Luzon is Mr. Edison and any native with the slightest pretension to education whom you may question on the subject will take delight in reciting a list of his achievements. The ruling Filipinos, during the existence of their provisional government, appreciated the necessity of providing public schools to be accessible to the poorer inhabitants. Had events so shaped themselves as to have provided an opportunity for carrying into effect the plans formed on this point, it seems possible that the mental plane of the entire population might have been raised gradually to a surprising height.



Out of respect to the statements of other people, which the narrative of my experience may seem to contradict, I wish to say that I have found the native of the interior of Luzon an astonishingly different character from the one ordinarily met in Manila. Previous to my journey I regarded those whom I had encountered in that city with great dislike and after my return I was unable to overcome that feeling. They are not a fair sample of the race; and I cannot expect any one who has formed his judgment on the subject merely from observations of that type to express an opinion similar to mine as recorded above.

The experience of these gentlemen does not point to any very fruitful soil for wide-spread anarchy such as sundry alarmists have pictured as the result of Filipino self-government.

Mr. John Barrett is an advocate for the retention of the islands, but his arguments are based on the idea of the economic value of the country and not on pseudo-philanthropic ideas that they should be retained lest the natives go in for a general throat-cutting. He has reported a very pleasant experience during an extended tour. He found the people hospitable, generous and good-natured. He found them friendly. These are not the traits of "savages" or "robber bands." They are the traits of a somewhat civilized people. He attributes his happy experience with them to the fact that he treated them as he wished to be treated. This is a very suggestive point for the consideration of a people who are going in for their share of the white man's burden,—from commercial or from any

other motives,—particularly in the far East. Regarding the government established by Aguinaldo in Malolos, Mr. Barrett says :

“By the middle of October, 1898, he had assembled at Malolos a congress of one hundred men who would compare in behavior, manner, dress and education with the average men of the better classes of other Asiatic nations, possibly including the Japanese. These men, whose sessions I repeatedly attended, conducted themselves with great decorum, and showed a knowledge of debate and parliamentary law that would not compare unfavorably with the Japanese Parliament. The executive portion of the government was made up of a ministry of bright men who seemed to understand their respective positions. Each general division was subdivided with reference to practical work. There was a large force of under-secretaries and clerks, who appeared to be kept very busy with routine labor.”

I cite these points, not to argue that the Filipinos are immediately capable of an absolute self-government. I introduce them because they are of important value in any fair consideration of the question of the future of the Philippine Islands. Nor do I cite the points for the establishment of any claim that Filipino government is better than American government. There is, however, some ground for an argument that people of so much intelligence and

education as a very large number of Filipinos certainly possess, may have a very fair idea of the kind of government that is best suited to their needs. Americans naturally seek to apply American methods, and it is far from proved that a system which suits the American is equally well suited to the Malay or the Asiatic. It does seem to be fairly established that for more than a twelvemonth the Filipinos maintained throughout a wide area a government that was quite satisfactory to them.

In turning now to the American establishment of civil governments, I wish to quote from a recent letter, published in "*Collier's Weekly*," from the pen of Mr. Frederic Palmer, who is recognized as among the ablest of American newspaper correspondents. I have not the date of the letter, but it was written subsequent to the arrival, in Manila, of the latest commission, therefore recently. Mr. Palmer says:

There is no town in these islands where we have native officials of whose loyalty we are sufficiently certain to allow them even to lay taxes for cleaning the streets without the personal supervision of an American officer. There are few towns indeed where taxes are not being regularly collected in secret by the insurgents.

This charge does not reflect upon the ability of the appointed Filipino officials, but upon their loyalty to the United States. It merely argues the persistence of their desire for a gov-

ernment of their own. Mr. Palmer's letter, and others which I have received since my return, assure me that my own letters, written a year ago, might, in all their essential features, have been written at the present time. I quote from some of those letters as follows :

“MANILA, August 22, 1899.

“Manila is under martial law and no distinct attempt has yet been made for the establishment of a local civil government. For the smaller points a form has been drafted, and it has even been asserted that the measure was receiving the warmest support and most cordial indorsement of the citizens of different places. The fact is that the whole thing is practically a dead letter, ineffective and futile. The military authority and influence so dominate all departments as to leave to civilians little save a form of government, without its substance, in such places as have accepted the system. The terms provided are as follows, and are referred to as ‘orders’ or ‘instructions’:

“To the end that peace and tranquillity prevail and that equality before the law be established ; to impress proper respect for property of whatever kind by punishing unlawful interference with or unjust appropriation of the same ; to permit all inhabitants to devote themselves to their accustomed civil pursuits and to reopen churches and schools ; in fine, to render life, property and individual liberty secure : it is ordered that provisional municipal governments be established in certain towns now garrisoned by troops of this

command and others when so garrisoned, viz.: the towns of Malolos, Malabon, Polo, Candaba, Meyearayan, Bulacan, Calumpit and Apalit.

"The commanding officer of troops in each town named will take measures at once to establish therein this directed government, exercising over its formation and proceedings immediate supervision and control. It will be organized and administered in accordance with the following general provisions:

"1. In each town there will be a municipal council, composed of a President and as many representatives or headmen as there may be wards [or *barrios*] in the town, which shall be charged with the maintenance of public order and the regulation of municipal affairs in particulars hereinafter named. It will formulate rules to govern its sessions and order of business connected therewith, and by majority vote (to be determined by the President in case of a tie) will, through the adoption of ordinances or decrees, to be executed by the President, administer the municipal government; but no ordinance or decree shall be enforced until it receives the approval of the commanding officer of the troops there stationed.

"2. The President shall be elected by a viva voce vote of residents of the town, approved by the commanding officer, and, together with the headmen or representatives of the Council, shall hold office for one year. He shall be of native birth and parentage and a resident and property-owner of the town. The headmen shall be elected by a viva voce vote of residents of their wards and shall reside and own property therein.

"3. The President shall be the executive of the Municipal Council, to execute its decrees issued for the following purposes, viz.: to establish a police force; to collect taxes and license fees; to act as Treasurer of public funds, and to make disbursements on warrants of the Council; to enforce regulations relating to traffic and the sale of spirits; to establish and regulate markets; to inspect live stock and record transfers and brands of the same; to perform the duties formerly

belonging to the lieutenant of paddy-fields: to enforce sanitary measures; to establish schools; to provide for lighting the town.

"4. The senior headman, or one designated by the Council, shall be Vice-President of the same, assistant to the President, and shall be ex-officio Lieutenant of Police.

"5. The headman of a ward is the delegate of the President for that ward; he shall take measures to maintain order, and shall have power to appoint two assistants.

"6. The Council shall have no jurisdiction in civil cases, but on the application of parties in interest, and their agreement in writing to accept the award of the Council, it shall hear and decide cases involving property not exceeding in value \$500.

"7. In criminal matters the President, representing the Council, shall make the preliminary examination, and, according to the result, discharge the prisoner or transfer him immediately to the custody of the military authorities for trial by provost court.

"8. The Lieutenant of Police may arrest or order the arrest of persons violating a city ordinance, disturbing the peace or accused of crime; but no person shall be held in confinement longer than twenty-four hours without a preliminary examination, and no person shall be arrested for non-payment of taxes or for debt.

"9. The President shall render to the Council during the first week of each month a certified account of collections under each tax, and of disbursements made during the preceding month. Said account, having been approved by the Council, shall be forwarded with vouchers to the commanding officer of the troops, who shall make and retain a certified copy thereof.

"10. Special appropriations shall require a unanimous vote of the Council; regular disbursements may be made by ordinary decree on a majority vote.

"11. Whenever the commanding officer of troops shall notify the Council in writing that, in his judgment, a decree issued under Subdivision 3 is inadequately exe-

cuted, or shall make any other criticism or recommendation, the Council will convene as soon thereafter as practicable to consider his communication, and shall make written reply thereto, which reply, if he deem it insufficient, he shall forward, with his remarks, through military channels to these headquarters.

"12. The foregoing provisions, tentative in character, are subject to amendment, enlargement or curtailment as special conditions or development may make necessary.

"While these provisions embody many eminently desirable principles, they carry a strong flavor of the purely temporary and provisional, and almost too palpably have 'a string tied to them.' Said string runs quite openly into the office of the American commanding officer, who may or may not be a man of wisdom and sound judgment. Perhaps no other system would be at all feasible under the circumstances, but this modified form of self-government has not, as yet, received any enthusiastic indorsement from the people. When the plan is laid down to them, when they are told that they are to elect their own town or municipal officers, regulate their own taxes and spend the revenue so acquired for their own local benefit, the theory appeals to them, and there have been some manifestations of satisfaction and gratitude. But in its practice the plan has proved less satisfactory.

"The presence of American troops and the effect of military laws and operations, as well as the immediate supervision of American author-



ity, detract from the sense of independent operation and tend to nullify the whole proceeding. The town of Baliuag was cited as a model of what could be done. A civil government was established and an *alcalde* elected. An American garrison occupied the place and gave force and direction to the civil administration. That all was comparatively quiet and orderly was probably due to the fact that the Filipinos are not, normally, a riotous or disorderly people, and also to their decided respect for the American soldier with his Krag. Within the last week it has developed that our prize *alcalde* at Baliuag was in active relations with the insurgents, and at last accounts he was the occupant of a bunk in the calaboose. The gentleman chosen as their *alcalde* by the people of Imus was found to be in the seclusion of the Bilibid Prison, in Manila, on suspicion of being an insurgent spy. The government of that town is, like all others, a form rather than a fact. To-day there comes the account of the arrest of the *alcalde* of San Pedro Macati, who was also generally regarded as a prize lot. It seems to be well established that he has used his official position and influence in furtherance of his purposes to make the village of which he was the head a central recruiting-station for the insurgents. He, together with four associates, has been arrested and now 'languishes in durance vile.'"

Other instances of this political unreliability on the part of the *alcaldes*, or *presidentes*, were reported from time to time. It may be charged that their conduct was wholly dishonorable; but their argument appeared to be that if the Americans were foolish enough to put either weapons or opportunities into their hands, they were not foolish enough to refrain from using them. The military garrisons in these towns are usually under the command of a captain or a lieutenant. Many of them are young men of little experience in affairs. The work which they do is their best, but their primary interest and obligation is along military lines. Very few of them speak the language of the country; far too few of them take that directly personal interest in the people under their charge which is a prime factor in all successful dealing with members of this race. The officer has not the time nor has he usually the qualifications for the direct oversight of the people of his district. The appointed *presidente* fears to act on his own initiative lest he offend the military authority. He seeks the best interests of his fellows and often holds a conviction that he can best serve those interests by using his office for the promotion of the cause of the insurgents. The commission reported the success of these institutions. A few of them may justify their assertions, but it is wholly true that, in the greater number of cases, law and order are the

result of the presence of a certain number of Krag rifles rather than of any coöperation of the people with the American plan of local self-government "with a string tied to it."

On October 2, 1899, I wrote as follows:

"Thus far 'benevolent assimilation' in the Philippines has been a distinct failure. If there be any virtue in the article at all, it must be that we are using the wrong brand. It is quite useless to attempt to evade the fact that American occupation has proved most unpopular in those places which have had the most of it. The argument that a practical illustration of the beneficent operation of American rule would 'turn many unto righteousness' does not seem to be supported by experience; still, in his blindness, does the Filipino heathen object to being 'subjugated,' or 'assimilated,' or to anything else that does not recognize him as a man with a modicum of gray matter in his *cabeza*.

"I am well acquainted with the American argument that if the Filipinos really had any brains they would see how hopeless is that dream of a 'cause,' how infinitely better off they would be as subjects, even, of the great United States. I do not understand that it is the intention to make them citizens. But the Filipino does not realize what he is doing by his refusal to lay down his arms and acknowledge the right

and the might of his new sovereign. He has the bad taste to prefer to fight rather than to submit, and he does not assimilate to good advantage.

“For fourteen months Manila has had no government, no municipal authority, save the American. That government has not been idle. It has accomplished more than a little. It has displayed a degree of justice and honesty in administration affairs that was never known to the people of the city in other days. It has insisted that they be cleaner than they really want to be. It has said that they must refrain from their favorite but cruel pastime of cock-fighting. It has ordered the killing of many wretched, mangy and flea-ridden curs. It has obliged the drivers of cabs and carriages to take out licenses and display the license number. It has done other things, some of greater and some of less importance. With all this the Filipino has had little to do. His attitude has been passive, not active.

“Yet all these things have not taught this obstinate Filipino to love the American and long for the American government. Here in Manila he stands as a constant menace to that government, after fourteen months of benevolent and honest administration. Of course, this does not speak well for the Filipino power of perception, but I believe that an allowance must be made for a belief which is prevalent among the Filipinos

that they are resisting a successor to Spain. At all events, it has not yet been made clear to them that they are fighting a friend and not an oppressor. This idea of American oppression has been strongly impressed upon the Filipino mind by the tone of press and public speakers in America, and by official orders which treat them as 'rebels' and clamor for their 'subjugation.' The charge that they are encouraged to continue their resistance by a so-called anti-imperialistic press may carry some truth; but it is not to be doubted that their antagonism is strengthened, their resentment stimulated and their attitude sustained by the vilification, the abuse and the clamor for a vigorous and relentless war against them, which is urged by too many Americans whose knowledge of the real character of the little brown men of Luzon is theoretical rather than practical. Much has been done for them in things for which they care but little. Almost nothing has been done for them along the lines of their greatest desires.

"The new ruler has perpetuated the offenses of the old, has continued Spanish laws and Spanish taxes. Of promises for the future he has given some; of talk about what would be done in the future he has given much. In practical result he has shown but little. He has frowned upon some long-established customs, has set up his own standards of right and righteousness and, under them, has suppressed or sought

to suppress diversions that had become an integral part of the life of the people. The war which is being waged has stifled commerce, restricted production and greatly increased the cost of the necessities of life. It is by such standards as these that a people whose experience with the world has been limited, whose lives have been isolated, measures the bane and the blessing of its government."

The following letter gives in some detail the processes of a provisional city government. Provost Marshal Reeve possessed the advantage of a good working knowledge of the Spanish language, and he was, moreover, one of those officers who both could and did treat the natives with consideration and deal with them justly and fairly.

"SAN FERNANDO, October 28, 1899.

"My reports concerning the progress of civil administration and government in the Philippines have not indicated any flattering results of the methods employed; yet I believe those reports to be fair statements of facts. It is not, however, to be assumed that there are no efforts and no results. Something—much or little—of good arises from it all. It is not always an unmingled good, but some of the seed that is sown will doubtless result in a crop of desirable ideas and processes. Here in San Fernando I am

studying a preliminary situation, a kind of 'stepping-stone to higher things.'

"San Fernando de la Pampanga, about forty miles nearly northwest from Manila, has been for the last four months the focus of much American operation and the center of more. It was the halting-point of the movement northward which, during the spring, attracted so much of public attention. After occupying Malolos, Calumpit and many other places, the movement paused at San Fernando for about two months, and the town was made a military center and base of supplies. About the middle of August operations were continued toward the north, and Angelis became the advanced point and military headquarters. The operations in the vicinity, in Mexico and Santa Ana on the east and Bacolor and Santa Rita on the west, brought San Fernando fairly well within the lines of American occupation and made it reasonably safe from any extensive attack by the Filipinos.

"Successive visits to the place have enabled me to note its changing conditions. I was here when no one paid any attention to shots in the vicinity and very little attention to an occasional stray bullet. I have seen it as one of the duller places on the island, a garrison-point with a mere handful of native people. I find it now struggling for a new life, which, though feeble as yet, shows progress upward. A large



section of the city is a wreck. The church, an imposing and artistic structure in the heart of the city, the ecclesiastical buildings adjoining it, and a large area of the commercial district are all a heap of smoke-stained ruins. Wreck, desolation and that rapid decay and the more rapid hiding of decay which are distinctive of tropical countries, abound upon all sides. Once the place was rich, one of the richest on the island. It is in the heart of a productive sugar country and was the permanent home of a number of wealthy planters. I am writing this in one of those homes, now occupied as a military headquarters. The room in which I write was once the salon. It is forty feet square. Its ceiling is richly frescoed, its massive double doors elaborately carved. Doors open into a spacious hall and into a dining-room in which a table might be set for fifty people. Sleeping-rooms, large and airy, open from the hall. All through there are frescoed ceilings and carved doors. It was not the home of a Spaniard, but of a 'savage' Filipino, and is but a fair specimen of many of the same kind to be found on the island.

"Gradually the people, exiled by the disturbance of the war, are coming back to their homes and to what there is left of their old lives. If they come as non-combatants it is probably as much as can be said of them. That they should come as loyal and loving American patriots, to

kiss the hands that have shot down,—whether under just and righteous provocation or no,—their fathers, their husbands, their sons and their brothers, is a hope only to be cherished by the cheerful enthusiast. They face the inevitable and submit, for the sake of life and home, to the will of the stranger. That that will is kindly is more strongly evidenced by the real American heart than it is by the powers that be. ‘Crush them into submission,’ say the powers that be. ‘Lift them into grateful appreciation of our motives and our purposes toward them,’ say those of broader humanity and truer Americanism. ‘They do not know the meaning of gratitude and interpret kindness as weakness; if you treat them well they will stab you in the back,’ says the man who thinks the dog loves his master because the master kicks him. He misses alike the essential features of both dog nature and human nature.

“The Spanish census gave San Fernando a population of some thirteen thousand. Probably a little more than one tenth of that would be the figure for to-day. The place is far from being ready for that form of civil administration which has been prescribed for towns within the lines by the Philippine Commission in Manila. Few citizens of the better class have returned and the futility of placing government in the hands of those who are here has been recognized by the commanding officer of the district, Gen-

eral John C. Bates. Pending its occupation by a larger number of the more intelligent and property-owning classes, a provisional municipal government has been established. Provision is made for three different classes represented. Lieutenant Horace M. Reeve of the Third United States Infantry, now serving as aide-de-camp on the staff of General Bates, is acting as provost marshal, exercising a general authority over all and a special supervision of all American interests. A native, Señor Enrique Kerr, has been appointed as *alcalde*. He represents and directs the municipal affairs of the native people, while a prominent and wealthy Chinaman, whose long residence has led to his adoption of a Spanish name, deals with the Chinese affairs. A brief set of general ordinances has been drafted by Lieutenant Reeve, and copies of it, translated into the local Pampangan tongue, are posted conspicuously about the town. Can the people read them? The percentage of those who can would be about the same as it would be in an American town with the notice printed in English. There are people in the Philippines who are not far from being savages, but they are away in the minority. The general run of Filipino men may wear their shirts outside their trousers, but the shirt is always clean, and the plan is a local fashion and not an evidence of ignorance or savagery. In the abstract, it is quite as sensible as a coat-tail.

“This framework of a municipal government reads as follows :

“OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL,  
SAN FERNANDO, October 17, 1899.

“REGULATIONS FOR THE CITIZENS OF THE  
TOWN OF SAN FERNANDO

“1. The *alcalde*, Señor Enrique Kerr, and the policemen of this town are recognized by the United States authorities, and they will be respected and obeyed in the discharge of their duties.

“2. The *alcalde* will render judgment in cases arising where none but natives or civilians are interested. He will grant licenses to open shops and for other enterprises, to erect buildings, and will give burial permits.

“To meet civil expenses the *alcalde* will levy a moderate tax.

“3. It is the duty of every citizen to assist in preserving order. Thefts and other crimes should be immediately reported. Criminals and dangerous characters should be reported; citizens who are aware of their presence and do not assist in delivering them to the authorities will be considered accomplices and liable to trial.

“4. Depredation or disorderly conduct committed by persons other than natives should be reported to the provost marshal.

“5. Carrying arms is forbidden.

“6. Cases of smallpox or other contagious disease will be reported to the provost marshal.

“7. No one shall enter a *camarine* [warehouse] or vacant house, or one reserved for American soldiers, without a permit from the provost marshal.

“8. All persons are forbidden to leave their houses between 7 P.M. and sunrise, except in cases of going for a doctor.

“9. The occupant of each house or building will keep the buildings and yard thoroughly clean; also the street in front of the premises.

"10. No person will enter or leave this town except with a pass from the provost marshal. Passes will be given only in exceptional cases, and the applicant must be vouched for by the *alcalde*, or, if the applicant be a Chinaman, he must be indorsed by the captain Chinaman, Eusebio Sarate.

"HORACE M. REEVE,  
*First Lieutenant, Third U. S. Infantry,*  
*Provost Marshal.*

"One important point, the liquor question, does not appear in these ordinances. There is some force in the argument under which it is omitted. It is needless, so far as the natives are concerned. Liquor might be sold, as it always has been, as openly and as freely as any other commodity, and no trouble be given to either police or police-court. America can teach these people, as a matter of fashion, to wear shoes and to tuck their shirts inside their trousers, but these people can give America long odds on temperance. The police-court records in Manila report an occasional drunken native, but after nearly four months here I have yet to see my first drunken Filipino, or any Filipino that showed any sign of having 'changed his breath.' The need of a liquor law in San Fernando is confined to the soldiers of the United States, and the ground is covered by a general order issued from division headquarters. Under that order the sale of intoxicants is strictly prohibited throughout the territory occupied by the division, except under such conditions as are

provided for by general military law—canteens, commissary, etc. This covers the field. The sale of the local *vino*, a most potent knock-out, is prohibited. The native does not get drunk, and the American soldier who does so is punishable under the army regulations.

“I spent a very interesting two hours yesterday in the office of the provost marshal. It was the daily official session. The *alcalde* and the captain Chinaman were in attendance, each to attend the visitors of his special department, though Lieutenant Reeve was the final authority in all. A smiling and obsequious Chinaman approached. He was the proprietor of a little restaurant. He had been notified by the captain Chinaman that he was assessed three dollars Mexican for the privilege of running an eating-house. He spoke a good ‘Pidgin-English,’ but had not been able to understand clearly his fellow-countryman. He ‘came Hongkong side,’ while the captain Chinaman ‘came Foochow side,’ and ‘no speak samee.’ It was made plain to him that every adult male Chinaman in the town was to pay ten cents Mexican per month toward municipal expenses, and that all merchants, store- and restaurant-keepers and vendors of merchandise were subject to a levy of three dollars Mexican. He fished out his three dhobie dollars, and wafted himself out on a smile of beautiful blandness.

“Natives wanted passes to go to Manila.

They did not get them. Word had been sent out that Manila had all the natives it needed. Natives wanted passes to go to adjoining towns for all sorts of reasons. Some wanted to go out and bring their families back to their homes in the town. Some wanted to go out and look after their crops of sugar-cane or of rice. Some got what they desired and some did not. Two or three were accommodated with passes to go through the country to look up bull-carts for purposes of transportation for the army. Among them were some whose fidelity to the United States was quite doubtful. One applicant for a pass was known to have been a lieutenant-colonel in the Filipino army, and it was not clearly established that he had undergone a change of heart when he changed his clothes to come into town. One visitor reported that some sugar had been stolen from his storehouse. Another reported that he was being robbed right along and asked for a guard.

“A change of terms is coming on. Inside the American lines, and in the vicinity of territory that has been for some time under American control, the *insurrecto* becomes a ‘*ladrone*’ or a ‘*tulisan*.’ The *ladrone* is a thief and a robber. The *tulisan* is a villain of deeper dye. He may even commit a murder, and frequently operates in considerable bands. Benevolent assimilation is turning him, by name at least, from an *insurrecto*, a rebel, into a *tulisan*, a robber. But he is



very much the same bird, in spite of his new name.

“Notwithstanding the steps that are being taken toward the establishment of civil government in San Fernando, there remain ample signs that the times are not those of peace. Firing is heard from time to time in different directions. Under the window at which I am writing, two men are chopping fire-wood. A guard with loaded and bayoneted rifle stands over them. They are captured Filipinos being instructed and trained in the arts of peace. They use axes belonging to the American army, but they sit down while they chop. Others of the same kind come and go, doing various duties and similarly attended. That old chap out there with a blue shirt on and a dirty rag around his head failed to convince an American scouting-party that he was an ‘amigo’ engaged in peaceful pursuits when they found him up a tree with a rifle in his hands.”

Thus far it is not to be claimed with truth that American government in the Philippines has been attended with any measure of success. It is doubtless owing to the conditions of an existing war, but, up to the present time, American government has been less successful than was the Filipino during its fifteen months of control. The administration has announced the vague policy that:

It is our purpose to establish in the Philippines a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants and to prepare them for self-government, and to give them self-government when they are ready for it and as rapidly as they are ready for it. That I am aiming to do under my constitutional authority, and will continue to do until Congress shall determine the political status of the inhabitants of the archipelago.

The "inhabitants" say that their "wants" are the expulsion of the friars and the recognition of their political rights. Who is to determine what government is suitable to their "wants and conditions," and why, once such a government is established, should it be changed to any other form? Who is to determine the suitability, America or the Filipinos themselves? Is it not possible that the Filipinos have sufficient intelligence to know what kind of a government will suit them and be suitable for them, quite as well as any collection of American legislators or commissioners? These are pertinent questions, as is also the question whether any form which those of wholly American experience are likely to establish would be suitable for the place and people. The Filipino loves display. He would see his highest official ride in state with coach and four, gaudy liveries and outriders. He would see that official garbed in resplendent uniform, with sword and chapeau. We think that silly. We admire Jacksonian simplicity and rejoice in a President who walks downtown and buys a necktie or a newspaper just as

does the department clerk. The Asiatic does not think as we do, and a menace to American success in the far East lies in the American tendency to disregard that fact, and to issue decrees against cock-fighting, insist upon the adoption of American standards in all departments of life and oblige the Oriental to tuck in his shirt.

## XVI

### *THE CHURCH AND THE FRIARS*

The root of Philippine troubles—Early arrival of the friars—Abuse of power and influence—Religion rather than spirituality—A Manila church service—Curious customs—Church music—America's position—Arrival of Archbishop Chapelle—Its immediate results—Local press comments—An alleged interview and its results—Free speech in Manila.

AT the very root of all things political in the Philippines there lies that most delicate of all matters, a religious question. No competent knowledge of affairs in the islands is possible without a clear understanding of the position of the church in Filipino life. As the church has affected the history of the islands in the past, so is its influence still potent to-day. Beyond this, it lies before the American occupation as a barrier, bristling with serious complications, which is not surmountable by mere force of arms. The difficulties that confront the American government would still remain a long way from solution even were the last insurrecto to be shot down or imprisoned. With the Spanish

soldiers of the days of the sixteenth century, actuated by the idea of "territorial expansion," went the representatives of the church, with their ideas of the extension of the kingdom of God and the augmentation of the power of the church. A review of the writers of those early days will show that, while these two elements operated together in the establishment of Spanish authority in the Philippines, they were in an almost constant state of dissension as to which of the two constituted the supreme authority. During the latter years of that century Spain was the scene of a somewhat animated and sometimes bitter controversy regarding the scope and functions of the church in the islands of the East.

Previous to and during the controversy, mendicant friars had gone to the islands in considerable numbers, though lacking the proper authorization of the rulers of the church. The controversy at home terminated in an arrangement by which the church should receive one tenth of the tributes of the island. A body of Augustinian friars was to be sent out at once, and they were to be followed by representatives of other orders. Serious friction occurred at frequent intervals between the authorities of the church and those of the state, and many acrimonious contests took place between the friars of different orders. Upon the plastic materials of ignorance, credulity and superstition, the

priests and friars, many of them men of keen and highly trained minds, have impressed an idea of a religious power greater than that of the state.

Most unfortunately for the natives, and also most unfortunately for the church, the power of the priesthood has been greatly abused. That statement needs some qualification. I do not find that the protest of the people has been against the Church of Rome *per se*. It has been directed more distinctly against the extortions and abuses which are admitted to have been exercised by the various religious orders, the Augustinians, the Dominicans and the Franciscans. The Jesuits were expelled from the islands in 1768, but were permitted to return in 1852, upon the definite condition that their operations should be wholly confined to educational work. The Recoletos, being a branch of the Franciscan order, may be grouped with the mother organization.

I believe myself to be wholly in accord with the facts in stating that, while Spain has nominally exercised authority in the Philippines, the real power and many of the minor functions of government have been in the hands of the religious orders. The decision of the Council of Trent, which forbade the holding of benefices by friars, has been made void in the Philippines and nowhere else, if I am rightly informed. Papal bulls have made an exception in these islands, and misfortune and revolt have followed the

system. In spite of a notably strong protesting element, those orders have a grip on the Philippines and a power over its people that cannot be loosened by guns and bayonets.

It is distasteful to comment unfavorably upon any branch of an institution which stands in the world of to-day as stands the Church of Rome. But the Philippine Islands present a long array of wholly uncontrovertible facts regarding the misrule, the misconduct, and the oppression and extortion of these religious orders against which in past years Filipino revolt has been directed. Many of the better class of the natives have no hesitation in saying that the Spanish government, though hard, was far from unbearable. It was the exactions of the monastic orders, whose sway was supreme, against which they rebelled. These orders own and control vast areas of rural property and have extensive and valuable holdings in the towns and cities. What they give in return for what they get does not seem to be known. In his book, the standard work on the subject, Mr. John Foreman covers a number of pages with detailed accounts of monastic oppression and corruption. He also frequently alludes to the great possessions and the gross abuse of the great power held by these monastic orders. It is interesting to note that Mr. Foreman is himself a Catholic. His statements are those of an honest man who is ready to acknowledge the faults he sees.



To-day these orders are watching every move and every step taken by the officials of the United States. Democratic measures and systems are wholly subversive of the principles and methods of monastic orders. The orders represented here "view with alarm" the possibility of an American intrenchment within their stronghold, the possibility of democratic encroachment upon preserves which have been theirs for three centuries. With all the power of their organizations they are to-day working, for the greater part by secret and insidious methods, to support antagonism to American control.

Their religion, Roman Catholicism, means much to the Filipino people. Men as well as women are faithful in their attendance upon church worship, not only on Sunday, but upon the prescribed holy days as well. Stand for an hour by a church door in Manila at any time of day during the week. The majority of the men will be seen to lift their hats as they pass the portal. A Protestant American attending a service in one of the many churches in Manila would be impressed by it along the line of the breadth of his previous experience. If he had attended corresponding services in other countries, he would especially note only the minor differences of detail that arise from the differences of race and national life and custom. If he were suddenly transplanted from an en-

vironment which had always been limited to the Sabbath life of New England, it is more than probable that he would be decidedly shocked. Religion as a dominating and radiating force in individual life has little meaning in the Filipino life, viewed from the standpoint of New England Congregationalism. In this the Filipino is by no means unique. He shares with perhaps the majority of the human race the idea that the general acceptance of certain propositions and the observance of certain ceremonies will assure him of a more or less definite state of happiness in a future existence. But while his religion manifests no dominant motive in his daily life, and while his ceremonies are attended by surroundings which strike the American observer as decidedly incongruous, there can be no doubt that such religion as the Filipino has is a serious thing with him.

I attended service one morning in the Binondo church. The building is a large and rather imposing structure of stone, stained and weather-beaten, with here and there, upon walls and tower, a bunch of grass or growing shrubs which has sprung from wind-blown seeds lodged in accumulations of dust. A chime of bells hangs in its tower, and while these are doubtless rung upon some system, they peal, in various tones and combinations, at any and at frequent times, week-days as well as Sundays, from early morning until sometimes late at night.

As one approaches the church at the time of a service of any special importance, he finds the broad sidewalk densely thronged with passers, idlers, attendants and peddlers. The peddlers are particularly numerous on Sundays and high feast-days. The majority are women. Their wares, consisting of various fruits, flowers, cigars and cigarettes, cakes and different kinds of native compounds of sweetened pastes, are displayed in broad, shallow baskets of circular form. Around and beside these the venders squat in the common Filipino attitude. As a friend of mine puts it, "they double up like a closed jackknife." Among the delicacies thus displayed the American army hardtack finds a prominent place and ready sale.

With very few exceptions, the people are neatly dressed. Their fashions are other than ours, as is shown in the many illustrations that have appeared in American periodicals. Most of the garments are made of inexpensive materials. White cotton or drill prevails among the men, though many wear as an outer garment, in place of a coat, a shirt of the conventional pattern, made from either a light muslin or a native cloth of very thin texture and open mesh. This native cloth is wholly transparent and one rather wonders what purpose it serves. It offers neither warmth, coolness, nor concealment, yet many of the garments are quite elaborate and somewhat expensive. The specially

striking feature about the great majority of garments is their evidence of recent appearance from the laundry. The people are quiet, orderly, and sober almost to seriousness. The Filipino does not seem to be a ready laughers. He is somber and sedate rather than hilarious or even vivacious.

The interior of the church is conventional. The marble-tiled floor, the fountains of holy water, the candle-illuminated high altar, the choir-stalls, the statues and figures and the altar-boys attendant upon their duties behind the officiating priests, may be seen in any of the Catholic churches in America and elsewhere. The attitude of all the worshipers is reverential. The poor, the wretched, the lame and the blind kneel or stand commingled with their fellows of a better fortune. No special section is reserved for women, but some habitual separation is evident. Some portions of the floor show a predominating feminine occupation, while in others the men are the more numerous. The women generally kneel; the men usually stand. As I was a spectator rather than a worshiper, I noted the congregation rather than the service. I noticed one man in conventional European clothes. He was evidently a Spanish half-breed. His form and face would have made him a model for an artist to paint as Colonel Newcome. He knelt with upright form and bowed head, his hands resting upon the top of his walking-stick. Dur-

ing the whole of my stay in his vicinity he remained as motionless as a statue. The entire setting and the attitude of the man made him a study for a striking picture.

The music of the service was excellent. Upon another occasion I heard it to better advantage in the same church. The organ was of fine tone and was skilfully handled. The choirs contained excellent voices. The attendants were evidently wholly familiar with the services. This was indicated by the general recognition of those points in their process at which the crossing, the bowing of the head or the bending of the knee are called for. Some upon entering, most upon leaving, dipped the fingers in the font of holy water and crossed themselves with its drops. As I left the building, immediately as I crossed its threshold, a hand-bill was passed to me, among others. It advertised that at half-past three, on the afternoon of that Sunday, there would be a performance of Verdi's great opera of "Aïda" by Tagal artists, in the Tagal language, at the Teatro Libertad.

In all the demands for reform made by the Filipinos upon the Spanish government, at the bottom of all revolutions and uprisings, and in all of such demands as the Filipinos have made to the United States, there appears, with unfaltering persistence, as the one thing indispensable in Filipino life and peace, the demand for the expulsion of the friars.

In his letter of November 3, 1898, dated at Malolos and addressed to General Otis, Aguinaldo makes the following statements:

These priests . . . have been for a long time the absolute masters of the life, honor and property of the Filipinos. For this reason it is a widely known and notorious fact, recognized by all foreigners who have studied Philippine affairs, that the primary causes of the Philippine revolution were the ecclesiastical corporations, which, taking advantage of the corrupt Spanish government, have robbed the country, preventing progress and liberty.

There is no question of theory; it is a question of fact. Apologists, be they who they may, may make what statements they will, deny as they will the charges preferred against the friars, urge what advantages they will for the present system. The fact remains, indisputably, the Filipino people have demanded and still demand the expulsion of the friars. Conceding the most that can possibly be conceded,—namely, that the demand is unjust and unwarranted,—the fact of the demand remains. Moreover, it may be confidently expected that it will remain so long as the present system continues. Even were the friars to amend their ways, live the purest, holiest, most charitable and useful of lives, it may be doubted if they would then be acceptable to a people who have become deeply embittered against them.

I do not care to go into details concerning the charges of gross immorality, wrong and oppres-

sion that are brought against the orders as organized bodies and against the members of the orders as individuals, from the archbishop downward. The charges are brought openly, and there can be no question that many of them are capable of the fullest substantiation. All that may well be regarded as a side issue, important if you will, but subordinate to the main and fundamental proposition. That proposition may be briefly stated thus: Does the American principle of religious toleration warrant the continued imposition of an unacceptable priesthood upon an unwilling people? Behind that stands a question of almost equal moment: What can be done about it? There is little question that such continuance will only result in further protest here, and that the protest will again, as it has in the past, lead to revolt. The official or military support of the institution will make the United States a party to a condition operative against itself, subversive of law and order and contrary to American principles.

The arrival of Archbishop Chapelle was presumably a step toward the adjustment of differences and difficulties for which any adjustment seems little short of impossible. The demand is for a new order of things, not for a readjustment of an old system. Thus far it may be questioned whether his presence has not worked an added harm. His very association with Americans is used as a basis for rumors, which



spread widely, of affiliation between the American officials and the representatives of the church. The reception given in his honor, under American auspices, was largely attended by Americans, who were prompted by different motives. Some went out of respect, some out of courtesy, some from curiosity, some to enjoy a sociable time. The Filipino does not know, does not distinguish. He sees the official launch sent off to bring the ecclesiastic ashore; he sees the visiting archbishop on cordial terms with the (to the Filipinos) more or less objectionable Dominican, Archbishop Nozaleda, through whose influence and authority they believe they have been oppressed and at whose instigation they believe their friends and fellow-countrymen have been brutally shot on the Luneta; they see hundreds of Americans flocking to a social reception given to the visitor, beside whom stand Nozaleda and three other local church dignitaries. Had these people been imbued with confidence in the purposes and kindly intentions of the Americans, their views might have been cheerful and hopeful of better things. As it is, they are suspicious and look upon all these relations as evidence of a common action between the old order and the new rulers.

The incident is also seized upon by the political element as a basis of other and further rumors. The leading Spanish paper prints a long list of subjects, claiming them as the topics

proposed for discussion by Archbishop Nozaleda. "Libertas," the organ of the Dominican archbishop, discredits the authenticity of this program. "Libertas" and "Comercio" are both Spanish papers and both Roman Catholic. "Libertas" supports the friars, "Comercio" stands for a secular clergy.

Whether or not the list be authentic, it does unquestionably include many of the topics that will be considered by the reverend gentlemen. From the purely American standpoint, one would be justified in asking what these gentlemen have to do with some of these matters anyway. The principles have been determined and accepted in the United States and it would seem to be a new phase of things if America must ask certain monastic orders what it shall or shall not do concerning matters upon which a determination has been reached. It would seem a waste of time to discuss, on American soil and under the American flag, the maintenance by the church of schools and hospitals. The answer is wholly simple and fully established. They may maintain all for which they will themselves pay, and control none for which they do not pay. "Shall there be American priests in the capitals?" Another broad question with a simple answer. If they are wanted there, yes; if they are not wanted, no. "Shall the catechism be taught in the primary schools?" "Shall taxes be imposed for the maintenance

of the church?" "What shall be the scale of parochial fees?" etc.

These and all other questions are wholly fruitless until the basis be established. The real questions are, Shall the present order continue, contrary to the will of the people? Shall the friars be expelled and their places be filled by an acceptable secular clergy that will deal honestly, justly and in love and kindness with the people? This is the demand, and the vital question is that of compliance with it. In this question the American people are deeply interested, whether they be Catholic or Protestant. Will the American people back up the Dominican, the Franciscan and the Augustinian parish priest, as did the Spaniards, with bullet and bayonet? Already, it is said, the friars are proposing a return to their parishes and demanding their protection by American troops in the places to which they go. Already rumors come of the assertions of the Filipino people that if the friars come back they will kill them. Already petitions are coming to headquarters for a secular clergy. A priesthood is wanted, but the demand is for a secular clergy whose aims and purposes shall be the welfare, spiritual and social, of those to whom they minister. Under the present system the accumulation of money is an evident object, and morality and spiritual development are minor considerations.

The finest and most costly buildings on the

islands are the churches and the church buildings. Those who pay for them live in nipa huts. *El fraile* fares sumptuously and drinks his good wine. He who pays for the wine lives on rice, bananas, and fish when he can get it. The orders hold more or less valid titles to vast tracts of land in the Philippine Islands. There seems firm ground for the current rumors of transfers of these titles to private holders who are aliens, English and others. What is the object? Sensational stories are told of the way in which large amounts of landed and other property have been acquired. There are tales of dying men terrorized into devising their possessions; of the denunciation of wealthy Filipinos as political conspirators and a "stand in" with the authorities for the property of the condemned. I do not vouch for the methods of acquisition, though such stories are openly told and generally believed. The "great possessions" are evidently facts.

Comparatively little complaint is heard regarding the Jesuits. Their work, except for missions among the Mohammedans, has been chiefly along educational lines. In that department it has been of great value. Their college, library, museum and observatory with meteorological observations and reports are of incalculable value to the islands and to any nation that may possess them. Much of that which they have received has gone back to the people

increased a hundredfold. The bitter complaint, the protest and the revolt, are against those who absorb and retain and who pervert the functions of their holy office by obtaining in unholy ways.

I submit the following quotations from local papers of January, 1899. From "La Patria," January 16:

That a river of blood flows between the Filipino people and the monastic orders is already a matter of history. It is inconceivable that they should be enthroned once more on their former heights of power to control the affairs of the people like so many Jupiters, to retard as they have done hitherto the education of the people that they may be able to live on in their ignorance *in æternum*, to commit, in short, the grossest meanness and insult to which there is no parallel in history. How can the people be reconciled to those who have amassed enormous fortunes by deceiving the good faith of our ancestors and by abusing their religion in bringing about the deaths of our ancestors and of our great men, Burgos, Gomez, Zamora and Rizal—be reconciled, in fact, to those who by their mischief brought about the revolution of 1896?

From "El Grito del Pueblo," January 16:

Those who intend to reëstablish the friars in the parishes here need have no doubt that, as Cicero invoked the sword of justice and fury of the gods upon all traitors, so will the provoked people invoke a justice of their own if a new tyranny of their hated enemies be imposed upon them; . . . but this surely will not happen, for the apostolic delegate must realize that this step would involve the converting into a rank imposition what they have looked forward to as their salvation from misfortune.

There can be no doubt that these extracts give voice to a common opinion. The same ideas reach me through private channels from Filipinos of education and high social position. Further evidence is found in the following petition submitted to the archbishop by a delegation from the Santa Cruz district of the city of Manila. Petitions of similar tenor have been presented from other points.

TO MGR. P. L. CHAPELLE, APOSTOLIC DELEGATE OF HIS  
HOLINESS LEO XIII IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS :

The undersigned proprietors, merchants, lawyers, physicians, pharmacutists and other leading citizens of the Santa Cruz district of the city of Manila, present themselves before your Reverence with all due respect and veneration, and state: That they have heard it rumored that the regular clergy, that is to say, the members of the different religious corporations now residing in these islands, will be charged again with the salvation of souls and will assume all the other ecclesiastical dignities which they enjoyed throughout the archipelago under the long Spanish régime. Your Reverence cannot imagine what a disagreeable effect this report has had on the Philippine people, who unanimously protest against the pretension of such individuals, who, by their hateful behavior, caused, to a great extent, the revolution which shook the Spanish yoke in these islands.

The undersigned are stanch Catholics, faithful sons of the Roman Church, but they earnestly desire to have all their parishes and other ecclesiastical dignities administered by their secular clergy, without the interference of the friars in any way.

The friars are foreigners here, and are everywhere rejected, even in Spain itself. The best policy of the American government, especially at the present junc-

ture, would be not to admit the friars remaining here. In making this respectful application to your Reverence as the true representative of the Common Father, the undersigned refer especially to the church of the Santa Cruz district, which they hope will never be administered by a friar, but by a Philippine clergyman.

This is a grace and a justice which they hope your Reverence, whose hands they kiss, will grant to them.

MANILA, SANTA CRUZ,  
January 10, 1900.

Nor is the agitation confined to the island of Luzon. The following is a translation from the news columns of a Manila Spanish paper, "El Progreso":

CEBU, November 12, 1899.

A special meeting having been called, in the Government Building, of the representatives of all the social classes of this city, the meeting was called to order at 10:30 A.M., and the President informed the meeting of the arrival, according to information, in this city, of seven friars,—persons who have been the cause of the evils which are so fresh in the memory of all,—in order that each one present might express his opinion on a matter of such vital interest. After a short discussion, the meeting resolved to inform the Provincial Council, for transmittal to the American government, that the people are opposed to the permanency of the friars, which might give rise to disorder, and for which reason it is necessary, and they so demand, that the said friars be immediately expelled. The meeting was adjourned at 11:15, and all present signed the minutes.

The signers of the foregoing have a right to be regarded as representatives of the better class of Cebu, whether or not their propositions are accepted. Don Florentin Rallos is the president of the American government of the island of Cebu, and the other signers are merchants, lawyers and leading men of the town, which is a truly Catholic one.



One notable result followed the arrival of Archbishop Chapelle. "El Progreso," which is printed in Spanish and is bitterly antagonistic to the friars, published an alleged interview with the newly arrived ecclesiastic. It contained some remarkable statements and for several days my friend the editor, Señor Juan de Juan, went about in fear and trembling lest his paper be suppressed and his property confiscated. In some way the matter slipped through. He was not molested, but he had opened a flood-gate and pent-up feelings found vent in a way wholly unknown in Manila experience.

In the alleged interview Father Chapelle was quoted as saying: "The four public lectures given by Father McKinnon caused President McKinley to realize the necessity for the monastic orders remaining in the Philippines. I come to Manila with ample authority for everything. The friars of the Philippines have alarmed themselves without any reason. I know their importance and am openly predisposed in their favor. If the friars occupy the parishes they will be considered as elements of order and therefore as American agents." There was more of somewhat similar tenor.

That was too much even for Filipinos. They let themselves out. That which had been whispered in corners was shouted from the housetops. Without suppression and without punishment, journals printed and men shouted: "Abajo los

frailes!" ("Down with the friars!") "Fuera a los frailes!" ("Away with the friars!") "Muerte a los frailes!" ("Death to the friars!") "Fuera Nozaleda!" ("Away with Nozaleda!") Nozaleda is the archbishop. Foreman styles him "the Bloodthirsty." These were the cries of a large number of men, all of them Roman Catholics and all of them prominent, and most of them representative Filipinos, at a public reception tendered by Archbishop Chapelle to the "parish priests and Filipino Catholics."

The pro-friar element, evidently a very limited body, and the friars themselves, sought to discredit these proceedings by charging them to "non-Catholic sects and the diabolical spirit of Freemasonry." This will hardly hold water, as there are no representatives of "non-Catholic sects" here, excepting the Americans, and they took no part in it. Neither is there any Masonic order or organization. As said by the Manila "Times," it was "no effervescence, but a great movement, deep-rooted and far-reaching, in fact, the voice of the Philippine people." The demonstration, which was prearranged, may have been in bad taste, but there can be no doubt of its sincerity and its deep significance.

## XVII

### *THE ARMY AND THE NAVY IN THE PHILIPPINES*

Submerged heroes—A word for deserving men—Philippine “battles”—An attack on San Mateo—An army “dandy”—An engagement on the south line—Stragglers—Incidents of the field—Imus—Generals in the Philippines—The work of the navy—A fight at Subig Bay—At Novaleta—A dangerous coast—The navy in the south—The Mosquito Fleet.

**T**HE story of the army and the navy in the Philippines would make several books, each of them larger than this. Some day it will be written. It will be a tale including many accounts of hardships patiently and pluckily endured, of personal courage and of general bravery in fight. I sincerely hope that whenever such a work is done it may include several chapters on “Submerged Heroes.” Their country should know of and appreciate the work done by men whose story is too seldom told. It seems hardly fair to quote any names here. To cite a half-dozen instances gives to six a prominence which is due to sixscore. Colonels, majors, captains and lieutenants have served their

country on active campaigns and on warm firing-lines. Good work under such circumstances is usually reported. Yet even better and more telling work is often done behind the lines. The men who do it get no glory and the reading public knows little of them. Who knows how Major Butler D. Price for months held the city and administered the affairs of the district of Imus, commanding the Fourth United States Infantry in the absence of his regimental superiors, at an almost isolated post in the very heart of the most turbulent district of Luzon? Who knows of the work done by the Third Infantry up in Baliuag, San Ildefonso and the Candaba country? Who knows how much of the maintenance of order and of safety to American civilians in Manila is due to the untiring and intelligent work of such men as Captain Morrison and his fellow-officers of the Twentieth Infantry, the Fourteenth Infantry and the Sixth Artillery? Who ever thinks of Censor Greene, good fellow, gentleman and faithful officer that he is, except to condemn him for his steadfast discharge of his thankless and disagreeable task? I admit that the correspondents are to blame for giving Captain Greene a somewhat unsavory reputation, but the truth is that Greene deserves credit and honor for his work. I have mentioned names, after all. Let them stand. They stand also for scores who are equally deserving.

It is no discredit to the army to say that many of the accounts of their operations have been overdrawn. Few of their "battles" would have counted for much during the Civil War, but they were the biggest affairs we had on hand and they loomed up in a false perspective. I reported one of these at the time of its occurrence and the account may be taken as typical of much the greater number of "battles" in the Philippines. On December 18, 1899, the gallant Lawton fell, in what was practically a repetition in duplicate of this movement upon the same place.

"MANILA, August 20, 1899.

"The so-called 'battles' in the Philippines serve little purpose save the illustration of the general fighting qualities of the American soldier and the personal courage of many of the members of the army. The 'battle' of San Mateo, on August 12, may be cited as fairly illustrative of the great majority of military engagements in the Philippines. It is a larger affair than some, a smaller affair than others. The objective point, San Mateo, lies some fifteen miles to the northeast of Manila. It has been occupied and abandoned by the Americans perhaps more than once. Some points have been 'captured' and abandoned again and again, with a resulting casualty list upon each occasion. Except for its extension to San Fernando

along the railway, the American line northward and eastward of the city describes, generally, the arc of a circle whose diameter would be about ten miles. It runs from Malabon, on the bay, through Kalookan, La Loma and San Juan del Monte, with brigade headquarters at Deposito, not far from the latter point.

“The handful of troops to be employed in the San Mateo trip were from Young’s brigade of Lawton’s division. The movement was to be effected by the advance of three separate columns. One, under Captain Cronin, consisted of a hundred and fifty men from the Twenty-fifth (colored) Infantry. It was to move eastward from Novaliches, effecting a junction with Captain Rivers, who, with a hundred men of the Fourth Cavalry, was to move from the southwest and join Cronin in or near San Mateo to intercept the retreat forced by Captain Parker of the Fourth Cavalry. Parker, who, by the way, made an excellent record as lieutenant-colonel of the Twelfth New York, was to lead the main attacking body. That consisted of two hundred and eighty men, in six companies, from the Fourth Cavalry and Twenty-first and Twenty-fourth (colored) Infantry. Four of these companies were commanded by second lieutenants.

“Parker was to cross the river near Mariquina and follow the road leading northward upon its eastern bank. The purpose was to drive the

Filipinos, known to be in the vicinity, back upon San Mateo, where they would encounter the combination of the other two columns. The general plan miscarried, but Parker's force found a busy time for some four miles. The enemy, well intrenched, was encountered near the little river Nanca. Their dispersion involved the crossing of an unusually long stretch of those abominably muddy rice-fields which make military movements here so arduous. The troops plunge and flounder about in mud and muddy water from six to eighteen inches in depth. If the fire of the enemy becomes too galling (I believe 'galling' is the proper and accepted term), it sometimes becomes necessary for the men to imitate the carabao, and lie down and wallow in the stuff. That soils the clothing, ruins the temper and has a tendency to cause rheumatism and fever.

"A forty-minute fight took place at this point. The command was composed largely of recruits, but they showed all the pluck and dash and coolness of well-seasoned troopers. They manifested but one desire, and that was to charge forward. The junior officers won and received the cordial approval of their leader. Lieutenant Van Duyne, a young fellow from Newark, New Jersey, just out of West Point, displayed a most praiseworthy coolness and courage. In the face of such work as that the Filipino does nothing but run. I do not think his running to



be as much a sign of fear or cowardice as a part of his kind of warfare. Fear, or something akin to it, may well be a factor, for it must be rather appalling to face a line of brawny Americans whose onrush is attended by yells that almost drown the rattle of their shots. The first dash of the 'scrap' was the hot one. It was made across the open and against trenches. It cost the Americans eighteen men in killed and wounded. The Filipino loss is not known. Under such circumstances the loss to the enemy is usually reported to be four hundred.

"For the next four miles it was a running fight, with the Filipinos gaining at every jump. The lightly clad native, who knows every inch of the running, rather handicaps his American pursuer at that kind of a foot-race. Parker kept them moving at a rate that sent them through the city before Cronin's arrival. Some escaped to the north. Others undoubtedly played the usual game and got away around to the right of our line and were 'amigos' by the time they reached the rear. It is beyond question that a fair number of the Americans' opponents of the 12th were seen as industrious agriculturists at work in their fields, and all very friendly, when the troops returned a day or two later. That is quite a way they have. It has led to some misconception regarding the attitude of a considerable number of Filipinos toward the Americans. After discussing the point with a

good many officers who spend their time on the line, I am disposed to a belief that such things as honestly friendly Filipinos belong to the *rara avis* family.

“Cronin’s march was without special incident. Some three or four miles outside of San Mateo, Captain Rivers came upon an intrenched outpost. A sharp little engagement followed, with the stereotyped result. The Filipinos fired a few moments and then disappeared. Their fire cost one American life and a few wounds. What was gained by it all? I cannot say. A town or two which had been previously captured and abandoned was again captured and again abandoned. The Filipinos were scattered from the vicinity, just as flies are driven from the sugar-bowl. They are soon back again. Our guard-lines around Manila are fairly strong and could be quickly reinforced from the regiments in the city. Beyond that guard-line it really makes little difference whether the enemy be five miles away or fifty.

“Captain Parker’s trip resulted in an incident or two worth recording. One company was under command of Captain Wilhelm of the Twenty-first Infantry. Besides his qualities as a fighting man with plenty of courage and cool nerve, Captain Wilhelm is one of those whom some would call a ‘dandy.’ But dandies of his kind are good things to have in the army. At a certain stage of the fighting he saw four of

the enemy running away at close range. He ordered his men to fire on them and bring them down. Just at the critical moment, and just in time to save them, a native woman ran out and placed herself, with extended arms, immediately behind the fugitives, in the line of the fire. There was but one thing for Wilhelm to do as an American gentleman, and he did it promptly. He ordered his men to reserve their fire and moved on, while the hurrying Filipinos got as quickly as possible out of range, sheltered from harm by American gallantry and their guardian angel.

"This same Captain Wilhelm showed himself in another rôle during the same scrap. The command was moving along an open road when it was assailed by a very lively shower of bullets. All of his men did just what they should have done under such circumstances: they hunted what cover they could find in the muddy rice-fields, where they floundered about as one must under such conditions. Wilhelm remained alone, standing in the roadway, the only prominent object in the whole field, while Mauser and Remington bullets pattered around him, kicking up, as they do, each its little puff of dust. People who want to chaff Wilhelm say he stayed there because he preferred getting shot to getting his clothes muddied. That is as it may be, but, clothes or not, it took plenty of cold nerve to stand there, the sole target for the Filipino fire.

“Whatever else they do, these little ‘scraps,’ as the men call them, show very clearly that the stock of American courage was not exhausted at Bunker Hill, at Missionary Ridge or at San Juan; there is evidently a good supply still on hand.”

Another of these representative movements was reported as follows:

“MANILA, October 6, 1899.

“News-getting in the Philippines is as variable an occupation as that of the commercial traveler. Active seasons come somewhat spasmodically. During the greater part of the time business is either dull or normal, with an occasional day of unusual activity. But the man who is ‘on the end of a wire’ can never be really idle. Much of his work may be and is only a routine of visits to certain places from which news may emanate. Upon these places he must keep a constant watch lest the unexpected happen and he lose a desirable news paragraph which his more fortunate or more faithful competitors secure and send in ahead of him. News-getting on the line is more interesting and less tedious. It is usually more fruitful, but it is also more dangerous.

“Bakoor is a town on the shore of Manila Bay, some seven or eight miles south of the city as the crow flies; by the shore road it is some

twelve miles. Imus is about four miles south of Bakoor. The Imus River passes Imus and empties into the bay at Bakoor. A road, which is a very good road in the dry season, runs southward from Bakoor along the river into a land that is yet unknown to more than a very few Americans. The road runs upon the eastern bank of the river, crossing by a bridge on the outskirts of Imus. For two or three miles along the western bank of the river the Filipinos had constructed rude trenches and breastworks among the dense thickets of bamboo and other growth.

“The engagements of Friday and Saturday resulted in several casualties for the Americans. On Monday the Americans assumed something of the aggressive. A detachment of the Fourteenth Infantry was sent out from Bakoor to effect a junction with a detachment of the Fourth Infantry, which was started from Imus. They had a decidedly interesting time, but failed to break up the Filipino lines. Four Americans were killed and some six or eight were wounded. Among the killed was Captain Eldridge of the Fourteenth. In the afternoon a call was made for reinforcements. The wires were down, so that news of the Monday engagement was late in reaching the city. Further troops were ordered up and one hundred and fifty marines were ordered ashore from the ships in the bay of Cavite. General Lawton and his staff rode

out from the city at an early hour on Tuesday morning. General Grant, brigade commander of the district, was already on the ground.

“Mr. Collins of the Associated Press and I left Manila for Bakoor on board a commissary tug at 8 A.M. We got out a little too late to be upon the immediate firing-line, but as we were after news of what had been done and how it was done, rather than on a hunt for Filipino scalps, it was perhaps quite as well for us. While we were still some distance from the shore we heard the boom of artillery at work. As we approached the shore the sound of the rifle-fire became quite distinct. Scattering shots and volleys were plainly audible. Shallow water and no pier necessitated an anchorage at some distance from the beach. We secured a native canoe and got to the shore as quickly as possible. The town had a notably deserted look. A few native women were about, but there was hardly a native man to be seen. Soldiers on detail duty, hospital men and a few stragglers were loafing around or going about their work.

“We spent a half-hour picking up information and putting it on the wire for Manila and then started out on the road toward the firing-line. I think I never saw a prettier road. Nipa huts, fenced with plaited bamboo, nestled under dense foliage. Graceful bamboos waved and swayed in the wind. The broad-leaved bananas and the

denser foliage of hardwoods served to turn the whole into a parkway as beautiful as one could wish. Occasionally we met soldiers resting under trees or straggling back. There are always some that straggle back. I don't know why. They get separated from their particular command and instead of joining something else in their vicinity they go poking alone to the rear. As we had been told in Bakoor that the road was not quite safe even for peaceful pedestrians, we questioned these stragglers regarding the advisability of going on. Had we listened to them we should have started for the United States at once. All had tales to tell of very close shaves, sharp-shooters in trees and danger everywhere.

"We came upon one group of a half-dozen men sprawling comfortably in the shade of a tree. We had seen the same group start out a little ahead of us. We questioned them concerning their being there. They told a fearsome tale. A little farther on there was a bridge which it was dangerous to pass. A little way beyond the bridge there was a stretch of open road that, according to their horrible tale, seemed to be constantly swept by a hail-storm of Filipino bullets. They dared not cross it and had returned. Apparently, by their story, the thickets swarmed with sharp-shooters. I had heard the tales of that type of soldier before. We knew that General Lawton, dressed as usual



in his conspicuous light-colored suit and mounted on his big bay horse, was a half-hour or so ahead of us over that same road. We left the stragglers to their straggling. As we proceeded, the sound of the fighting became more distinct. We could hear the Americans howl as they rushed some trench or breastwork, the rattle of volleys and the crack of Krag and Mausers fired at will.

“Turning a bend in the road, I regretted that I had not brought my camera. I am a man of peace, but I love the artillery. I like the infantry and I like the cavalry, but the artillery somehow makes a special appeal to me. Around that corner we came upon a bunch of huge artillery-horses standing by a caisson. Just beyond them was a 3.2-inch field-gun trained across the river. The battery-men were scattered about, some idle and some alert and watchful. The breech of the gun was open and shrapnel lay at hand. The scene and its setting made a picture that I very much wanted. We stopped for a little chat and then pushed on to the bridge, which was just beyond.

“We found the entrance to the bridge guarded by a squad from the Fourteenth and stopped to hear their story. They were on the watch for straggling Filipinos. They pointed out a bamboo jungle some fifty rods away. From that point General Lawton had been fired upon as he rode past. The words were barely out of the

speaker's mouth when, crack! crack! came the tones of two or three Mausers. There was a general dropping and plunging for cover behind the low wall that bordered the road at the entrance to the bridge. Eager hands clutched the rifles and cautious heads were raised to look over the wall for a possible shot at the shooters in the jungle. A few more shots came, a dozen or so in all, but there was no sign of the hidden marksmen. Five minutes later all were as unconcerned, standing up, walking about, or sitting down, as if there were no such things in the world as guns and bullets. We crossed the bridge and came upon a solitary sentry at the other end. He was a tall, very broad-shouldered chap, evidently of German blood. He was as alert and watchful as his position required, but as cool and as phlegmatic as he would have been had he been hunting rabbits. He called our attention to an object in a near-by field. It was a dead 'nigger.'

"Forty rods farther brought us to a well-shaded spot on the bank of the river. There was no need to ask what those men were doing there. The green stripe of the hospital service and the white sleeve-band with the red Geneva cross told plainly enough of the field-hospital following the firing-line. But there had been nothing for them to do all the morning and I am glad to say that we saw them pack up and return to Bakoor as we passed on our return

late in the afternoon. They then reported 'not a case all day.' Just beyond them was that awful stretch of open road from whose terrors the squad we had seen farther back had turned in apprehension. A skirmisher posted in a thicket at the beginning of the clean stretch told us that everything had been quiet for a while and he 'reckoned' that we could get over all right. We did. There may or may not have been Filipinos covering the spot from across the river. If there were, they evidently did not think us worth a shot.

"At the other end of the stretch there was a low breastwork behind which three soldiers were hugging the ground. They told of a heavy firing there a half-hour before our arrival, but all was quiet at that time. From the Bakoor bridge all the way to Imus there rested a line of guards. Every few rods we came upon one, two, three or more soldiers guarding the line under such protection as was available. Some were behind rudely made breastworks. Some were hidden in dense bamboo thickets. All had stories to tell of 'close calls' and thrilling experiences, which we discounted duly. We next came to the spot where Eldridge was killed. It was an ugly corner. There was a sharp bend in the road at that point. Immediately opposite the bend, on the other side of the little river, a strong body of Filipinos had been well intrenched. From that place of concealment

they had sent in a fire which cost two or three American lives and sent a half-dozen wounded Americans to the hospital. Here we met Captain Reilly of the Fifth Artillery, in command of the battery engaged about Imus. He pointed out the details of the engagement of the previous day, showing where one of his 3.2-inch field-guns had stood and operated on trenches at less than one hundred yards' range. The trees, leaves and roadside fence were spotted with the marks of Filipino bullets. The same across the stream showed the marks of American shrapnel in addition to bullet-holes.

"From this point to Imus the road was entirely safe, made so by the skirmish-line that guarded it and by the fact that the advancing firing-line was driving the Filipino troops farther away to the south and southwest. This was shown by the lessening of the fire and its evident greater distance. We entered Imus and went to headquarters, only to find that every one from there was still out on the line. We went to the hospital to learn of the casualties at that end. Only one had been reported, that of Lieutenant Burgess of the artillery, shot, rather badly, near the ankle-joint. We kept on toward the retreating sounds of the engagement. A half-mile out of the town we met General Lawton and his staff coming back. We turned back with them. It was useless to go any farther. When General Lawton rides back from the

front, over a couple of miles of the vilest kind of muddy road, just to get lunch, there is not much for newspaper men to see. The row was practically over. We spent an hour or two in pleasant company and started back.

“On the edge of the town we overtook the marines on their way to the shore. I am quite sure that if I were to see such a bunch of big, strong men coming in my direction with ‘malice prepense,’ I should do just what the Filipinos do—run for all that was in me. I inferred that the marines did not wholly relish the job they had been doing. They said it was not a fight; it was very much like hunting rabbits in a land of swamps and thicket. All was quiet on our return. The skirmish-line was still on duty along the road. Occasionally some of them saw, or imagined that they saw, Filipinos across the river, and blazed away at something or at nothing. We met further reinforcements coming up, but they were not needed and were sent back.

“The marines told us that in following up the retreating Filipinos they encountered many whose apparel was clear evidence of their having been in the trenches, but they held up their hands and declared themselves amigos. I have said that on our way out we saw no men. On our return the place was full of them. They had simply followed down the western side of the river and crossed to their homes after their

day of fighting the Americans. They, too, were our friends, the amigos, the 'benevolently assimilated.' On Wednesday they were quiet, orderly, peaceful and law-abiding Filipino-Americans. On Wednesday night they burned Paranaque, a few miles north of Bakoor. That is war in the Philippines. All this was as near to Manila as Elizabeth is to New York, and some of it was about as far from Manila as Newark is from New York. It was within the territory which has accepted American sovereignty with reported avidity. Three months ago it was officially reported that the Filipino force on the south line had been wholly scattered and broken. There seems to be a little 'life in the old dog yet.' On Tuesday night there was another threatened uprising in Manila itself. Again the guards were doubled and the authorities were on the alert. Provost Marshal Colonel Williston spent the night in going about the city, watching, studying and directing.

"A local paper on Thursday morning prints an editorial headed 'On a Volcano.' It makes the following statements: 'There has not been an hour since February 4 that this city has not, figuratively speaking, been nestling over a volcano. . . . One hour of neglect in the precautions established and rigidly maintained, and there would be such an eruption here as would shake the city from its foundation and drench the ruins with the blood of foreigners.' This is

a somewhat overdrawn statement, but there is a thread of truth in it."

In the following article I essayed brief sketches of the personality of some of our military leaders with whom my work brought me into more or less of personal contact:

"MANILA, December 24, 1899.

"A general officer is a General. The officers of the army are those of the line and those of the staff. The staff does the business and the line does the fighting. In the line three groups occur—general officers, field officers and line officers. Below the last, and not exactly to be included, are the non-commissioned officers—the sergeants and the corporals. General officers are those of any grade entitled to wear a star or two. Field officers include colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors. Line officers include captains and first and second lieutenants.

"A certain personal interest always attaches to leaders. Yet personalities are always a most difficult topic to handle. All men are open to both praise and censure. One may comment, dispassionately or otherwise, upon the work done by some one of high rank or position, yet be charitably loath to touch upon his personal idiosyncrasies. The man may be of a peevish, irritable, pompous, conceited, or any other kind of disagreeable temperament. One does not



like to post such little human weaknesses before the reading public. It is much pleasanter to say nice things about people than it is to tell the other kind, even though they be true. Let me essay a few thumb-nail sketches of these military leaders in the Philippines.

“General Otis is one whose face is entirely familiar from many pictures, some honest and some caricatures. The shaven chin with the ungraceful side-beard framing it and the somewhat heavy cast of countenance are well known. Much has been written about the man. Some of it is true, some wholly false. I read a letter recently, alleged to have been written by a local correspondent, in which General Otis was pictured as a man of quite elegant leisure and a tendency to enjoy it. The writer told of the general’s life in a palace and implied that his principal business was to ride in a comfortable carriage and to ‘fare sumptuously every day.’ He does live in what passes for a ‘palace’ in this region; he does ride in a carriage; and I hope he fares sumptuously. I am no warm admirer of General Otis. His methods of working seem to me, as a business man, most unbusinesslike. But work he does, day in and day out and far into the night, indefatigably, persistently and conscientiously. He is the hardest worker on the islands. In that, it seems to me, lies his greatest error. He wastes endless time and strength in the doing and supervision

of petty details. His work should be administrative, executive, that of direction, plan and arrangement—broad, not narrow. He lives in a valley and works with a microscope, while his proper place is on a hilltop with a spy-glass. Some say he is in both places, using both instruments. That is not in human nature. His endurance is wonderful. He has been shot through the head and suffers from loss of sleep. No criticism rests upon the *amount* of work he does, whatever may rest upon the *kind* of work and its results. He does enough work to kill most men.

“In an office adjoining that of General Otis sits General Schwan, the chief of staff, one of the ablest and most competent men in the service. Loyal to his chief and faithful in his work, he puts in almost as many hours a day as does General Otis. He is a tall man of rather gaunt frame—a man of a clear and well-stored mind, a ready and pleasant talker, courteous in manner, with the direct straightforwardness of one who has seen many years of military life. He is a German by birth, enlisting as a very young man in the American army. He has risen steadily, step by step, through his own personal worth and merit. He served with distinction in the campaign in Porto Rico and commanded a small but successful expedition in the Philippines early in October. His best work here has been done in his office in the

ayuntamiento, where the American public does not see it and does not know about it.

“The ranking officer in the field is General MacArthur. He, too, is a staff man in the regulars, and, like General Schwan, in the adjutant-general’s department. He is a man of strong and sturdy figure, which a less active life would probably develop into rotundity. He enlisted in the Twenty-fourth Wisconsin in 1862, serving as first lieutenant and battalion adjutant. He was mustered out as lieutenant-colonel of his regiment in June, 1865, and entered the regular service as second lieutenant in the Seventeenth Infantry in February, 1866. He was transferred to the staff as major in 1889, was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers in May, 1898, and made major-general in August of the same year. General MacArthur is a man of wide and thoughtful reading and is unusually well read in military matters. In work of the kind so well done by Lawton and Young—the rapid movement, the brilliant dash, the quick sweep through a hostile country—General MacArthur would probably be no rival for such men. In efficient strategical movement of an army corps or a division there are probably few men in the army who could excel him. He is a man of thoughtful habit, who studies and plans. Some think him slow, but if left to himself he would rarely have to do his work a second time. He is a gentleman both in manner

and costume, courteous and somewhat formal, not readily approachable by strangers and apt to be unpopular with the ill-bred, who set him down as being 'stuck up.'

"Taking the brigadiers as they stand in their rank in the regular army, the list would run as follows: Hughes, Bates, Hall, Young, Wheaton, Kobbé, Bell. Three are here appointed from civil life: Wheeler, Grant and Smith. Another civilian appointee, Funston, is on his way. Of General Lawton I shall say nothing. All the world has read the obituaries of that gallant officer, whose life was lost in a mere skirmish with the little brown men of Luzon. He deserved a nobler death in a nobler cause. He, too, was from the staff, the inspector-general's department, and was the last of the staff men on the list of general officers here except the next in relative rank in the regular army, General Hughes.

"General Hughes, ranking, as did Lawton, as colonel in the inspector-general's department, has been winning laurels as a soldier in Panay. He is military governor of his district, and now that troops have been furnished him and the season has come when army movement has become possible, he has scattered his opponents and is proceeding with the work of garrisoning his district. His troubles are not over, but they are being simplified. In the prize-ring General Hughes would be classed as a 'light-

weight.' His strength lies more in his head than in his body.

"The second in relative rank is General Bates, of whose achievements I have already given some account. Some rather severe criticism has been passed upon his work in effecting a treaty, a few months ago, with the sultan of Sulu. This criticism is quite unwarranted. General Bates had a certain work to do, with generally outlined instructions. His mission was admirably accomplished, so far as his personal work is concerned. The principle involved is a matter of opinion. One thing is wholly certain: he deeply impressed the people of that southern department by the justice that he manifested, the tact that he displayed and the fairness and courtesy of his attitude toward all in that section. Part of his success was due to a striking personality. He is a tall and slightly stooping man who, in a black frock-coat instead of a uniform, might easily be taken for a professional man, a student. Very heavy and bushy eyebrows overhang piercing brown eyes, which can flash or twinkle, according to the situation. There is no doubt that his personality carries great weight with those with whom he is appointed to deal. Fortunately, this is well backed up by clear judgment and unflinching honesty.

"General Hall is unique in his position here. Among the general officers serving in the

Philippines who belong to the regular army, he is the only one, except the newly appointed Bell, that is a graduate of West Point. He entered that institution in 1855 and served through the Civil War in regiments of the regular army. He is an excellent type of the soldier-man in his personal appearance. He is of medium height, well and cleanly built, square-shouldered and flat-backed, a fine face, with white mustache and short imperial. His clothes correspond to his build, well fitted and always in order, kept as a soldier is expected always to keep his equipment. He is of dignified and somewhat reserved bearing, improves steadily upon increasing acquaintance, and after one has gotten to know him turns out to be of the kind whom one is very glad to know.

“General Young is a cavalryman who needs a horse that is a weight-carrier. He is a tall, heavily built man of two hundred and forty pounds of normal weight. His endurance on his long trip through the wilds of northern Luzon has been marvelous. He has broken down men and horses, and pushed on, himself, any way he could get along—in the saddle, on foot or sitting on the floor of a clumsy and springless hill-cart. His men dropped out and his native scouts fell behind; but Young kept on until he got about as far as any one could go. When he got there his command had dwindled to a squad. He is another type of soldier

than those described. A big, fine-looking man with a frank, breezy manner, he says what he thinks, with little regard to his audience—a bluff, open-hearted, free-handed man. He, too, is a Civil War veteran. He enlisted as private in the same regiment as General Hughes—the Twelfth Pennsylvania. He came out as colonel and brevet brigadier-general. He then entered the regular army as second lieutenant and rose by gradations to the colonelcy of the Third Cavalry and now to a brigadier-generalship.

“We have another fighting soldier-man in General Wheaton, one of the most deservedly popular men in the islands. He is tall, fine-looking, heavily bearded. He is approaching the time of his retirement and does not stand quite as straight up and down as he did a few years ago. He hunts no newspaper reputation and gets less of public notice than he deserves, yet he is the friend of the newspaper men and his quarters are always open to them in most cordial hospitality. He is a man of strong opinions and goes at his points in conversation as he goes at his opponents in the field—directly and vigorously. Yet he is not intolerant. I have had a tilt or two with him myself. He is a man who thinks strongly and fights as he thinks. He is essentially the man of the field rather than of the office. He thinks his place is at the head of his troops, and when his powerful voice rings out, ‘Men, follow me in a



charge!’ every blue flannel shirt, whether it be on a man’s back or hanging on a bush, starts up and follows wherever Wheaton may go.

“General Kobbé is one of the many good men in the army that are but little known outside of army circles. It takes a long time to get rank in the artillery, and after twenty-seven years in that arm, following ten years in the infantry, he is still a major. His present star is a just recognition of valuable service rendered here in the Philippines. He is a man of sound and ripened judgment, quiet and rather retiring in manner, cool, clear and level-headed in action. He talks little, but says something when he talks. He is spare of figure and a little above medium height. His face is serious and thoughtful, but lights up with a pleasant smile in conversation.

“Compared with these whom I have mentioned General Bell is something of an infant, though a very sturdy one. At the opening of 1899, J. Franklin Bell was in the regular service, a first lieutenant in the Seventh Cavalry. At its close he wears the star of a brigadier-general of volunteers. He has earned it. At first I thought him rather theatrical, given to gallery plays. I now feel that I was wrong. Scouting-trips are the pyrotechnics of warfare, but they are essential. They are spectacular, but they are important and often vital. The more efficiently they are executed the more spectacu-

lar they become. Hence Bell seemed endlessly spectacular. Bell and the Thirty-sixth were everywhere, but that is only evidence that they were doing their work. Bell is hardly yet in the prime of his life, a robust, vigorous, energetic man, laudably ambitious in his work. He is yet untried as a brigade commander, but all who know him hope for and believe in his success.

"Of these men, Otis, Schwan, Hughes, Bates, Hall, Young, Wheaton and Kobbé—all excepting Bell—are veterans of the Civil War. Of the civil appointees, Wheeler, Grant and Smith, I have no room to speak here. Wheeler and Grant need no introduction or description. Their work in the Philippines has been minor and relatively unimportant. General Smith came out as colonel of the First Californias, but has stayed to do most creditable work as administrator in the island of Negros. I wonder what they all really think about this thing. Their honestly expressed opinions would be valuable and interesting."

My tribute to the work of the navy was paid in the following article. Its major fault lies in its failure to make fitting individual mention of all the scores of gallant gentlemen, from Admiral Watson downward, who did so efficiently the work which they had to do. It is faulty also in its scant attention to the gentlemen of the ma-

rine corps, whose work in Cuba, in the Philippines and in China has done something toward giving them that place in the public estimation to which they are so justly entitled.

“MANILA, December 22, 1899.

“The operations of the army in the Philippines during the year that is past have somewhat overshadowed those of the navy; but there is a navy here and its presence and its work have been indispensable in the establishment of American supremacy in the islands. A comparatively small amount of anything that could be called fighting has been done, but there have been no tales of the building of birds’ nests in the throats of the navy’s guns.

“In some instances the navy has operated as a serviceable attendant upon the operations of the land forces. In other instances there has been a more prominent coöperation. In a few cases the navy has acted alone. A blockade, only partly effective, has been maintained. There has been no cordon of alert and watchful ships drawn around the islands, as there was in the case of Cuba. That would be a process which is practically out of the question. Probably not less than one hundred vessels would be required for an absolutely effective blockade around the Philippines and for the stoppage of all coastwise and inter-island communication.

“The huge *Oregon* does some cruising and, when occasion offers, presents her majestic bulk and ominous muzzles along the coast in the vicinity of army operations on land, thus lending a moral and, if needed, a very material support to the land forces. I saw her a few weeks ago at Iloilo, a very emphatic object-lesson to the people of that vicinity. A few days ago she was acting in coöperation with General Young on his expedition up the west coast of Luzon to Vigan. Philippine waters are not the safest possible cruising-grounds for a boat of her size, but there is no question that her appearance makes an impression upon all natives who get a look at her.

“The most extensive distinctly naval engagement of recent months was that of Subig Bay on September 23. It was a somewhat formidable and expensive operation for a seemingly small work. It was known that somewhere on the western coast of Luzon the insurgents (now known as ‘bandits’) were in possession of four modern 6-inch Krupp guns which the Spaniards were said to have left behind them on Isla Grande, at the opening to Subig Bay. It was reported that the Spaniards had taken away the breech-blocks and dropped them overboard in deep water. Word came that one of those guns had been taken to the mainland by the Filipinos, who had mounted it and fitted a new breech-block. It was a menace of some consideration,

though nothing very serious in the hands of people who can do no better shooting than can the Filipinos. But it was thought desirable to break up the establishment, and the *Monterey*, *Charleston*, *Concord* and *Zafiro* were sent in for the job.

“For three or four hours the ships made various-sized holes in the air of Subig Bay, the *Monterey* making seventeen 12-inch and twenty-one 10-inch ones with her big guns; while she and the rest pounded away with an assortment of sizes down to the *Zafiro*’s one-pounder. The result was inevitable. One shell from the shore gun, well aimed by an accident probably, came quite near to scoring on the *Monterey*. A force of one hundred and eighty blue-jackets and seventy marines was landed under cover of the fire of the ships, and though they were also under a rifle-fire from the enemy on shore, the affair was soon over. The gun, a valuable piece of twenty-five feet in length, was blown up with guncotton, and the force returned to the ships with a loss of but one man wounded. Their reception had been a warm one, the Filipinos showing a notable degree of pluck. That the American loss was so small is due to the same cause that accounts for the small casualties in all engagements here: the Filipinos shoot often enough, but they don’t shoot straight; they fire high and their shots are wasted.

“On October 2 a detachment of small gun-

boats was sent in to smash up the town of Orani and recover the gunboat *Urdaneta*, which the Filipinos had captured at that place. This was the boat commanded by Lieutenant Wood, who was killed, while his crew were taken prisoners. Some of them have since come in, released through the dispersion of the Filipino army in the northern provinces. They encountered little resistance in recovering what was left of the *Urdaneta* and little in an investment and occupation of the town, which had been practically deserted by its inhabitants. The town appears to have suffered some damage during the engagement.

“Some important work was also done by the *Petrel* and the *Callao* at the time of the movement on the south line on October 8. Some of the operations were near the coast and it was possible for these light-draft boats to lie sufficiently near to the coast to help in clearing the country with their small guns. Special credit is due upon that occasion to the marines who landed, three hundred strong, under Colonel Elliott and most efficiently coöperated with the troops under command of General Schwan. Their percentage of losses was very much greater than that of the military arm and this too little known and too little appreciated branch of the service certainly met hot resistance and did good work in the fight at Novaleta, a town which, it is said, the Spaniards were

never able to conquer in any of their operations. This was the affair which General Otis disposed of in an official despatch by the brief statement that the 'navy vessels and marines at Cavite made a demonstration on Novaleta yesterday.' The 'demonstration' cost the marines one man killed, two officers and eight men wounded, and fifty heat prostrations. That is quite up to the average casualty list in Filipino 'battles' and the work of the marines on that day is deserving of far more credit than General Otis accords it in reporting it as only a 'demonstration.'

"The navy also covered the landing of General Wheaton's troops at the head of Lingayen Bay on November 7. The *Bennington*, *Princeton*, *Helena*, *Manila*, *Callao* and *Samar* shelled the coast for an hour or so prior to the disembarking of the troops, the Thirteenth and the Thirty-third. Here, as at the landing of the blue-jackets and marines at Subig, the Filipinos stuck to their posts in spite of the shelling and put up some resistance to the landing troops. The boats of this little squadron were also of endless service as despatch-boats between Manila and this point of occupation. At that time the water route was the only means of communication with headquarters. That condition obtained until, some days later, a juncture was effected at Dagupan with the forces under General MacArthur.



“I do not care to comment on the loss of the *Charleston*. A few clouds on the horizon portend a possible scandal. There appears to be a disposition on the part of the crew to enter rather serious charges against the officers. The determination of the cause of the disaster and the responsibility for it rests with the board of inquiry which, of course, will be established. Testimony will be taken from both officers and men. It may easily be that the loss would have occurred in any case, even granting a foundation for the complaints of the men. The vessel was cruising in badly surveyed waters and was less fortunate than others which have found themselves in dangerous positions. The *Oregon* had a close shave not long ago. The *Manila* spent some days aground on a reef in the Sibutu Channel in September and the *Yorktown* took a little scrape on the reefs of Palawan in November. There is a big job ahead for the Department of Coast Survey in charting all the thousands of square miles of Philippine waters. There are charts, but they are neither adequate nor wholly reliable.

“Small gunboats of the navy have done an extensive work in preventing inter-island trade carried on by the small sailing-vessels of the native people. The real advantages and benefits of this stoppage of local traffic and the real wisdom of interfering with it may be open to doubt and argument. But the order being

issued interdicting such trade, the work of these little vessels has been excellent. That it has not been entirely effective is due to the limited number of them available for the work. Their effectiveness is, perhaps, best proven by the condition of real distress which has existed and which still exists in some of the central islands and in the southern provinces of Luzon. The questionable point would be as to the wisdom of beginning an experience with a new people by subjecting them to hardships with no good and sufficient reason for doing so. But no fault lies with the navy in the matter. Their work was to obey orders, and that they have done with commendable judgment and surprising efficiency, considering the number of vessels placed at their disposal.

“The work of the navy in the Sulu waters is worthy of notable credit. Captain Very of the *Castine* watched the important port of Zamboanga for several months as a cat watches a rat-hole. On shore there was an insurgent organization of five or six hundred men in camp, some armed with rifles. The outfit had twenty-five or thirty Nordenfeldt and rapid-fire guns, with ammunition, taken from Spanish gunboats prior to their being gathered up by the Americans, who had purchased them. During those seven months Very and his men were seldom ashore. Seven months on board a ship in southern waters is no pleasant experience.

“The climax of Captain Very’s work came peculiarly. Orders for his relief by the *Manila* had come. The *Manila* was on the ground, rushed down after convoying General Wheaton’s expedition to Lingayen Bay. The *Castine* was ready and about to start northward when Señor Midel appeared with his importunity for the American occupation of the long-watched place. The *Manila* was despatched to Jolo for a military force to occupy the town of Zamboanga, and upon their arrival the place was surrendered to the Americans without a struggle. General Otis was irritated at the course taken by Captain Very and querulously intimated that he had been embarrassed by an unwarrantedly premature step on the part of the navy. The place is in the department of General Bates. At the time of my late visit to Zamboanga, General Bates told me, in terms of the highest commendation, of his cordial approval and indorsement of Captain Very’s course and action, not only in the matter of the occupation, but in all that had preceded it during those many and tedious months. The work of both Captain Sperry of the *Yorktown* and Captain Nazro of the *Manila* in those southern waters is to be mentioned in terms of emphatic praise and approval. Trouble was to be had for the asking. Tact and sound judgment were required for its averting. I feel highly honored indeed, when I am made the guest in

quarters and at table of men who, like Bates and Sperry and Very and Nazro, have served their country by exercising a wisdom and a tact that has kept that country thus far from war with a people to whom war is something of a pleasant pastime. To this quartet and to the officers of the Twenty-third United States Infantry is due the addition to the United States of the territory between the fifth and ninth parallels of latitude without a blow and without the loss of a single life. It is an honorable record and its maintenance is something to be hoped for.

“In treating of water operations here some note should be made of the work of a flotilla which does not belong to the navy. It consists of a little collection of gunboats like the *Napindan* and the *Laguna de Bay*. They are officered by army men and ply upon the waters of lakes and rivers. An affair at the town of Paete led to the court-martialing of a couple of lieutenants, but, barring one or two such incidents, the work of this lake and river flotilla has been admirable.”

## XVIII

### *THE PRESENT*

Official reports—Change in the situation—Comparison of incidents of different dates—Reports of correspondents—A serious factor—Unfortunate attitude of American soldiery.

AGAIN and again, during the eighteen months of strife in the Philippines, the reading public has been officially assured that the trouble in the islands would be of brief duration, that it would be over in variously specified periods marked by days, weeks or months. Its ending is now officially asserted as the inevitable result of Filipino despair in the event of Republican success in the Presidential campaign of 1900. The term "despair" is not used; we are told that the "Filipinos will realize the hopelessness of further resistance." At the same time, it is asserted that the "war is over" and that such disturbances as have occurred within recent months are but the work of "bandits" and "robber bands."

There has been a marked change in the military situation on the islands during the twelve months preceding this election; but the change

has been one of scope rather than of character. The arrival of large bodies of reinforcements during the autumn of 1899 has effected a wide extension of the territory occupied by American troops. With two and a half times the number of soldiers that Spain ever had on the islands at any one time,—Spain's strongest force having been twenty-seven thousand in the days of Polavieja,—there has been a more general and more effective military occupation than was ever the experience of Spanish authority. Upon one side it is asserted that this military extension constitutes a gratifying success; upon the other it is charged that it is a marked failure, in that it has engendered and stimulated feelings of hatred and bitterness, the fruitful seed of troubles to come. How much or how little the military situation has changed within recent months is indicated by the following comments bearing different dates. I take the following from a letter of my own:

“MANILA, January 11, 1900.

“From such copies of the local newspapers as happen to lie on my table at the moment, I cull the following in illustration of the many similar incidents that may be looked for during the coming days in the Philippines:

“MURCIA, January 5, 1900.

“The regular train, No. 1, which left Manila at nine o'clock this morning, was laid over here this after-

noon on account of the engine giving out. Consequently an engine was telegraphed for from Bautista to come down and take up the train.

"About five miles south of Bautista the engine ran into two logs of wood that were laid across the track.

"Between Gerona and the Tarlak bridge the train ran into a big bunch of wire that was evidently laid across the track with the intention of getting it entangled in the wheels of the engine, but as they were moving at a low rate of speed no damage was done. At Tarlak the engine was turned around and started to back down to Murcia and hitch on to the waiting train. Some four miles from this place the engine suddenly left the track, the engineer at once reversing the engine. Just then about fifty *insurrectos* began to yell, and started for the engine. The crew, not being armed, did not stop to investigate, but started on a four-mile race for this place. I Company of the Ninth was immediately sent out, but was unable to find any insurgents on account of the darkness. An investigation showed that the insurgents had removed a thirty-foot rail and placed the same across the track near a bridge. The supposition is that they were trying to ditch the regular north-bound train, and, had they succeeded in their plans, the train would have gone into the creek, with a severe loss.

"Last Wednesday a detachment of the Third Cavalry was despatched from San Fernando de la Union by Colonel Wessels to reconnoiter the neighboring mountains. The party consisted of a squad of only ten or twelve men under a sergeant, and when they had gone a few miles into the hills they were suddenly surprised by a mounted body of about forty insurgents, who immediately charged them.

"Without waiting for orders, the squad at once sought safety in flight, seeing the futility of resistance. The men scattered in all directions and the sergeant in command was the first to reach camp, where he reported to the commanding officer. The rest of the men straggled in at different times, and none were injured,



though several did not turn up till next day. The enemy captured three large cavalry-horses and a rifle. Colonel Wessels severely censured the sergeant for not conducting a more orderly retreat, but as yet nothing more has been done with him. He said in explanation that he thought it was about time to look for a better place.

"Sunday evening's train brought to this city the remains of Private Carter of L Company, Twelfth United States Infantry, who was murdered by a prisoner that he was guarding. The guard took the prisoner out to cut a few bamboo poles for the company camp and as neither of the men returned, a search was made, which revealed the fact of the murder.

"It is generally supposed that the prisoner took advantage of the guard's kindness to him and at an unsuspected moment plunged the knife used for cutting bamboo into him.

"When found by his comrades, Private Carter was horribly mutilated. A deep gash on the head is evidence that the guard had not thought it necessary to keep a particularly close watch on his prisoner, as the wound without doubt was caused by the blow that felled him.

"On January 3, while a squad of men from Company D of the Thirty-second Infantry were engaged in repairing a bridge on the road between Dinalupihan and Llana Hermosa, the little party was surprised by a band of insurgent guerrillas. Being outnumbered more than ten to one, there was nothing for the Americans to do but retire as they could. While the squad was engaged with the insurgents, Private Claude Pearson had two fingers of his right hand shot off and Private Charles More was made a prisoner by the insurrectos.

"On Friday morning the loss of thirty-two rifles and seven thousand rounds of ammunition was discovered in the camp of the Ninth Infantry at Tarlak. The guns were in a box and stored in the kitchen of one of the companies, and in the absence of the soldiers at dress-parade were loaded on a bull team by insurgent

agents and carried off. A bull team had been standing near by and when the soldiers returned its absence gave the clue. A thorough scout of the surrounding country was made and a short distance from the town the empty box was found with two rusty old Remingtons inside. No trace of the thieves could be found and a hunt is still in progress. It is thought that the native cook, who was the only person about quarters at the time, had planned the robbery and given the signal. The man was formerly an insurgent sergeant.

“BAUTISTA, January 8, 1900.

“On the afternoon of the 6th instant, Musician Joseph Crispie of Company A, Seventeenth Infantry, disappeared from his command at this place, and diligent search of the surrounding country failed to produce any tidings of his whereabouts until this morning, when his dead body was found on the riverbank about a mile from the town. It is a clear case of murder, the body being horribly mutilated, apparently with a bolo. From the appearance of the corpse it is evident that the dead man made a desperate fight for life before he succumbed.

“The insurrectos are causing more trouble along the Manila and Dagupan Railroad. On Tuesday, while the native train was running from Tarlak to Kapas, it was fired upon. The conductor notified Conductor Bon, who was in charge of the regular train, by cable, of what had happened. The despatch was received at Tarlak and all made preparations to give the insurrectos a warm greeting. When nearing the place designated in the despatch, Engineer Benware slowed the train down and continued to run at a low speed, and reached Kapas without meeting any obstructions whatever. A detachment of soldiers was sent out to disperse the bolomen that were seen along the line.

“ANGELES.

“The outpost Sunday night retreated near the village, expecting an attack. Upward of three hundred native

women left the village Sunday and Monday. Whenever the native women and amigos go away in a hurry, as those of Angeles have done during the past few days, it means an attack by the insurgents soon.

"The insurgents are becoming troublesome along the railroad on the north line. Last Saturday, about midnight, a band of Aggie's adherents attacked the town of Mabalakat. Quite a number were armed with rifles, the rest being bolomen.

"The boys of the Twenty-fifth were not to be caught napping, however, and they gave the midnight marauders a decidedly warm reception. Sunday morning, when the sun peeped over the tops of the bamboos that form a jungle around Mabalakat, several dead insurrectos were found."

Under date of April 19, 1900, the correspondent of the New York "Herald" reported the situation as follows:

I have endeavored to find out the military situation in Luzon and the southern islands as it exists to-day.

The results obtained have been from my own observation in the Camarines, Albay, Leyte, Samar, Mindanao, Cavite, Manila, Tarlak and Pangasinan, and from reliable officers in Tayabas, Laguna, Union, Ilocos, Abra and other northern provinces, as well as in Cebu, Negros and Panay.

I find that the canvass hardly sustains the optimistic reports to be had at headquarters in Manila. In other words, there is still a good deal of fighting going on; there is a wide-spread, almost general hatred of the Americans; there are approximately twenty thousand rifles still in possession of the Filipinos, and there are numberless forces of armed men operating in many districts.

That the insurgent army, as an organized force holding definite limitations of territory and maintaining an

orderly and tangible formation, is broken and disrupted, there is no doubt. Instead of knowing that the enemy holds certain towns and districts and that a fight is necessary to possess those districts, our troops can now plan no movement or expedition with the certainty of making contact with an armed force.

Reports which tell of the presence of large bodies of armed Filipinos in the vicinity of garrison towns frequently are brought in, but when a force of Americans goes out to find them they are gone—that is, if the American force is a strong one.

But let a small body go out and the woods and hills will be found alive with riflemen and bolomen. The Filipino method of warfare has changed from their old, defiant methods to a new and more insidious one, that is as much, if not more, to be feared.

Long before Tarlak was taken, Aguinaldo realized that his troops could not stand against ours. Even a force numerically much stronger could be driven at will by comparatively small American forces. Soon after this discovery, which he seems to have been long in making, he heard that the United States was going to increase the Philippine army to about sixty-five thousand, a force that could annihilate him if he contested its advance or will. He then issued, along in October, a proclamation advising many of his followers to return to their homes, hide their rifles and await a call at some future time. Others of his followers were held under arms and directed to begin a guerrilla warfare in the territory held by the Americans at that time or to be held by them later on.

That proclamation, which was undoubtedly forced by the vigorous campaign inaugurated at the time by Generals MacArthur, Lawton, Wheaton and Young, marked the end of organized resistance on a large scale. It will be remembered that Tarlak was taken without a shot and that our troops occupied in turn all the provinces of the north with fewer than a dozen fights of any consequence. From that time on it became a foot-race after the demoralized bands that were leaving

the Tarlak lowlands. There was no established capital, no machinery of government, no grand army, and half the Cabinet surrendered or were captured.

The insurgents, or robbers, or ladrones, still have between fifteen and twenty thousand rifles. I have no record of the number we have captured, but General Bell, one of the most active and successful officers operating on the islands, admits that he has captured only about four hundred altogether. An official bulletin was once posted in Manila which detailed the surrender of eight hundred arms and men at Bayombon. I have since learned that only forty rifles were really captured, while the general who surrendered stated that there were eight hundred in the province. In all the captures of arms there has been a very small proportion of Mausers. Assuming six thousand to be a very liberal estimate of the rifles we have taken, it is therefore seen that the Filipinos still have nearly twenty thousand in their possession.

Most of the military leaders of the insurgents are still at liberty. Generals Tino, Macabulos, Mascardo and Alejandrino are still in the north, all of them with well-armed forces.

The military situation in Albay is bad, a condition that I believe to have been brought about partly by our own soldiers. When Legaspi was taken a great many bolomen were killed. This was due to the fact that they were in the Filipino trenches and therefore exposed themselves to that danger. There were also a number of hemp-workmen, armed only with wooden hemp-beaters, who were shot down in that mad, exultant carnage that our soldiers indulged in. Some of these were non-combatants and should have kept out of the way. When Albay was taken our outpost fired on everybody who attempted to enter the town. Even natives who were professedly friendly were prevented from returning to their homes. As one American officer said, with an oath, "There are no amigos." Nevertheless this indiscrimination kept all Filipinos out of town and as a result all the people who might other-

wise have been at least passive became violently hostile. There was a reign of terror.

The correspondent goes on to describe conditions in the Camarines and in Cavite and Laguna provinces, and adds:

This sullen indifference is found pretty generally through the towns held by our troops. The people don't like the Americans. We have found many of them who were believed to be honestly friendly, but time has proved that they were simulating. Some of our most promising local presidentes have been found guilty of the rankest treachery toward the Americans. It is doubtful whether they hated the Spaniards as much as they hate the Americans. Between them and the Spaniards there were some instincts and ties in common. Intermarriage was quite frequent. Long association has grafted into the native character many of the habits and likes of the Spaniard. With the American it is different. There is n't an impulse that is common to the two races. We may mean well, but they don't understand our ways. Neither do we understand theirs. When patience and forbearance would be immensely effective, the American methods hurry and irritate the people.

On my return from South Africa I received a personal letter from one of the ablest and best-known correspondents in the Philippines. From it I extract the following:

MANILA, May 22, 1900.

MY DEAR ROBINSON: It is more than doubtful whether this letter ever penetrates to that part of darkest Africa which holds you, wherever it may be, but I will have the conscientious knowledge of a pleasant duty



done in despatching it. The Philippines are still well in hand—apparently in the hands of the devil. The backbone of the insurrection gets itself crushed every week, but as fast as one robber band is put down, there are a dozen more springing up in unexpected corners.

The situation to-day is this: Young reports that Aguinaldo and Tino have collected a considerable army in the north of Benguet and he must have reinforcements to go after them. General J. M. Bell reports that several thousand insurgents are besieging the garrisoned towns in his provinces, Nueva Caceres, Sorsogon, Albay and the Camarines, and that his troops cannot do anything without reinforcements. Samar, Leyte, Marinduque, Masbate are in the same plight. Major Brett reports fighting with the Moros around Cottabatto, who have intrenched themselves in the old Spanish forts and cannot be dislodged without reinforcements, his battalion with two gunboats being insufficient. In northern Mindanao we are also fighting the Visayans and Moros; they killed twelve of our men in a night attack on Iligan. Four Americans killed at Bongao by Moros. One of our garrisons consisting of thirty men in Samar was surrounded five days and twenty of them killed. This evening comes a report of four killed and sixteen wounded at one of our small garrisons in Panay.

The situation in Panay and Cebu is, if possible, worse than a year ago. From every direction come howls for reinforcements and no reinforcements are available unless McKinley sends more troops.

An Associated Press despatch from Manila, dated August 5, 1900, reads as follows:

There has been an increase of insurgent activity during the last three weeks, especially in the way of ambushes and attacks upon small parties. First Lieutenant Alstaetter of the engineer corps, with an escort



of fifteen men, was taken in ambush in the province of Nueva Ecija, Luzon, on August 1, by a large force. The Americans fought until their ammunition was gone, and as they were surrounded there was nothing to do but surrender. One man was killed and three were wounded. General Lacuna, who was in command of the insurgents, returned the wounded with a letter promising to treat the prisoners well.

Lieutenant Bocton Hulesberg was ambushed and killed near Santa Cruz, province of Laguna.

Five men of the Twenty-fourth Infantry were captured at Nueva Ecija, but Sergeant Schmidt of the Twelfth Infantry, with seven men, trailed the captors and killed five.

Captain Lara of the Manila native police was dangerously shot by an unknown assailant yesterday while on the street. He had been effectively enforcing regulations and had made enemies among the Filipinos, some of whom have long threatened vengeance. Lara had been generally accused of gross corruption in office and specific charges were filed against him by an American officer.

Under date of September 19, Major-General MacArthur submitted an official report beginning thus:

MANILA, September 19, 1900.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, WASHINGTON :

Considerable activity throughout Luzon. Fighting reported vicinity Carig and Estella, Isabella province. Insurgents estimated five hundred ; probably much exaggerated, but sufficient force to make trouble in district heretofore quiet. In the Ilocan provinces Samuel B. M. Young (brigadier-general) reports numerous small affairs and has called so emphatically for more force that Kingsbury's squadron, Third Cavalry, and Borden's battalion, Fifth Infantry, have been sent him ; other battalion, Fifth, same destination upon arrival.

Country north Pasig, including all of Bulacan, very

much disturbed and numerous contacts with small parties throughout that district. South of Pasig, including Tayabas province (Luzon), same conditions obtain.

It is upon this sequence of corresponding incidents at different dates that I rest my statement that the military situation in the Philippines has changed in scope but not in character. The more important question of a probable change in character can be no more than a matter of personal view and opinion. Washington authorities and their supporters are emphatic in their assertion of an utter collapse in the event of the reëlection of President McKinley. There are those, at home and in the islands, who hold the opposite opinion. There has appeared what purports to be a translation of a part of a proclamation issued by Aguinaldo on June 30, 1900. It reads as follows:

Let us be constant and enduring in our resistance; we are on our soil, and should this war be unfortunately prolonged, even then let us not despair. Let us go ahead and our happiness will be more profitable. In all times and in all places independence has been won only at great cost. You must bear in mind that the majority of the American people are not deaf to the performance of true justice. . . . Therefore, my fellow-citizens, let us not cease until we have clearly seen what we most ardently desire—our independence.

On September 8, 1900, the following letter was written by Señor Sixto Lopez, a prominent Fili-

pino who arrived in the United States during the closing days of that month. He says:

Aguinaldo's safety and success depend largely on the truly marvelous way in which he conceals his movements and the rapidity with which he moves from place to place. In order to do this successfully you can well understand that every one is not allowed to share his confidence. He was recently for a considerable time within seven miles of Manila. I have the very latest news of him both by letter and by Filipinos who have just arrived in London. They tell me that he is exercising an unparalleled amount of energy, that he enjoys good health and is most hopeful of being able to continue the defense for an indefinite time. His losses in men are always made good from an inexhaustible reserve of men who, owing to insufficiency of arms, are waiting to take the place of those who fall or are taken prisoners. His losses in arms and munitions are made good and added to by frequent captures of small convoys from the American forces. These captures are not reported in America, but that they occur is a fact for which I can vouch. In one province alone there are fifty-four of Aguinaldo's officers mounted on American horses! And many of our soldiers are armed with American rifles. In addition to this we manufacture our own ammunition; we make black powder from materials obtained in Luzon.

In view of this practically inexhaustible supply of men and gradually increasing supply of arms and ammunition, with the nature of the country in our favor, which is so adapted for guerrilla warfare, and with the unrelenting determination of our people to die rather than submit to foreign rule, we are confident of being able to continue the defense for twenty years if necessary, or even a longer period.

The events of the months of August and September, 1900, and the various incidents con-

nected with them, present little ground for hope that Filipino hostility to American military rule is by any means ended. The influence of the election may or may not be determined before these pages reach their readers. One serious factor remains. It lies in that reckless portion of the American army which enlisted for a fight, hopes for fighting and has no hesitation in saying that it does not intend to return without a fight. My very good friend, General Schwan, a man of sound and ripened judgment, recognizes the importance of this factor when he says, *vide* his recent report: "The most serious obstacle in the way of complete pacification of the islands now lies in the mutual distrust between the troops and the inhabitants." General Schwan also introduces the "effect of the election" argument, in which I cannot quite agree with him, and he states this other proposition less flatly than I do. But he recognizes its force.

The Filipinos have learned to hate the American soldier, justly or unjustly, and the American soldier, rightly or wrongly, is disposed to return the feeling in kind. It bodes ill for peace so long as the two are in contact. The enlisted man of the army to-day is not a philanthropist with a broad love for his fellow-men and a desire to help them to higher things. There are few of the soldiers who will not do their utmost, after a fight, to help or to succor a wounded

Filipino, who will not treat a Filipino prisoner with kindness. At all other times a Filipino is generally regarded as an enemy and an enemy is something which should be killed. Many enlisted for the avowed purpose of "killing niggers" and such have neither intent nor desire to return without having done their errand. The enlisted man is not a diplomat and his relations with and attitude toward the people around him are seldom those which tend toward a peaceful settlement of international or inter-racial differences. This has been illustrated in both Cuba and Porto Rico, as well as in the Philippines. It is little to many of our men whether the United States is at peace or at war. The purpose of enlistment is not the civilizing of "niggers," but the shooting of them. That General Otis pronounces the Filipinos, *vide* his recent report, to be "industrious and intelligent," that so many of those who know them best have so much to say in their favor, has little effect upon this class. Their business is to shoot Filipinos, whether they be men or "niggers." This attitude on the part of so many Americans in the islands is full of menace and danger to our peace with the island people.

## XIX

### *THE FUTURE*

The future—The Chinese as a factor—The Chinese worker—  
The Chinese merchant—The social future—The educational future—The religious future—The Filipinos as they are—Evidence of capacity for self-government—The policy needed.

AND now, in closing this volume, I turn to the days that are to come. All futures are mysterious and complex. Into the future of a new life for the Filipino people, whatever may be their government, there enter the many-sided problems which concern all nations. These may be summarized under the heads of the industrial and commercial, the social, the educational, and the religious. Something of what I saw and thought of the first of these has already been presented in these pages. One element needs a further emphasis. On February 6, 1900, I sent to the New York "Evening Post" the following letter on the influence and position of the Chinese in the commercial and industrial future of the Philippines. I see no reason for change or modification of the views therein expressed.

“MANILA, February 6, 1900.

“The Chinaman forms an almost indispensable element in the life of the Philippines. The islands would undoubtedly remain here and life would go on if every Chinaman and every Chinese mestizo were to be deported; but it would be easier to picture the Southern States with the negroes eliminated from the industrial and agricultural life of that section than to picture the life of the Philippines without the Chinaman. I am not wholly sure that it would be a wild statement to say that development in the islands would be impossible without the patient, submissive, industrious Chinaman.

“The history of these people in the Philippines is a long tale of a tenacious struggle against opposing conditions. No one knows just when these relations first began. Chinese trade with the semi-barbarous aborigines probably very greatly antedates Spanish discovery and settlement. Legaspi, the founder of Manila (1571), would appear to have been their first real protector in their traffic here. Prior to that their junks were their warehouses. They sold their wares to the natives if they were the stronger, and were robbed by the natives if the weaker. Legaspi encouraged their trade, afforded them a measure of protection and enabled them to effect a land establishment. In fact, it may be said that the Chinese were the founders of Philippine commerce.



“As they were its founders, so also are they its propagators. Within a score of years of their establishment on the land, their influence and importance were recognized. Within fifty years, the Chinese population, traders and workers all of them, was estimated at over thirty thousand. Their increase became a menace to Spanish domination and various measures were proposed for their restriction. Such steps were not easily to be undertaken, however, as they were even then almost the only merchants and traders, and then, as ever after, they were a source of very considerable revenue to the government. If the government wanted money, it found a way to get some from the Chinaman. He was a tangible proposition, with his wares and merchandise, far more readily accessible than the irresponsible and often vagrant native. Then, as now, Filipino merchants were rare and the trading Spaniard was not much in evidence.

“Their position in the islands has always been a peculiar one. They have been tolerated because of a manifest necessity for their presence, rather than encouraged. Even Legaspi’s encouragement was that of the politician rather than anything else. They have never been really welcome, never popular, always regarded as a thing apart, a sort of necessary evil. Again and again their total expulsion has been considered and about the middle of the eighteenth century it was actually ordered, but the order

was suppressed. The complaint brought against the Chinaman here is the same as that so often heard in the States. He does not form or become an integral part of the social and political organism. He is a kind of commercial parasite or leech. He goes to another country than his own simply to make what money he can out of that country and then return to his own land. He will work cheaply and sell for a narrow margin. His patient industry, his economy and thrift are offensive rather than otherwise to the indolent and improvident native. The Filipino would not do the work that John does, but he clings to an idea that John is his industrial competitor and by working at a cheaper rate is taking the bread out of his mouth. As a consequence John is not approved.

“Throughout the islands the Chinaman is the general trader. His shop is seldom much larger than a dry-goods box, but he crams a lot of merchandise into it. In many sections he is the middleman between the producer and the English or European trading-house. He buys hemp, copra and other products in small lots, often takes them in trade by barter for his wares. He stores his hemp until he has a bale or two, which he may sell direct to the exporter or turn over to a compatriot who deals on a little larger scale than himself. His general transactions are on a small scale, though here and there one finds a Chinaman of very extensive trade rela-

tions and large income. Such men, as a rule, are the gatherers of the small lots picked up by their fellow-countrymen. The Chinese pack-peddler has also been a feature in island life and many of this class have lost both life and pack at the hands of those with whom they sought trade in outlying and isolated sections. In a certain way, John does not seem to have the pluck of a sheep; but he will seek trade at the risk of his life among those that hate him, and the Chinese litter-bearer jogging along in dangerous spots on the firing-line, seemingly indifferent to bullets, is a well-recognized feature in military experience here. This apparent temerity is probably less due to courage or pluck than it is to the fact that the king of terrors is less of a bugaboo to him than to many of greater physical and moral courage. His belief in a blissful immortality seems to be a bit more firmly anchored than that of the average Christian and death is an incident that does not scare him as it does most of us.

“John is a shrewd trader, a clever evader of customs tariffs and an economical merchant; yet he is surprisingly honest in commercial transactions. The type that comes to the Philippines is not the best. The best can usually do well enough at home. From the stocks displayed in the Chinese shops in Manila, in Iloilo, in Jolo, in Zamboanga and in the smaller cities of Luzon and Visaya, one might

readily infer, probably with correctness, that the Philippine trade was chiefly in the hands of a few houses in Hongkong and Singapore. There is a very noticeable sameness in the articles and patterns displayed. The Jolo store might almost as well be in San Fernando or Aparri, and *vice versa*. This may be due, in large measure, to a certain conservativeness on the part of the patrons. Certain colors, certain wares and certain patterns seem to be staple. Fashions do not change, as with us, and the demand is not, like that of 'civilized' people, for novelties simply because they are novelties.

"Perhaps the special interest for Americans in this trade condition lies in the fact of the eminent improbability of the capture of Filipino retail trade from the hands of such competitors. Some day there may and perhaps will be room here for the American merchant. But there is likely to be very little room for the American shopkeeper. There are several large and fairly imposing retail establishments on the Escolta. They serve a certain class of patrons—the better class, of course. But the great bulk of the trade of the people goes to the Chinaman, in Manila and elsewhere. Neither the Hebrew nor the Spaniard, both of them among the shrewdest of traders, has been able to take that trade from him, and the case is almost hopeless, under normal conditions of competition, for the American.

John's expenses are of the smallest. He will sell five dollars' worth of goods a day at a smaller profit and with smaller store expenses, and out of that business will lay up more money than an American could or would on sales of fifty dollars a day.

"The position of the Chinaman in the industrial and agricultural life of the islands is probably one of supreme importance. I am quite disposed to think that the industrial future here depends absolutely upon Chinese labor. I am coming to a belief that the future is hopeless without it. In a way the Filipino is wholly lazy and indolent. In another way he seems industrious. As one goes through the country and sees the Filipino at work in his rice-fields and notes the endless amount of tedious, back-breaking work involved in the cultivation of those thousands and thousands of acres, when one notes the processes of plowing, planting, setting, weeding and gathering and realizes the amount of labor represented and that a vast deal of it is Filipino labor, he can only wonder if this race is so very lazy, after all.

"But rice culture does not involve that continuous day-in-and-day-out, all-the-year-round labor to which the Filipino evidently has a rooted objection. Intermittent labor, done very much when the laborer feels like doing it, for a period of six months in the year, supplies the average of the native peasantry with maintenance for

his family. The Filipinos are far from wholly idle. Even in this land some work is obligatory. Its people are not wholly exempt from the operation of that law which compels the exchange of perspiration for bread. But the labor of the native is desultory, the laborer improvident. *Mañana* obtains, but that is because there is no *mañana*. The average Filipino has no special object in life beyond maintenance for himself and family from day to day.

“Different in aim and purpose as in temperament and tendency, John Chinaman has an object and works for it. He works patiently and persistently. He will work all the time and, if necessary, endless hours a day. He can be counted on for eight hours, for ten hours per day. The Filipino cannot. He employs his time to suit his own ideas, not to suit those of his employer. Almost no reliance is to be placed upon him. That is one of the things we have to teach him. He has to learn that he will be a great deal happier if he will work himself half to death for the sake of getting a lot of things that will not do him a bit of good. He has to learn that life is a flat failure unless he has something better than his neighbors, that life is useless unless spent in moiling and toiling, early and late. Of course it is social heresy, but the more I see of tropical races the more do I wonder if they really have not the best of it, after all.

“But the Chinaman will work and therefore

is of much interest and concern for the prospective investor here. He is the laborer of the region and the only one. He will labor at anything and will usually do his work faithfully and well—at least, he can be made to if rightly handled. He is the worker here now, particularly in the cities and towns, where his life is protected by laws and policemen. In many parts of the rural districts he runs some risk, with no added inducement to do so. Right there lies a dilemma. The sugar-planter, in order to succeed, the hemp-raiser, the tobacco-planter, the indigo- or coffee-raiser, if these industries prove successful here, must have regular and reliable labor. For that, Filipino labor is utterly hopeless. The native might be educated to it in a generation or two, but who is to pay for his education? John is the man and there are enough of him to be had for all the farms, plantations and estates, for all the mills and factories, that will ever be started in the Philippines. But if he be allowed to come here in great numbers the United States will probably stand in the position of an interested participant in a very lively race war between the Mongol and the descendant of the Malay.

“Unless some acceptable channel of industry be found by which the Filipino can support himself along the line of his own ideas, he is quite likely to enter a vigorous and perhaps offensive protest against an undue percentage



of Chinamen in his midst. A problem is introduced which is not to be evaded. If the Chinaman comes there is strong probability of a row. If he does not come the outlook for the investor is not a cheerful one. One needs but to review the past history of the Chinese in the Philippines to realize the force of the former of these propositions. Any business man can see the difficulty, almost hopeless, of essaying production of any kind with a crew of erratic and unreliable laborers. A Chinese exclusion act means an almost insurmountable barrier to industrial activity and progress. An open door to Chinese immigration means danger of very serious political complications."

For the social future of the Filipinos, Americans need feel no special concern. They have their own ideas of society, suited to their temperament and environment. In social morals they are above the average. They are courteous and hospitable, by the evidence of those who know them in times of peace, and even during a time of war many Americans have been the recipients of a kindly hospitality and entertainment at Filipino hands and under Filipino roofs. We may regard their national pastime of cock-fighting as brutal and degrading. We should remember that a number of our American cities, notably in the South, are but recently and incompletely emancipated from the same species

of entertainment. They have their own ways of enjoyment, domestic, social and musical. Those ways suit them and being an adaptable people they will readily make up any existing deficiencies as opportunity may present itself.

In educational departments the Filipino needs little encouragement to avail himself of all that may be opened to him. Already far from being an illiterate people, those whom Professor Worcester has called the "five millions of civilized" Filipinos are eager for greater opportunities for a fuller knowledge. Thus far the church has been their principal instructor; but the educational system of Roman Catholicism is open to many objections from the American point of view, and there is every reason for belief that the Filipinos will display a marked readiness to adopt a broader and more American system if conditions make such an adoption a possibility.

The religious question has already been treated in another chapter here. With no desire save to treat the matter honestly and in the spirit of the broadest toleration for those both of Roman Catholic and Protestant connection, I repeat my conviction that the future permanent peace of the Philippine Islands depends chiefly, if not wholly, upon a happy solution of the now vexed and tangled religious question. The demand of the Filipino people, repeated again and again in their past and, I believe, dominating all others to-day, is for the establish-

ment among them of secular priests, preferably of the Roman Catholic Church, the incumbents to be chosen from among their own people. I go so far as to assert my belief that for every such priest, acceptable to the people, duly installed, an American garrison may be withdrawn.

The following letter was written on September 27, 1899, more than a year ago. In using it here, I have made no changes save those of tense and one or two alterations in matters of minor detail corrected by fuller information. It lacks the weight of official assertions, covering a period of eighteen months, that the war would see a speedy ending and a ready establishment of peace and peaceful industry. But events have more fully justified the views of this correspondence than they have the general tenor of official assertions. I shall feel that my work has not been fruitless if this volume shall establish in the mind of any of its readers a more charitable and kindly feeling toward those little brown people of the distant islands where America has become so unhappily involved, a people struggling and fighting with no mean heroism for an idea, crude and narrow though it may be, of a fuller and freer political and religious life. The letter is as follows:

“MANILA, September 27, 1899.

“I have no wish to represent the Filipinos as being any better or any more able than they

really are. That they are greatly misunderstood by a large class of Americans is plainly shown by comment and expression constantly recurring in newspapers and magazines. This mistaken view, which is held by so many, seems to be based upon statements made and information written by those who have never visited the islands or by those whose observation has been either very brief or very superficial. Much is also due to a biased selection of the most unfavorable comment from the work of competent observers. If one wished to do so, he could find a good bit of evidence even in such a work as Bryce's 'American Commonwealth,' that would represent the American people as a decidedly undesirable lot.

"The serious military mistake has been made of greatly underestimating the fighting strength and ability of the Filipinos. No amount of vilification of Aguinaldo and no amount of sneering at the courage of the Filipinos because they do not stand out in the open to be shot by American soldiers, can do away with the fact that their resistance has lasted for eight [now twenty] months, that the resistance has made imperative an enormous increase in the army sent against it and that it may even necessitate a still further increase in the American army of conflict and occupation. More or less of this military blunder, prolonged by those in authority long after it was seen by others who raised a

warning voice, is due to a general ignorance of the people with whom the United States has had to deal. Out of that ignorance and out of something, too, of a supercilious self-confidence and an idea that a little fellow would always lie down at the feet of a big fellow, or could be made to lie down without much trouble, came the idea which has prolonged this struggle and cost the United States hundreds of lives and millions of dollars.

“As relations between the American and the Philippine people are likely to be maintained for some time to come, whether the war be prolonged or whether it find an early termination, it is eminently desirable that, in the political relations which follow the war, the mistake should be avoided of underestimating the political and social capacity of the Filipinos and the Visayans. These are the two races, or tribes, with which politics will have most to do. They probably represent three quarters of the population of the islands. Perhaps one third of the remainder may be included in the general political proposition. Its representation would be some of the lesser tribes, such as the Ilocos, the Pampangans, the Macabebes and others more or less distinct from Tagal and Visayan, but also more or less affiliated with them and presenting a measure of civilization which would constitute them a political factor. The remainder of the population, represented by the

Moros of the southern islands and by such of the wilder tribes as the Gaddanes, the Negritos, the Igorrotes, the Itavis and others, are a distinctly military problem.

“One contention of the Filipino leaders is that for considerably more than a year from the time when they had the Spaniards practically besieged in Manila, six weeks after the arrival of Admiral Dewey, they administered the affairs of very much the greater part of Luzon and constituted such authority as there was in many of the central islands.

“I cannot feel that it would be wise or right immediately to leave these people to the sole conduct of their own affairs; yet, unless some marked improvement be shown in American methods, there can be little doubt that they would get along by themselves quite as well as with American interference. But there are many who contend that to leave them to themselves would be to yield them up to a general anarchy and the drenching of the islands in the bloodshed of strife among themselves. What would really come, no man can say; but the best authorities and the closest observers set these people down as peaceable and peace-loving rather than bloodthirsty and quarrelsome. That their history has in it much of turbulence and revolt argues for them rather than against them. Their fighting has not been done for the sake of or the love for fighting. It has been their pro-

test against injustice and oppression, the struggle of crude patriots rather than of crude and warlike men. At least, that is the charitable and, probably, the correct view of it.

“Coming to a more tangible and more evident proposition, some notice may be given to the experience of that time during which the Filipinos claim, and quite rightly, to have been administering their own affairs over so large a territory. Has the experience in that territory borne out the idea that Filipino self-government would mean only anarchy and bloodshed? News from outside the American lines has been neither abundant nor reliable. The major portion of what has come has been brought by those whom it is wholly safe to suspect of being actuated by some personal motive. I am inclined to think that too much stock has been taken in that kind of thing. If Señor Don Anybody, or somebody claiming to be Señor Don Anybody, representing himself as the owner of vast properties in some far-distant province and the accredited delegate from his vicinity, arrived with a tale of Filipino oppression and a prayer for American recognition and protection of his property, he was accepted with sympathy and Washington was notified that another province was hungry and thirsty for American rule. El Señor Don may be an honest and truthful emissary from his section, but it is quite an open question whether, on the other hand, he



may not be practically a spy or a shrewd and far-seeing chap with an eye to the main chance who desires to have 'an anchor to windward.' Viewing the whole matter broadly, there is little ground upon which to doubt that the majority of Filipinos would rather be Filipinos than Americans. The amigo is a well-demonstrated humbug in whom the American soldier has neither belief nor confidence.

"That this lack of faith in Filipino-Americanism is justified is evidenced by the frequent transformance of the amigo at work in his rice-field into the insurrecto who fires a gun from the trenches. It is demonstrated by the fact that in the towns and villages where civil government has been established within American lines it is the custom to elect, as president or alcalde, the most ardent Filipino of the place. Many of those so elected have shown their Filipino loyalty, have proved recreant to their professions of fidelity to the United States, and several of them have gone to jail for using their posts in furtherance of their efforts to give 'aid and comfort to the enemy.'

"I have learned of no well-authenticated evidence of anarchy or disturbance within the territory controlled by the Filipino government. Complaints reached Manila from individual planters that insurgent bands appropriated their cattle and their poultry and made levy upon them for financial aid to the Filipino cause.

But that is a condition of war which is by no means unique in the Philippines. While a Filipino army is maintained in the field, other Filipinos continue the production of their staple crops of rice, hemp, tobacco and sugar. Neither Spain nor the United States governed the districts in which these industries went on. They were either in no hands or in Filipino hands. If there was no government, it speaks well for the people as peaceable and orderly citizens. If they recognized and were subject to a Filipino government, that appears to be a fair argument for the strength and wisdom of the administration.

“There is one point which I think is not generally known to the American people, but which is a very strong factor in the question of Filipino self-government, both now and in any future position. In the West Indies the greater number of offices and official positions were filled by Spaniards, either native-born or from the Peninsula. In the Philippines the percentage of available Spaniards for minor positions was vastly less than that shown in the West Indian colonies. The result was that while the more prominent and more profitable offices in the Philippines were filled by Spaniards, many of the minor offices in the larger cities and most of those in the country were held by Filipinos. Therefore, when the Filipino party assumed the government for those districts which the Span-

iards evacuated, the Filipinos had a system of government in which Filipinos held most of the positions, already established for their purposes. It was but necessary to change its head and its name. Instead of being dominated by the agents of Alfonso XIII, *por la gracia de Dios Rey católica de España*, the same machinery was set in motion and controlled first by the dictatorial government and then by the Philippine revolutionary government, under the constitution proclaimed on June 23, 1898. This fact simplified matters for the Filipinos and gave them the ground upon which they make their assertion of maintaining a successful administration in those provinces which they occupied.

“The great danger in absolute self-government for the Filipino is in the lack of a balance-wheel among aspiring leaders. That may well be the function of the United States. Protection from other powers they must have. For that the United States is now almost irretrievably pledged. Protection against disorder arising out of struggle for leadership is also a work to which the United States is morally committed. A tactful hand for guidance and restraint is the special need of the Filipinos until the now untried and half-broken political colt shall become settled in the traces and accustomed to his work.

“The great danger in American interference in Filipino affairs lies in the idea that American ways are best and right, and regardless of estab-

lished habit, custom and belief, those ways must be accepted by any and all people who live under the American flag. We assert a glorious American liberty and insist that all shall live by American standards. The American mind lacks elasticity. It has become hidebound and makes no allowance for people whom it does not know and for conditions which it does not understand. The little Porto Rican toddler makes mud-pies and rolls in the sunshine, naked but innocent. That is declared immodest and indecent and the little beggars must wear petticoats and pinafores. My own direct ancestors left their homes in Scrooby, England, went to Leyden and from there to Massachusetts, to find 'freedom to worship God' in their own way. Descendants of Pilgrim and Puritan and Huguenot, of Scotch Presbyterians and of the followers of Charles Wesley, have said to Porto Rican and to Cuban, and will say to Filipino, Visayan and Moro, that the Puritan Sabbath shall be their Sabbath. The menace to the success of American colonial administration lies in the strong probability that American authority will too strenuously seek to force upon unwilling people standards of life and conduct which are none too rigorously observed at home.

"There have been protests against the toleration of a Mohammedan sultan to rule over the Moros of Sulu and Mindanao. Hands are raised

in horror that there should be any perpetuation of those forms of polygamy and slavery which exist in the sultan's territory. When those questions are too closely touched in that country, the people of America may look to see the uprising of thousands upon thousands of fierce fighting-men to whom death is no more a terror than is sleep to us. Their weapons will be the barong, the kris, the spear and the shield, but their method of fighting will not be that of the Filipino who runs from his trenches and maintains a dragging guerrilla warfare. It will be more that of 'Fuzzy-wuzzy' with his 'come in the Sudan.' The Moro will prove to be 'a pore benighted 'eathen, but a fust-class fightin'-man.'

"The United States now has these propositions before it. There seems to be no clear way to any complete withdrawal which shall be consistent with right, honor and justice. The mistake has been made, the 'day of grace' sinned away.' Nothing is now left save to retrieve the mistakes of the past as far as that can be done, by the realization of such powers and possibilities as these people do possess, and the utilization of those powers and possibilities instead of their suppression. This must be accompanied by a policy, broad, tolerant and charitable, which shall recognize and take into consideration facts of difference in race, character, training and environment. Cuba, Porto Rico and Hawaii bear about the same relation to the Philippine

question that  $2 \times 2 = 4$  bears to the stiffest proposition in Euclid. America has plenty of men capable of doing the work that is to be done, but they are not of the type which secures appointment by reason of the number of votes controlled in an election."







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
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